Jerker Söderlind:

Stadens renässans. Från särhälle till samhälle. Om närhetsprincipen i stadsplaneringen.
SNS Förlag 1998.

Recension av Christina Thunwall

I min anmälan av Johan Rådbergs bok *Drömmen om atlantångaren* för drygt ett år sedan gjorde jag några personliga invändningar mot trädgårdsstaden och antydde att den täta staden skulle fortsätta att attrahera många. En verklig entusiast för den täta staden, *sam*hället där *närhetsprincipen* härskar, är Jerker Söderlind. Han har skrivit en omfångsrik, uppslagsrik, innehållsrik, kritisk, optimistisk, systematisk men också skissartad och överlastad bok om vad som behövs för en stadens renässans. Han slår fast att han inte kommer med något nytt stadsideal. Han vill "visa vägen tillbaka till den stad som i princip varit förbjuden att bygga sedan 1930-talet..." Författarens målgrupp är

politiker, planerare och utbildare på samhällsplaneringens område men han hoppas också bli läst av personer som inte till vardags ägnar sig åt planeringsfrågor.

I bokens inledning ges ett slags övergripande varudeklaration där nyckelbegrepp och använda teorier redovisas liksom de tre perspektiv som genomsyrar framställningen, det ekonomiska, det ekologiska och det kulturella. Framställningen är därefter uppdelad i två avdelningar, en kritisk lägesrapport och en förslagsdel.

Del ett innehåller dels en resonerande lista med tolv utgångspunkter, förutsättningar för stadens återuppbyggnad. Dels kapitel om stadens och rörelsens grammatik liksom om funktionens och trafikens förbannelse. Tio villkor för stadens liv – vart och ett med en utläggning och en slutsats ingår i kapitlet "Stadens grammatik". En av författarens många kungstankar är att åtskillnaden mellan stadsbyggande och trafikplanering varit mycket olycklig; de måste förenas för att staden ska kunna återupprättas.

Del två tar upp spelregler som behövs för stadens renässans och de olika delområden som måste reformeras: politiken, marknaden äganderätten och gatan. Det näst sista kapitlet gäller visioner, framför allt då Boverkets "Sverige

2009". Söderlind anser att den regionförstoring genom utökade snabbtågsförbindelser som förutsätts i Sverige 2009 är tvivelaktig. Visserligen kan befintlig bebyggelse- och ortstruktur bibehållas men transporterna blir orimligt långa och den negativa funktionsuppdelningen kan fortgå. Mitt hem är min borg är rubriken på det allra sista kapitlet som behandlar den moderna stadens privatisering eller som författaren också kallar fenomenet: *stadens balkanisering*. Särkilda sovstäder eller förorter är av ondo. Aktuella tendenser att rika eller miljövänner stänger sig inne i sina egna slutna samhällen är än allvarligare. Blandning av människor är en förutsättning för demokratin. Även om klassamhället består där människor lever under olika sociala och ekonomiska villkor är det viktigt att det offentliga rummet är till för alla. Söderlind exemplifierar med sin egen idéskiss till bostadsområden på Bromma flygplats från 1994 med både goda och mindre goda lägen för hus.

Illustreringen utgörs inte bara av en vitsig helsidesteckning till varje kapitel utan också av lånade bilder (men hur kan man förväxla Ulfarna Frödin och Lundkvist s. 221?) liksom en del foton. Men huvudparten av illustrationerna tecknas i ord. Långa citat ur litteratur och tidskrifter och ofta aktuella fall ur verkligheten ackompanjerar de resonemang som förs. Författaren urskuldar sig för att han har tagit med ännu pågående och alltså inte avgjorda ärenden. Det behöver han inte göra. Aktualiteten ger en fräschör och ett intryck av att skribenten verkligen är insatt i det han behandlar. Han är kunnig, påkopplad, energisk och ambitiös och samtidigt resonabel. Däremot gör strömmen av exempel boken något snårig. Ibland är det svårt att avgöra om det är författaren själv eller någon citerad auktoritet som talar. Citaten återges ibland direkt i texten, ibland avgränsade av vågräta linjer. Emellanåt ges också långa referat. Redigeringen är distinkt på översiktlig nivå med två avdelningar och talande kapitelrubriker men rörig inom kapitlen, särskilt i del två. Systemet med underrubriker är odistinkt. En del upprepningar förekommer, något som författaren själv påpekar. Det är kanske oundvikligt när ett så rikt stoff behandlas; en av bokens kungstankar är ju *integrering*. Korsreferenser ges, vilket underlättar orienteringen.

