

identity – identification

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Kevin Lynch is one of the most respected planning theorists in the world. His theories are compulsory reading in architectural and planning schools and he is quoted by both academics and practitioners.

However, building areas classified as good according to his criterions for good environmental form have been heavily criticised which leads one to question the validity of his theory and its actual usefulness.

Edward Relph – although a critic of Lynch – is virtually unknown to planners and architects. He is advocating a more complex analysis which includes a significant human element. In this article I will explore some parts of their theories and consider merging some of Relph's aspects in Lynch's theory to create a synthesis.

In *The Image of the City* (1960) Lynch introduced a concept of identity based on the unique “qualities” of the physical environment. These qualities can, according to Lynch, be traced in peoples images of the physical environment. Taking issue with Lynch, Relph responded in *Place and Placelessness* (1976) with a more complex concept of identity, based on the notion that a place has an identity

which is defined both by unique *and* common features in the environment. Relph also suggested that emotional attachment to the physical environment can be subdivided into several types of identification with the environment in question, thus influencing the identity of the place.

Both Lynch's and Relph's theories about identity, people and physical environment concern the inter-relation between people and the built environment, but there are certain differences. Lynch is more normative in that already in *The Image of the City* he wants to tell us how the physical environment should be ordered.¹ He weaves his conclusions from *The Image of the City* into his normative, general theory in *Good City Form* (1981). Relph's approach in *Place and placelessness* on the contrary, is reflection and questioning. However, I have chosen not to consider these differences further here.

Another difference is that Lynch is looking for the “public image” of the city.² In *Good City Form* Lynch says that

the sense of a particular place will vary for different observers... nevertheless, there are some significant and fundamental constancies in the experience of the same place by different people.³

Relph, in turn, questions this general picture by pointing out that images of different groups of individuals might contradict each other. This I will return to later.

Both Lynch and Relph assume their respective works can shed light on the understanding of places and identity,⁴ but as far as I can understand Lynch's ideas and understanding have been considered to be useful in many situations, while Relph's ideas are more rarely referred to. While not claiming to give a complete picture, I will illustrate this with a few examples.

Relph's literary work is made up of three volumes while Lynch has written some ten books.⁵ Apart from his considerable literary production, Lynch has also been a inspiration to town planners and planning analysts. Some examples can be found in Northern Europe. In Germany, Michael Trieb has developed Lynch's ideas both in theory and in practice, in connection with the conservation of older, rare urban environments.⁶ In Denmark, at the School of Architecture of the Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts, the work of Trieb has in turn been developed, this time with less precious built environments in mind.⁷ In addition, the Urban Planning Department of the Municipality of Copenhagen has used Lynch's notations as a starting point for a number of analyses of the urban environment.⁸

In Sweden, Lynch was popular during the sixties and seventies and has recently returned to vogue. In 1965 two then newly built suburban areas in the Stockholm region, were analyzed in a critical study based on Lynch's ideas.⁹ And according to the Swedish researcher Ulf Sandström the regional planning in Stockholm at the end of the sixties was based on Lynch's ideas.¹⁰ *The Image of the City* was at the time compulsory reading at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm.¹¹ At the Chalmers Institute of Technology in Gothenburg, a technique for annotating spatial experience, based on Lynch, was developed in the seventies.¹² In 1991 Lynch's theories were said to be "very useful in practical traffic planning"¹³ and Lynch was used as a source of inspiration (although without reference) in the visionary planning 1994–95 for the City of Malmö.¹⁴ In a preparatory document for the Comprehensive Development plan by the Municipality of Lund, an analysis was used indirectly inspired by Lynch (again here without reference).¹⁵ In a similar fashion Lynch is included in the teaching at all the Swedish schools of Architecture and Landscape Archi-

ecture. More could be said about Lynch's influence but I do not intend to consider this further here.

In the above mentioned Lynch-based Swedish study from 1965, one of the housing area is described as good urban form, that's to say in complete accordance with Lynch's listed demands. Since built environments from this period have been much criticised (something I prefer not to discuss here, although there is a resent shift in this attitude), Lynch should not be used as an example again without some reflection. Instead Relph's criticism should be seriously discussed in relation to Lynch's theories.

Thus there is a two-stepped point of departure for discussing Relph and Lynch: Firstly, Lynch has had more influence, while Relph, who might be considered a critic of Lynch's ideas, is not referred as frequently neither in practical or theoretical town planning. Secondly, environments, built in a way that it apparently can be classified as fulfilling Lynch's criterions for "good city form", has been heavily criticised.

