


## How to Read (Anything as) Art

by Kari Jormakka



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Alberti defines beauty in architecture as a state of harmony in so much as that any change in the building would be for the worse. Yet, it is hard to believe that any physical object can ever become so perfect. Hence, Alberti seems to leave us with only two alternatives; either there can never be beauty in architecture, or else architectural masterpieces and other works of art are not material things at all, but rather belong to a world of Greek necessity, inhabited by gods and, if Freud is right, dreams as well. Through a discussion of architectural criticism, I try to show how works of art are constituted in interpretation as perfect artifacts in such a way that Alberti's vision is both possible and inevitable.<sup>1</sup>

**I**N NOTRE DAME DE PARIS, Victor Hugo claims that architecture was the primary medium of communication before Gutenberg because a building was more accessible and resistant to the ravages of time than a precarious manuscript. "To destroy the written word there is need only of a torch and a Turk. To destroy the constructed word there is need of a social revolution, a terrestrial upheaval."<sup>2</sup>

To elaborate his linguistic analogy, Hugo describes architecture as writing, the structure of which is similar to that of ordinary language. He claims that architecture was first an alphabet: an upright stone was a letter, and each letter was a hieroglyph, and on every hieroglyph rested a group of ideas, like the capital on the column. Words were constructed when stone was laid upon stone; the Celtic dolmen and crom-


lech, the Etruscan tumulus, the Hebrew galgal, are words. The temple of stones at Karnac is a complete sentence. "Last of all," Hugo writes, "they made books. – to the dictation of the prevailing idea of the epoch, they had written these marvellous books which are equally marvellous edifices: the Pagoda of Eklinga, the Pyramids of Egypt, and the Temple of Solomon. – Solomon's temple, for example, was not simply the cover of the sacred book, it was the sacred book itself. On each of its concentric enclosures the priest might read the Word translated and made manifest to the eye –. – Thus, during the first six thousand years of the world – from the most immemorial temple of Hindustan to the Cathedral at Cologne – architecture has been the great manuscript of the human race. And this is true to such a degree, that not only every religious




A menhir,  
an architectural letter.



A dolmen, an architectural word.



The Temple  
of Solomon.  
An architectural  
book. From  
Fischer von  
Erlach, *Entwurf  
einer Historischen Archi-  
tektur*, 1721.



The temple  
complex at  
Kamak, an  
architectural  
sentence.


symbol, but every human thought has its page and its memorial in that vast book.”

In addition to articulating the structural analogy between language and architecture, Hugo attempted to read the meanings of architectural sentences. Written in architecture, he discerns “the law of freedom”: every civilization starts with theocracy and ends with democracy. For example, the Romanesque period is a new beginning after the fall of Rome and therefore a theocracy. Hence, everything in the Romanesque style “represents authority, unity, the imperturbable, the absolute, Gregory VII; always the priest, never the man: everywhere the caste, never the people.” The Gothic age is quite the opposite: the pointed arch of the Gothic style symbolizes the new freedom of the bourgeoisie. The Gothic cathedral bids “farewell to


mystery, to myth, to rule. Here fantasy and caprice are a law unto themselves. – The four walls belong to the artist. The stone book belongs no more to the priest, to religion, to Rome, but to imagination, to poetry, to the people.”<sup>3</sup>

### Reading vs. projection


For the purposes of this paper, we need not decide how accurate Hugo’s interpretations are but some of his strategic moves merit attention. If architecture has the same structure as ordinary language, one would expect they are read in the same way. Yet, Hugo’s example of deciphering the meaning of architectural sentences is not how we usually read. Typically, we somehow identify the language of the text, and then decode the message accordingly to determine what the text says. Instead, Hugo already knows, be-



Authority.  
Ruins of the  
abbey church  
of Notre-Dame,  
Jumièges,  
ca 1050.




The people. Notre-Dame de Paris during the Fête  
de Libération of 1830. From Texier, *Tableaux de  
Paris, 1852-1853.*



*Manifestatio.*  
Villard de Honnecourt,  
detail of the interior  
elevation of Reims  
Cathedral, 1235.

*Concordantia.*  
St. Nicaise  
(destroyed),  
Reims,  
ca.1230-1263.



fore starting to read, what the meaning of each sentence is: what he wants to do is to determine how the meaning is embodied the architecture. In other words, he wants to determine the code on the basis of the meaning.