Det är en levande och övertygande bok med ett beundransvärt försök att ta ett helhetsgrepp på stadens kris och nödvändiga återupprättelse. Boken vimlar av drastiska formuleringar och innehåller många dråpliga bilder. Inledningsvis deklarerar författaren att form- och estetikfrågorna

läggs åt sidan. Detta är en samhällsvetenskaplig skrift som renodlar villkoren för stadens liv och verksamheter. Det är inte formen som skapar en fungerande stad. Funktionalismens stad karaktäriserar han som en byggd analys – lika onjutbar som att serveras en uppsättning ingredienser i stället för den tillredda sockerkakan.

Närhetsprincipen har alltid rått i staden ända till de sista hundra årens explosionsartade kommunikationsutveckling som gjort det möjligt att funktionsuppdela den på ett mycket olyckligt sätt. Tidigare gjorde höga transportkostnader det till en naturlig sak att tränga ihop skilda verksamheter på liten yta. Med spårvagn, bil och buss blev det möjligt att förlägga arbetsplatser, handel, nöjen och bostäder till perifera områden där det fanns gott om billig mark. Billiga och snabba transporter kompenserade för de ökade avstånden.

"Staden är människans främsta gemensamma projekt" fastslår Söderlind övertygande. Han ser hur det är och vad som är fel. Säger någonstans att det behövs stora och kontinuerliga insatser för att ta hand om det som redan är byggt. Men vad ska ske med den enorma byggnadsmassa och infrastruktur som kommit till under de senaste femtio årens icke-stadsbyggande. Den kan fläckvis anpassas till andra förutsättningar. Men jag har svårt att tro att de stora enheterna och den storskaliga ägarstrukturen ska kunna påverkas av en aldrig så god stadsplanering med integrerad trafikplanering. Halvdana kompromisser får nog de flesta leva i under århundraden framöver. Tankens kraft är viktig men den räcker inte hur långt som helst. En förhoppning är naturligtvis att det som kommer till ska formas av nygamla tankar mer i samklang med den traditionellastaden, staden-före-bilen.

Över 300 sidor av furiöst flöde präglade av klarsynthet, insiktsfullhet, nyanser, en resonerande både-och inställning. Mot slutet av boken är energin inte lika sprakande. Som i denna bildtext: "Frank Lloyd Wrights vision, Broadacre City, håller på att förverkligas. Skattesubventioner av transporter och ekologisk stadsfientlighet drar åt samma håll." Slutmeningen lyder lite uppgivet: "Måste vägen till framtiden nödvändigtvis vara en transportsträcka?" Den bedövande framgången för "icke-staden", såväl på marken som i föreställningsvärlden är en mäktig motståndare. *Stadens renässans* ger argument och exempel som var och en som vill verka för den täta, integrerade staden kan ha användning av. Jerker Söderlinds arbete är en stimulerande men litet för tjock debattbok i hårda pärmar.

Kaj Nyman:

Talojen kieli

Rakennusalan Kustantajat RAK, Kustantajat Sarmala Oy, Helsinki 1998

Recenserad av Raine Mäntysalo

Although professor Kaj Nyman is a Finn, his architectural philosophy is probably better known in other Scandinavian countries than in Finland, because his doctoral thesis *Husens språk* was written in Swedish. Soon after the publication of his thesis (1989) Nyman started to write a Finnish translation of his book. Finally, after nine years, we have *Talojen kieli* in our hands. But although the title of his new book is a Finnish translation of *Husens språk*, it would be a drastic understatement to call the book itself just a translation of the text he created a decade ago. *Talojen kieli* is a new distinct landmark in the continuing evolution of Nyman's architectural philosophy. It also presents his ideas about architecture in a more clarified and compact form than its predecessor *Husens språk*.