Though this may not sound like reading at all, one should not dismiss the idea too easily for it characterizes the best of art and architectural criticism. Consider Erwin Panofsky's interpretation of Gothic architecture as parallel to scholastic philosophy.<sup>4</sup> Having postulated *manifestatio*, or clarification, and *concordantia*, or reconciliation of opposites, as the two principles characteristic of scholasticism, he points out analogical features of Gothic cathedrals. The panoply of clearly articulated shafts, ribs, buttresses, tracery, pinnacles, and crockets in a cathedral is for Panofsky a self-analysis and

explication of architecture just as the apparatus of parts, distinctions, questions, and articles in scholastic *Summae* is a self-analysis of reason. The dialogue of reason and faith in philosophy and the integration of the rose window into the system of pointed arches in a cathedral are his illustrations of the acceptance of contradictions. To make the analogy between philosophy and architecture plausible, however, Panofsky has to ignore many features of Gothic architecture which other historians emphasize, such as the dematerialization of stone, the mystical, colored light which pervades the church; and the exaggerated verticality of the space. Surprisingly, the great iconologist overlooks iconography, as well, both the elaborate Christian symbolism as well as the more general metaphorical representation of a forest or a mountain.<sup>5</sup>

Still, it is not the idiosyncratic focus which is most remarkable in Panofsky's reading but its utter banality. Two centuries after Vico's *Scienza nuova* it was not the least bit original or provocative to indicate similarities in Gothic philosophy and architecture. Then again, the problem facing an art critic is not to make original readings or discover unexpected meanings but to show how a few plausible meanings are embodied in the particular work and to determine which elements are the bearers of a preconceived meaning.

### The exegetical model

In this sense, Panofsky's reading can be viewed as a projection of a pattern of meaning on the object of interpretation.<sup>6</sup> The strategy is appropriated from exegetics which uses projection for two reasons. Firstly, the universe is a projection of God's essence. Since *omne agens agit simile sibi*, as Thomas Aquinas likes to insist, every effect necessarily bears a relation of likeness to its cause and, conversely, exemplarity is an essential property of the efficient cause. God the Creator being the primary efficient cause of the universe, He will have impressed His stamp of similarity upon every being.<sup>7</sup> Secondly, the universe and the Bible have the same meaning. God has given humanity not one but two books, the Bible and the Book of Nature. Yet their meanings are identical for God is not *diglossos* or forked-tongued, saying one thing here and another there.<sup>8</sup> When confronted with an obscure Biblical passage, a meaningless object, or an absurd historical event, an interpreter may then safely assume that it also contains a translation of God's unitary message.

While there is a certain logic to exegetics, it is not self-evident that a projective reading of an artwork were legitimate once we refuse to take works of art as the self-expressions or projections of a divine being. We can, of course, postulate other supernatural subjects, such as the spirit of the times. The *Zeitgeist* theory is nothing but a secularized version of exegetics; it also fixes the meaning of every phenomenon in ad-

vance. Heinrich Wölfflin insisted that to explain a style cannot mean anything else but "to insert it into the general history of the age according to its expression; to demonstrate that in a language of their own, the forms of a style say nothing else than the other organs of the age."<sup>9</sup> Analogously to an exegete, the Wölfflinian critic wants to show how a style expresses a meaning which is determined from other sources. If we could accept the *Zeitgeist* theory the projective method would then be justified but collective subjects, such as the spirit of the times, are notoriously problematic philosophically.

Fortunately, there are other ways to legitimize art critical projection. Consider exegetics again. An exegete attempts to show how an obscure passage in the Bible can be understood as an expression of a basic religious tenet, and a theologian wants to demonstrate how even apparently senseless suffering is an essential part of God's redemption scheme. They situate the texts or events to be interpreted in a field of religious meanings in order to reach a religious understanding, as opposed to a historical or scientific one. In the same way, a projective reading of an object as an artwork relates it to meanings and values that belong to the internal discourse of art history.

### Art criticism as projection

An artistic interpretation must present the object as a work of art. In other words, the work as interpreted must display properties we expect of artworks. The interpretation of an artwork is, then, a projection of an idealized artwork onto the object. This implies that we can read philosophical speculations on the nature of art as norms of interpretation rather than descriptions of objects.