The core of Nyman's message, as well as his theoretical approach, is still the same. Nyman maintains that present architecture, which continues to follow the ideology of functionalism, has separated itself from the human use of built environments, which for its part is based on deep archetypal habits and intentions. Architects have lost their ability to communicate using the "language of buildings" and have created their own "architects' language", which fits seamlessly to the prevalent capitalist culture. Nyman holds that architects' moral responsibility is to give up their present position as instruments of societal power. Instead they should see themselves as instruments of human spatial experience; giving spatial expression to our deep emotional intentions. This is possible, if architects take their place as artists again. For Nyman art means *form-giving*: the creative restoration of wholeness in human condition – bridging the gap between unconscious intention and counscious expression, between heart and mind, body and soul.

Nyman builds his theory upon the Chomskyan hypothesis of the deep structure of language that forms the shared root of all languages. This conception of language is com-

bined with Jung's theory of archetypes, and thus the archetypes as structuring principles are seen as linguistic structures. By drawing from Lacan's combination of semiotics and psychoanalysis Nyman is able to give formal and methodological clarity to his theoretical approach.

Nyman's architectural philosophy

For Nyman architecture is a nonverbal language that everyone can communicate. Architecture is built "text" which we "read" with our bodies. Our bodily emotions reveal, whether the environmental text is "understood" and whether this text deserves to be called architecture. Nyman claims that basically we all have the same bodily intentions when it comes to our relationship with our environment. As any other living organism a human being's primary intention is to survive, and everything which contributes to our survival arouses positive emotions within us. Architecture is about such built environments that "match" with our bodily intentions and thus about built environments where we feel at ease, safe, attachment, not the least erotic emotions. For Nyman architectural experience is therefore not an experience that is derived intellectually, or via aesthetic education and knowledge. Architecture should be 'rakennus*taide*' ('byggnads*konst*' in Swedish, the '*art* of building' in English), the "judge" of which are our bodily emotions.

Almost categorically it is the traditional built milieus that arouse positive emotions, and the modern ones that do not, according to Nyman. His explanation for this is that modern architects have lost the primordial language of architecture. Nyman calls this language the "language of buildings". As conscious subjects we are "spoken" with the language of our unconscious bodies. It is a *natural* condition of our bodies that they are "housed". For 10'000 generations Homo Sapiens has arranged his/her relationship to the environment by building. Nyman maintains that it is fully imaginable that to some extent our natural ways to build our habitats may even be genetically coded. The deepest meanings of the language of buildings are objectively shared among people in different cultures, because they are based on archetypes that have their root in the prehistory of our species. If I understand Nyman correctly, these archetypes have to do with *elementary differences in our spatial existence*; such as inside-outside, together-alone, moving-stopping, narrow-wide, near-far, home-away, safe-

unsafe, etc. Modern architecture has systematically attempted to violate the experience of these differences: outside flows into the inside and vice versa; streets and courtyards merge into huge open spaces; home is an apartment amongst dozens of identical apartments.

Why is that? Why are architects so reluctant to the messages of our bodily sensations? Nyman's explanation is that architects have adopted the ideology of our prevalent culture that is based on enlightened reason and capitalism. Architects are no longer sensitive to the concrete code of our bodily emotions, but – like the rest of the modern society – are receptive to highly abstracted codes, such as number and money. According to Nyman, the values of the capitalist culture are "inbuilt" in architects' expert language. The politicians do not have to understand what architects communicate, because capitalism is inherent in all architects' messages. Therefore architects inevitably serve the politicians' primary ends. When Nyman talks about architects' language, he could as well refer to the 'language of capitalism'.

Architects communicate through their designs and through the buildings that are made according to their designs. By deciding what to communicate architects also choose the context against which their messages are to be given meaning. For Nyman this is basically a choice between two contexts: the context of capitalism and reason, and the context of use. In broad terms use means everyday life in the built environment that the built environment, by its "fit" to natural human spatiality, affords to become habituated. Being "fit" for use, a building becomes "embodied" as a part of the user's spatial existence and, at the same time, becomes an expression of his/her existence. This is architecture: the art of building by which the user's spatial existence is given form. According to Nyman, architects' choice of context is a deeply moral choice. The architect may choose to express the intentions of the users of his/her buildings; or s/he may ignore them, which means choosing to obey the politicians' and developers' intentions instead. By choosing the context of use the architect chooses the realm where art and ethics unite.

Is it a language?