Though attempts at general definitions of art have consistently failed, there remains a surprisingly wide consensus among philosophers from Aristotle to Arthur C. Danto and critics from Winckelmann to Clement Greenberg on what good works of art are like. They are characterized by "aboutness"; i. e. they have something

to say, usually something of profundity and relevance to all humankind. *Originality* is another commonly accepted characteristic of works of art; Danto claims that it is analytical to the concept of an artwork that it be original. Many critics and philosophers would further agree with George Dickie's claim that *artifactuality* is a necessary property of all works of art and that *unity* is a property all works have in common. Related to the concept of unity is another characteristic which modernist critics typically take for granted; it could be called *total determination*. For example, W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley state as axiomatic that in a poem, "all or most of what is said or implied is relevant; what is irrelevant has been excluded, like lumps from pudding and 'bugs' from machinery." In a similar manner, Rudolf Arnheim declares that "things which have no significance have no place in a work of art," while Danto takes it "as categorical with Warhol that there are no accidents."<sup>10</sup>

If these properties are characteristic of art, then a reading of an object as an artwork must be able to articulate similar characteristics, or else the object does not embody an artwork. Surveying actual art criticism, I find it to be the rule that of two competing interpretations of a material thing as a work of art that reading is preferred which better satisfies the following four conditions:

1. *Artifactuality: all the aspects of the object which are included in the reading can be attributed to the direct intentional causation of a human author.*
2. *Unity: all such aspects can be explained from one principle which the author can have intended.*
3. *Meaning: the principle (and consequently the aspects) have meanings relevant to the 'human predicament' directly or via other works of art which have such relevance.*
4. *Uniqueness: the aspects suffice to individuate the work as a particular.*

The work is identified as the conglomerate of such aspects of the material thing; thus constitu-

ted the work will have the characteristics of art and, actually, be art. Most often, the object to be interpreted is a material thing but it can also be constituted in another kind of interpretation. However, it is here assumed that the material thing is not described in a reductive physicalist or perceptualist vocabulary stripped of its historical context or social connotations but that it is a thing as understood in ordinary speech. As opposed to its bearer, a work of art is ontologically open in the sense that its constitution is determined in an artistic interpretation. It is possible to recognize the limits and the elements of the artwork and decide which features the work shares with the bearer only relative to an interpretation.

### **Artifactuality**


The above conditions need some additional elaboration. The artifactuality condition means that only those features of the material bearer are features of the artwork which can have resulted from the artist's actions. Hence, natural phenomena do not qualify as art. We do not read clouds as artworks even though we can read a found object as art. Obviously, no material thing is created *ex nihilo* by human hands; artifactuality is always only partial even in things we would unproblematically classify as artifacts.

What an artist takes as given, is typically not relevant. The flatness of a painting is not an expressive quality because it is dictated by the conventions of painting; the realism in a photograph is not interesting because it follows from the medium. In found objects, there is nothing which the artist directly made in the material thing so that one focuses instead on the intentional act of exhibiting it. In this sense, a reference to the author determines the limits of the aesthetic object as well as its aesthetic qualities; artistic features supervene on decisions which the author could have intended and for which he therefore has to take responsibility.

Still, not every action an artist performs becomes part of the work. Even if the artist actually makes the frame of the painting or mixes



William Blake,  
a page from  
*Songs  
of Innocence*,  
1789.




Hans Arp,  
*According  
to the Laws  
of Chance*.  
Collage, 1916.

the paints the frame or the paint as a substance does not necessarily become artistically relevant – unless they are intended as a part of the work. Typically, if we study a book in terms of binding we are not treating it as literature but as an example of book-making technology. However, in a few cases there is reason to include binding among artistically relevant aspects. William Blake, described by a contemporary as “a new kind of man, wholly original, and in all things,” devised an original method of relief-etching and book design in order to avoid compromising the uniqueness of his offering by more conventional methods of publication.<sup>11</sup> If we deem Blake’s inventions relevant, as we

commonly do, it is by virtue of authorial intentions for there has never been a widely accepted convention of such comprehensive book art before or after him.