For Nyman architecture is a language of the human body. It is a nonverbal language for expressing meanings that are related to our bodies in a similar way that verbal language expresses social meanings. Its code can be approached only via our emotional experiences, and it is therefore hidden from our intellect.

Nyman's conception of architectural language is somewhat similar to Christopher Alexander's. Also Alexander's theory of pattern language (1977, 1979) is based on the Chomskyan idea of the deep, timeless structure of language that is shared by every human being. Both also share the admiration for traditionally built environments. The difference, however, is that while Alexander sets out to define the general grammar of patterned human behaviour in built spaces, Nyman thinks that such a task would be impossible to carry out. The creativity of expression that makes the language alive – although timeless – would be lost by offering grammatically "correct" models of expression, as Alexander does. Both Nyman and Alexander see architecture as a language that is based on objective archetypes, but while Alexander thinks that these could be objectively expressed in the built space as well, Nyman thinks that expressions of our objective intentions are necessarily mediated by our subjectivity. The sameness within us is continuously seeking new and unique expressions in order to stay alive. For Nyman the poetry of architecture is that we find ever new expressions of our timeless and objective intentions in our use of the built environment. The form changes in order to stay the same.

In this I agree with Nyman, but on certain other accounts I find such a conception of language problematic. Nyman's language of buildings is a language that is about creating expressions of intentions but not about creating intentions themselves. Archetypal intentions are not created in our social cooperation – they are already there within each individual 'body'. They are "naturalized" social intentions. What is left for mutual communication among people when intentions are already shared? In principle, archetypal language means that communication with others is not needed. My own "objective" body provides the answers to my questions. My communication becomes auto-communication (see Järvinen 1992: 176–78) where my expressions mirror my own unconsciousness. The idea of private language creeps in. As a counterargument it may be claimed that it cannot be a private language, because I share the archetypal intentions of my unconsciousness with other

people. But this sharing of my intentions is not a result of my communication with them – I share them already *before* I communicate with them. On the other hand Nyman states that one's archetypal intentions are given a stable form through signification – through an expression of which one gains consciousness (pages 16–17). To me private consciousness is inconceivable. I cannot achieve consciousness of my bodily intentions by just expressing them to myself; instead this consciousness is a result of my communication with my social environment.

According to Järvilehto (1995: 107) consciousness was formed when our social cooperation gradually developed more and more complex forms, until it was necessary for individuals to anticipate and report their intentions to each other. Language was a reflection of our will to achieve better control of our environment. We began to strive for such higher goals that could be reached only by fitting together separate person-related tasks as sub-goals of these common goals. Language brought us the opportunity to objectify, not only the things that surround us, but also ourselves in terms of social *roles*: "First *I* do this, and then *you* do that". Similarly for Mead (1962: 122) language is the means by which individuals can indicate to one another what their responses to objects will be. My claim is that forms of social cooperation where role-formation and self-identification take place are not archetypal by their nature. Archetypal intentions are not social intentions in this sense – although it may be so that archetypal intentions provide the necessary social preunderstanding to enable the emergence of social intentions. With social intentions I mean intentions that are created by combining individual acts into more complex social activities that constitute common ends.

In Lacan's words, Nyman's language of buildings cannot be Imaginary. This is how Nyman wants it. It is the *architects' language* that is Imaginary – and nothing else. Architects' language is a language that has lost its connection to the Symbolic and to the Real. My assertion, however, is that what signifies language is its ability to reach all three Lacanian levels – the Real, the Symbolic *and* the Imaginary. Only such architectural communication that has an inherent capacity – for better or for worse – to develop into architects' language, is a language. It follows that for me the language of buildings and architects' language are not two separate languages. Rather the case is that architects' language,

as Nyman describes it, is an unhappy condition of the language of buildings. I can try to reformulate this in such a way that perhaps could be agreeable also to Nyman: *it is the separation of architects' language from the language of buildings that is the unhappy condition of the latter*. Architecture needs architects in order to be a language in a structural and systemic sense. Here I am not trying to glorify the role of architects; instead I am saying that it is the *emergence of the role* of architects that makes architecture a language. The problem of architecture is not that there are architects in general, but that there are architects that, through their communication, maintain the separation of architects' language from the language of buildings.