### Author

However, the concept of author is itself problematic. There are works of art that challenge traditional notions of authorship: these include Hans Arp’s random collages; Marcel Duchamp’s ready-mades; Laszlo Moholy-Nagy’s *Telephone Paintings* which were executed by anonymous craftsmen following instructions the artist gave over the phone; the collective poems and drawings by the surrealist group Exquisite Corpse; John Cage’s chance music; Harold Cohen’s computer drawings; Sol LeWitt’s mathematical permutations; and Peter Eisenman’s architectural “scalings”. Still, the critic is not disarmed. If the work does not seem a product of an intention (*objets trouvés*, ready-mades, and art produced by aleatory systems or generative algorithms), it only needs to be reassembled by the critic to resemble a paradigmatic case of art, such as a Rembrandt painting: e. g. if chance processes are employed, the description of the work focuses on those aspects which can be attributed to the author, such as the innovative process or the gesture the work embodies. Hence, Ted Cohen




Exquisite Corpse (Greta Knutson, Valentine Hugo, André Breton, Tristan Tzara), *Drawing*, ca 1936.

describes Duchamp's *Bottle Rack* as a gesture artwork because the artist had nothing to do with the materiality of the object, and Nina Hofer interprets Eisenman's *Romeo and Juliet* project as the process which then relates to fractals, simulation, origin, scale, and other contemporary issues.


There are also works which by nature are collective rather than products of a single intention. Usually, even these works will be constituted so that they stand in a conventional relationship to an author's possible intentions. In the analysis of buildings, operas and other collective projects, Western critics typically ignore the collective dimension in favor of reconstituting the work in a way similar to paradigmatic works of art, even if it might in some cases imply discerning several works embedded in each other. Works with a distinctively collective appearance, such as a performance of *Tristan und Isolde*, are in interpretation usually divided into parts: the critic focuses on the composition as Wagner's achievement, the orchestral performance as a work of von Karajan, the *Liebestod* aria as a performance of Martha Mödl. There are many other activities, such as architectural design, and city planning *a fortiori*, which have been sometimes presented as art, even though their products are relatively far from the paradigmatic work of art, and therefore the interpretation requires various constructions.

### Unity

Unity means that everything in the work must ultimately refer back to the same reason for its existence; i. e. only those features can be included in the work which are determined by the same *ergon*. Again, this definition does not determine the *ergon* but excludes certain elements as parts of the work. As Aristotle explains in the *Poetics*, "if the presence or the absence of a thing produces no distinguishable difference, that thing is not a part of the whole."<sup>12</sup> But the principle from which everything should be derived is not predetermined, either: it is chosen so that it explains as many aspects of the mate-



Sol LeWitt, *All Combinations of Arcs from Corners and Sides; Straight, Non-Straight, and Broken Lines*. Wall drawing, 1975.




Peter Eisenman, *Romeo and Juliet*. Scaling, 1986.

rial thing as possible. If everything in a work of art (that can be expected to have been manipulated by the author) is determined and meaningful, then any detail of the material thing can in principle be used in an interpretation. From this follows naturally but not logically the familiar idea that a masterwork always yields new meanings: the meaning of a work cannot be exhausted by any interpretation if in principle everything in its material counterpart is potentially meaningful.

### Meaning

The generic content of art is, according to the classic definition by T. M. Greene, the interpretative expression of various types of perceptual



David Salle, *Tulip Mania of Holland*, Oil on canvas, 1985.

and spiritual universals and the interpretative portrayal of various types of complex human and non-human individuals. In other words, artistic statements can be categorized as religious, social, introspective, or profound in the sense of philosophy of life, or alternatively, as dealing with disciplinary issues.<sup>13</sup> In painting, such issues might include problems of proportion, perspective, and illusionism; in architecture, axiality, spatial sequences, columniation. However pertinent these problems might be to the specificity of the particular art, we often feel that even these technical problems ultimately have some relevance to the human condition.

In Donald Kuspit's view, the critic functions as the mediator for a full-fledged artistic meaning, where such meaning is understood to make the art responsible to world history rather than simply art history. Stanley Fish suggests a number of ways a critic can produce such meaningful interpretations: one can argue that the true subject of the text is its own composition, or that in the guise of fashioning a narrative the speaker is fragmenting and displacing his own anxieties and fears; one can look in the text for evidence of large mythological oppositions; a text can be viewed as an instance of the tension between nature and culture. Three decades earlier, R. S. Crane was even more explicit, remarking that it requires no great insight to find an inner dialectic of order and disorder or a struggle of good and evil forces in any serious plot. He suggested life and death, harmony and strife, order

and disorder, eternity and time, reality and appearance, truth and falsity, certainty and doubt, true insight and false opinion, imagination and intellect, emotion and reason, complexity and simplicity, nature and art, the natural and the supernatural, nature as benign and nature as malignant, man as spirit and man as beast, the needs of society and individual desires, internal states and outward acts, engagement and withdrawal.<sup>14</sup>