A mature language produces differentiations of roles in relation to its use, and thus it creates new forms of social cooperation. Hence it also creates new socially shared intentions of how to build and live – socially – in our built environments. Archetypal intentions enable our ongoing creation of new social intentions – and, as I see it, only such communication which involves this kind of creativity is linguistic communication in its fullest sense.

I wouldn't call 'language' such communication that merely expresses the structuring principles of archetypes. For me it is not *yet* a language. By building a nest a wagtail expresses the structuring principles of its archetypes. If we extended the use of the word 'language' to denote this kind of organized behaviour, we could no longer use the concept to signify human-specific communication from the communication modes of other organisms. Probably this is just what Nyman intends to do – to underline the view of natural human communication as not particularly different from animal communication. In a sense this discussion is about whether we should use the concept 'language' to denote the similarity of human communication with the communication modes of other organisms; or whether we should use it to denote the distinctiveness of human communication. Both uses of the word are possible. At lower levels of organization human communication is similar to animal communication; but, on the other hand, human communication can also reach such higher levels of organization that are beyond the cognitive capabilities of other animals. These higher levels involve self-identification in terms of social roles and such highly abstract media as money. (Mead 1962.) For me language means the kind of communication

that can reach all humanly possible leves of organized behaviour (Mäntysalo 1997). This does not mean that it would have to be verbal. But there are others who have a different view of language. For Habermas (1987: 154), for example, money is a "delinguistified" medium of human communication. Lacan, for his part, associated the order of language with the Symbolic, not with the Imaginary (Sarup 1992: 103–05). To some extent this discussion correlates with the broad debate (held especially in connection to Habermas's social theory) of whether power should be considered as separate from language or not.

But can we trust our unconsciousness?

Unconscious behaviour means economy of thought and of consciousness (Bateson 1987: 136–37). It has to do with behaving on which we do not have to focus our awareness. All habits are economic in this sense. Archetypes are good habits; habits that make the continuation of human life possible. This follows from the simple observation that only good habits may last so long as to assume an archetypal character. But there are also bad habits, the most severe of which is capitalism.

According to Nyman, archetypal habits that enable our mutual preunderstanding are *trustworthy*. They provide the very base for the construction of our social world and thus we cannot doubt them. Archetypal codes are trustworthy – but *can we trust that it is these that we shall find in our unconsciousness?* Here I am not questioning the existence of archetypes. Although I am not particularly fond of the concept 'archetype', it is quite natural for me to assume that at the deepest levels our relationship to our environment is biologically structured. But the point is that unconsciousness is not about archetypes alone – it is about habits in general, good *and* bad. How can we select the good habits from the bad ones? Clearly not by just relying on our unconsciousness.

Necessarily a great deal of our unconscious "material" has to do with habits we acquire by living in our modern societies and modern environments. I believe that many architects get *real* aesthetic enjoyment from Mies van der Rohe's and Philip Johnson's Seagram building, although it is certainly not a building Nyman would use as an example of good architecture. Why is that? The reason is that architects have grown into a specific subculture, and for them this subculture has become an unconscious context that guides their behaviour,

more or less. A majority of architects have learnt to enjoy modern architecture, which means that for them the aesthetic experience of modern architecture is no longer an intellectual exercise. To some extent, at least, this must also happen to those that have spent much of their life (especially their childhood) in modern environments. Woody Allen and Mark Rothko have claimed that for them Manhattan is the only place they could feel at home. What should we think of such arguments? What is archetypal in Manhattan?

Nyman acknowledges that the architect cannot rely on pure introspection – i.e. on autocommunicative expression of his/her unconscious intentions. Unconscious intentions cannot be trusted, because we cannot be sure, whether they are archetypal or not. Communication with the user is needed in order to secure that what is relevant for the architect is also relevant for the user. Can the architect trust the user, then?

What are the users' intentions? Are they any "purer" than architects' intentions? Aren't the users the children of modern society, too – biased by the division of labour, obsessed by consumerism, lost in the labyrinth of popular culture? Who are the users anyway? The public?