### Uniqueness

The requirement that the artwork be unique seems to apply to autographic arts such as painting, where the original is revered, but not to other artforms. Henry van de Velde, for one, insisted on the thousandfold multiplication of his creations.<sup>15</sup> However, given the openness of the concept of artwork, the difficulty is easy to remove. If there can be more than one material counterpart to the artwork then the work of the artist, i. e. the work of art proper is seen as a type which is unique and original, and which can have been directly created by the artist, as suggested by the first condition. Thus, there can be many copies of a novel, many performances of a piece of music, many impressions of a graphic print, many casts of a sculpture, and so on, but the materiality, temporal and spatial location, of these instances or tokens are not properties of the work proper.

### Author in postmodern criticism

Even if the above discussion would apply to some modernist and pre-modern criticism, it is reasonable to expect that postmodern criticism with its rejection of unity, totality and the traditional author operates differently. Disappointingly, however, even post-structuralist critics follow traditional methods of constituting objects of study and aesthetic appreciation. Roland Barthes' seminal essay "From Work to Text" is a striking example. After insisting that Georges Bataille cannot be described as a novelist, a poet, an essayist, an economist, a philosopher, or a mystic, Barthes exclaims: "yet Bataille wrote



Sherrie Levine, *After Walker Evans*, Photograph, 1980.

texts,” and continues, “– even, perhaps, always one and the same text.”

This puzzling aside – “one and *the same* text” – cannot be understood as saying that in his diverse writings Bataille repeated the same text a number of times, for if a text is constituted in an intertextual field, no two texts can be identical; even the identity of a single text – if such an oxymoron is allowed – must be unstable because the field itself is in a state of flux. Therefore, the description “one and the same text” must refer to writings that are linked only by Bataille’s signature which they bear and which separates them from the intertextual. Hence, in spite of his talk against the myth of filiation, Barthes isolates text by the author. Once this is done, it hardly matters if the meanings were anti-authorial allegories of postmodern obsessions. Authorial intention is always already inscribed in the postmodern critical act in its acceptance of the authorial object to be subverted.<sup>16</sup>

But it is not enough for postmodern critics just to draw the limits of the artwork around the author; they also seem to struggle with the post-

modern ideal of openness and prefer to present the object of study rather as a closed unity, where every element is immanently justified, than as an *opera aperta*. While e. g. Paul Smith starts his reading of David Salle’s *Tulip Mania of Holland* by noting its postmodern qualities of deliberate meaninglessness, disjointed incoherence and provocative randomness, it only takes him a few pages to pull together every detail of the work and show that the painting is a rigorous, totally determined unity where everything, including the initially enigmatic title, can be seen as contributing to a single (but appropriately postmodern) theme, “the pornography of looking and – the male desire that underpins what we may call a will to representation.”<sup>17</sup>

Even Sherrie Levine’s programmatic attack on authority and originality is systematically transformed to fit into a traditional paradigm. In flagrant violation of artistic codes and copyright laws, she has rephotographed original prints by Edward Weston, Walker Evans, Eliot Porter, and others. Nevertheless, Douglas Crimp explains that far from being a copyist, Levine is actually making a sophisticated original contribution to the post-modern discourse by pointing out that Weston’s ‘original photographs’ are themselves appropriated images since they are based on the aesthetic ideals of classical sculpture and painting. Other critics restore Levine’s originality by understanding her as commenting on the concept of masculine author in general, or on simulation and reproduction as the condition of contemporary society.<sup>18</sup> Independently of what the artists are trying to do, critics of both postmodern and more traditional persuasion constitute works as the unified and original creations of their authors.

### Summary

In this paper, criticism has been described as the projection of an idealized conception of an artwork onto the object of interpretation. At least the following four conditions are characteristic of the projection: artifactuality, unity, meaningfulness, and uniqueness. This method of inter-

pretation is a variation of the principle of charity, or the idea that a correct interpretation is the one which makes the object as good an artwork as possible.

The notion of intention here propounded can be compared to the critical theory of the Enlightenment authors Christian Wolff and Johann Martin Chladenius. Their idea of intentionality does not refer to a psychological state or personality but to the specific genre of writing an au-


thor has set out to produce: it articulates a category and indicates which aspects of the material bearer are artistically significant aspects of the work of art. The conditions of artifactuality and unity function in the same way as guidelines for reading rather than descriptions of objective conditions. The meaning of the artwork builds upon the other three conditions, and ultimately provides the justification for the work's existence.

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## Notes

1. Leon Battista Alberti, *The Ten Books of Architecture*, tr. Giacomo Leoni, New York: Dover, 1986, VI.2; cf. I.9; II.3; see also Aristotle, *De Poetica* 1451a32–35; *N. E.* 1106b10–15. For Freud's conception of dreams as perfect wholes, consult Sigmund Freud, "Traumdeutung". In *Gesammelte Werke*, London: Imago Publishing, 1942, p. 517.
2. Victor Hugo, *Notre-Dame de Paris*, tr. Jessie Haynes, New York: Heritage Press, 1955, p. 115.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 109–110.
4. Erwin Panofsky, *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism*. New York: Meridian Books, 1958.
5. Panofsky's essay is not good criticism in the original sense of *krinein*, since it cannot make distinctions between different styles and ages: the principles of manifestatio and concordantia apply to too many philosophies and architectures. Not only the scholastics built systems but also Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, etc. Even more common than system-building in philosophy is the geometric organization of the design in architecture. Neither
6. is the reconciliation of opposing ideas specific enough. Aristotelian thought combines the opposites of Heraclitus and Parmenides while Palladio's church façades merge the Roman temple and the house and his villas reconcile the Roman villa with Italian vernacular architecture.
7. For an early conception of art as a projection of the artist, see Georg Wilhelm von Hegel, *Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art*, tr. T. M. Knox, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, vol. 1, p. 31.
8. St. Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.* d2, q2, a3.; *In III Sent.* d2, q1, a3.
9. Henri Crouzel, *Origen*, trans. A. S. Worrell, San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989, p. 70, 77; Gerard Rooney, *Preface to the Bible*, Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1949, p. 74.
10. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Renaissance und Barock*, Basel: Benno Schwabe & Co. Verlag, 1961, p. 64.
11. Arthur C. Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1981, p. 119; Danto, "Art-

- works and Real Things,” reprinted in *Aesthetics Today*, ed. Morris Philipson and Paul J. Gudel, revised edition, New York: New American Library, 1980, p. 333; George Dickie, *Evaluating Art*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988, pp. 164–165; W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” reprinted in Hazard Adams (ed.), *Critical Theory since Plato*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971, p. 1015. Arnheim, Rudolf, *Film as Art*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 50; Danto, Arthur C., “The Abstract Expressionist Coca-Cola Bottle,” *Beyond the Brillo Box*, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1992, p. 134.
11. F. O. Finch, *In Memoriam*, Vol. II. As quoted in Alexander Gilchrist, *The Life of William Blake*, Vol. I, London: McMillan, 1880, p. 343. The first edition of the *Songs of Experience* consisted of 31 color plates on 17 sheets; the order of the pages was not fixed. Working in the space between literature and the visual arts, Blake engraved both the poem and the picture on copperplate. Each print was colored with washes by hand so that no two copies of the book were identical.
  12. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1451 a35.
  13. Theodore Meyer Greene, *Arts and the Art of Criticism*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1940, p. 11–12, 9–10, 369.
  14. Donald Kuspit, “Authoritarian Aesthetics and The Elusive Alternative,” *JAAC* 41, Spring 1983, pp. 271–288; Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980, p. 343; R. S. Crane, *The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp. 123–124.
  15. Quoted in Lucius Burkhardt (ed.) *The Werkbund. History and Ideology. 1907–1933*. Venezia: Gruppo Editoriale Electa, 1977, p. 19.
  16. Barthes, Roland, “From Work to Text,” *Image-Music-Text*, tr. Stephen Heath, New York: Hill and Wang, 1977, 80–81, 75.
  17. Smith, Paul, “‘Salle/Lemieux’: Elements of a Narrative.” *Interpreting Contemporary Art*. Ed. Stephen Bann and William Allen, New York: Harper/Collins, 1991, pp. 143–150.
  18. Crimp, Douglas, “The Photographic Activity of Postmodernism,” *October* 15, Winter 1980, p. 98–99.



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