It seems that with users Nyman means those that relate to their built environment mainly in terms of its use value. Politicians, developers and investors can be seen as another group who are motivated by the exchange value of the built environment. I would consider neither of them as a social class *a priori*, but as social units that emerge as objects of analysis only to the extent they are identifiable via the distinction use value/exchange value in reference to the built environment. Users are those who in their everyday life do not approach their built environments with the attitude of buying and selling and profit-making. And then there are those who make a career out of buying and selling land and buildings; and those who make a career out of "buying and selling" authority over development decisions. The modern society poses a threat to architecture as a practical art. But the threat is not that it provides conditions for the emergence of exchange values from use values – the threat is that it gives exchange values the hegemony over use values.

The moral choice for the architect between use value and exchange value is necessarily a conscious choice. But that of which we cannot gain consciousness, cannot be a choice. Consciousness means freedom – and responsibility – to choose. The architect cannot rely entirely on his/her uncon-

sciousness. The unconsciousness does not evaluate its habits and select one intention from the other. For the unconsciousness habits are just habits. I have a more pessimistic view than Nyman to the role of unconsciousness as our guide to a good life.

Read it with your heart

In his book *Talojen kieli* Kaj Nyman presents a grand hypothesis of the archetypal language of architecture that every*body* can communicate. This is a *mythos* that will remain so, no matter how much one analyzes it, because it cannot be transformed into the code of analysis without losing its essence. The analytic approach should not dominate, either, when reading Nyman's book. Read it as a piece of literature. Here I am not undermining the scientific value of the book. But what would be a more proper way to approach the scientific text of the author who himself sees science as husbanded by art? The book is *more* than scientific. Each reader either will, or will not, become convinced by Nyman to the extent s/he is *emotionally affected* by Nyman's text and by the drawings he has made of selected buildings and milieus. I believe this is just the way Nyman would like to convince his reader. And in this regard his book is very powerful; it is an emotional experience. Read it with your heart first, and then with your mind.

References

ALEXANDER, C. (1977). *A Pattern Language. Towns, Buildings, Construction.* Oxford University Press, New York

ALEXANDER, C. (1979). *The Timeless Way of Building.* Oxford University Press, New York

BATESON, G. (1987, orig. 1972). *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* Jason Aronson, Northwale, New Jersey

HABERMAS, J. (1987). *The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 2 – Lifeworld and System.* Polity Press, Cambridge, U.K.

JÄRVILEHTO, T. (1995). *Mikä ihmistä määrää?* Pohjoinen, Oulu

JÄRVINEN, J. (1992). *Reference and Meaning in Architecture.* Department of Architecture Tampere University of Technology Occasional Papers 16, Tampere

MEAD, G.H. (1962, orig. 1934). *Mind, Self, and Society.* Ed. by C. W. Morris. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

MÄNTYSALO, R. (1997). "Different Differences: Territory, Map, and Map-maker", *Nordia Geographical Publications, Yearbook 1997*, 26 (1). Ed. by J. Vuolteenaho & T.-A. Äikäs. Oulu university press, Oulu

SARUP, M. (1992). *Jacques Lacan.* Harvester/Wheatsheaf, New York

REPLY TO RAINE MÄNTYSALO

Kaj Nyman

I have been informed that my architectural philosophy is different from most of current thinking about architecture. It is therefore very encouraging to read Raine Mäntysalo's penetrating review of the book. Perhaps my language is not entirely personal after all!

The allusion to Alexander is correct: there should have been a note about that. And when Mäntysalo speaks about my archetypes as *elementary differences in our spatial existence* it seems to me that he has understood what I am after more profoundly than I understand it myself.

There are problems, still, mainly relating to the notion of language in my key concept 'the language of buildings'. Mäntysalo reports that my theory is built upon "the Chomskyan hypothesis of the deep structure of language that forms the shared root of all languages", and this is combined with Jung's theory of archetypes. The "elementary differences in our spatial existence" can thus be thought of as linguistically structured. The problem for Mäntysalo seems to be that the language of buildings means expressing, somewhat passively, intentions that exist beforehand, and so

there is no creating of new intentions. Architecture comes to a standstill. Let me try to explain why this interpretation of my theory is a mistake.

For me, language is a system (or systems) for communicating meaning. Meaning is always meaning for somebody. This somebody must not necessarily be a human being; it can be an animal (or even a computer): whenever something is meaningful for somebody there is meaning. Quite often it is important for, let's say, the ant to have its meaning communicated – the meaning then becomes a shared meaning, and cooperation with others becomes possible. Communication implies language and intention (there can be no language without the intention to reach a goal), but it does not of course imply for the animal's part any conscious intention to communicate. Nevertheless an intention is being communicated.

In the same way, there is no need for architectural archetypes to be consciously conceived in order to be communicated. If it is true that the 'animal' kind of communication is typical also of human beings (and why not?), then the archetypes can be communicated and become shared intentions without any conscious effort. The foundation for this claim is that the language of buildings is a language of the body, and your body is no different from mine. I quite sincerely think that shared intentions about architecture is a normal state of humankind. The problems come with the modern architects who want an architecture of their own, not an architecture of everybody.

Shared intentions is a good basis – in fact a necessary basis – for mutual communication about intentions on another level. The language of buildings is not about what buildings should look like or how they should be technically constructed or what they should cost or who should live or work in them. Those are important questions concerning social intentions, but the archetypes are not social intentions. They are intentions of the species – and that's why they can exist only as already shared.

They are shared on the level of the unconscious, in the body. According to Mäntysalo's reading I say that "one's archetypal intentions are given a stable form through signification"; and signification necessarily implies consciousness. That is not exactly what I wrote, although I agree that my choice of words could have been better. I wanted simply to state that one's meanings must be stabilized somehow in

order to be meanings at all (although they cannot be clear and communicable before becoming conscious through signification). Meaning exists freely, abundantly and fuzzily in the unconscious (or perhaps even in the 'half-conscious') without being signified. And this is the only way for the primordial habits of the archetypes to exist – which means that the language of buildings never ascends from the level of 'animal' communication.

The artist has the privilege to be able to combine his unconscious with his consciousness. The architect-as-artist becomes an instrument of the language of buildings, and the environment that he creates makes it possible for people to experience the archetypes in their bodies. I admit that I don't know how the artist does it.

But can the artist trust his unconscious? Perhaps not. We have good *and* bad habits in our unconscious, says Mäntysalo. And he is right. But if my theory of archetypal archetypes has a core of truth, then it is also true that we have in our bodies the memory of everything that humankind during thousands of generations has learnt about how to survive as part of its environment. (And note that the environment is buildings!) This memory is reliable. The big question is how to avoid confusing this useful memory with other memories that might lead astray. If the architect-as-artist shares the life of her clients it is more likely that she makes good choices in her planning praxis than if she shares solely the life of her own subculture. Communicating with the users about issues related to on-going planning is not enough – it might even end in trivialities or too cheap compromises.

A bit surprisingly, Mäntysalo refers to the Lacanian cathegories of Real, Symbolic and Imaginary to illustrate his own differing views of architecture as language. I am not sure that Lacan's cathegories are applicable to other languages than the verbal, but if interpreted in the style of Anthony Wilden they might be helpful. The Real is the world as a concrete, unmediated experience (which is next to impossible for human beings), whereas the Imaginary is the world mediated through the Symbolic (which is the human capacity for forming linguistic symbols) into abstract, speculative and unreliable representation (which is nowadays a 'normal' condition for most of us).

The language of buildings as a language of the body stays close to the Real, avoiding abstraction and speculation. The more the architect wants self-expression, and not expression

of the shared archetypes, the more his language becomes Imaginary. An Imaginary architecture can be enjoyable, but it cannot be an 'existential foothold' (Norberg-Schulz). On the other hand, an architecture based on archetypes we have in our bodies makes us experience the physical world as Real and concrete, and alienation is overcome.

When Mäntysalo tells that "it is the *emergence of the role* of architects that makes architecture a language", he speaks of language in a sense that is alien to my argument. There can be no language without users of that language, of course. But I assert that people always have been, and still are, using a language of architecture totally regardless of architects, because they have it in their bodies, and they use the language with their bodies.

The problem is that the Imaginary architecture most architects produce is a language based on money, technology and politics. Such language is necessarily alienated from the human everyday life of work, pleasure, care and rest. It necessarily produces alienation in people, who thereby lose their ability to experience their own bodies and, hence, forget the relationship between the body and the environment. The feeling for what is good for the body is lost. Or, in Raine Mäntysalo's words: an architects' language which separates itself from the language of buildings means an unhappy condition of this language.

Yes, I want to make science based on what I feel. Feelings are Real. Most people will not be convinced. Somebody will.

*   *   *