Hence the purpose of this article is to show that Lynch's notions of identity from 1960 as well as his theory about the *Good City Form* from 1981, need to be and can be developed from a theoretical point of view. I also want to evince that such a development might be possible with the help of Relph's theory. I therefore consider Lynch's conclusions in *The Image of the City* as a thesis. Relph's statement is in contraposition to this, and consequently it is considered to be the antithesis. Then I return to Lynch's "answer" in *Good City Form*, which can not be seen as a synthesis, but more of a repetition of the original thesis. In order to achieve a synthesis, I dissect Lynch's and Relph's theories with the purpose of freeing valuable fragments which can be used in a new pattern. This new pattern, the synthesis, is presented as a hypothesis¹⁶ at the end of this article. The article ends with a proposition for a development of one part of the theory of *Good City Form*.

Lynch's motive for legibility

In *The Image of the City* Kevin Lynch discusses "the apparent clarity or 'legibility' of the cityscape" as an aspect of the visual quality of American cities. With the book, Lynch wanted to "assert that legibility is crucial in the city setting" and attempted to "analyze it (legibility) in some detail..."¹⁷

According to Lynch legibility is important for our "image of the city". The image in turn is the "strategic link" for our

orientation in time, space and culture. We use it “to interpret information and to guide action.”¹⁸

The image also work as a starting point for development of the individual’s personal understanding of the surroundings. Lynch says

A good environmental image gives its possessor an important sense of emotional security. He can establish an harmonious relationship between himself and the outside world. This is the obverse of the fear that comes with disorientation; it means that the sweet sense of home is strongest when home is not only familiar but distinctive as well.¹⁹

Lynch’s analysis of legibility

Lynch links the clarity of the physical environment to the notion of identity in the following way:

A workable image requires first the identification of an object, which implies its distinction from other things, its recognition as a separable entity. This is called identity, not the sense of equality with something else, but with the meaning of individuality or oneness.²⁰

Herein he stresses the uniqueness of the object. Lynch also claims that a relationship between the observer and the object is required, as well as relation between the surrounding objects. These relationships he terms “structure”.

In addition Lynch demands that the object has “meaning” for the observer, but the meaning is in Lynch’s own words “glossed over” in *The Image of the City*.²¹ Instead he says that “we may even be wise to concentrate on the physical clarity of the image...”²²

Lynch is looking for physical characteristics which relate to identity and structure in the image; “...that quality in a physical object which gives it a high probability of evoking strong image in any given observer”,²³ a quality which he calls *imageability*, *legibility* or *visibility*. At this point I think it is safe to state that Lynch has high demands on generality and conformity to scientific law.

He continues that as a consequence

a highly imageable (apparent, legible, or visible) city in this peculiar sense would seem well formed, distinct, remarkable; it would invite the eye and the ear to greater attention and participation.²⁴

This is a statement which leads the author to consider the over explicit elements of Post-Modern architecture developed later. But it is important also to stress that Lynch himself did not advocate a superficial clarity.

Lynch: the components of the image

On the base of pilot studies in three American cities²⁵ Lynch developed the idea of “imageability”. As a result he defined five, now classic, main components in *The Image of the City*: paths, edges, districts, nodes and landmarks.

Lynch also considered the division into categories as the beginning of an analysis of the image. In his own words this has to be followed by “their reintegration into the whole image.”²⁶ This inter-relationship between the physical objects he called the “structure”. But he complains that his investigations did not provide him with enough material for this.²⁷

Finally he also attempted to show how his ideas could be used in the rebuilding and planning of the cities, referring critically as I understand, to the situation in the American cities of the forties and fifties. I will not explore this further here, but I will get back to certain parts of this work later in the article.

Relph’s notion of identity and the ways of identifying with the environment

While Lynch explicitly avoided “meaning” in his early investigations, Relph on the other hand stressed that

What is required is an approach and attendant set of concepts that respond to the unity of ‘place, person, and act’ and stress the links rather than the division between specific and general features of places.²⁸

He puts this statement in opposition to Lynch’s definition of identity in the physical environment as the unique aspects and says that Lynch’s definition “tells us only that each place has a unique address, that it is identifiable.”²⁹ Relph also claims that

...it is not just the identity *of* a place that is important, but also the identity that a person or group has *with* that place, in particular whether they are experiencing it as an insider or as an outsider.³⁰

Starting with the difference between inside and outside, and with the help of an analogy from a study of how cultural

anthropologists are assimilated into their empiri, Relph formulates a theory saying that there are three direct and immediate and four less immediate “modes” of experiencing or identifying with the physical environment.³¹

The three direct perspectives are *behavioural insideness*, *empathetic insideness* (which includes emotional and physical participation in a place), and finally *existential insideness* or complete and unselfconscious commitment to a place.

The four less immediate perspectives are: *vicarious insideness*, which is the experience of a place from novels and other media, the *incidental outsideness* where the place is reduced to background for other activities e.g., *objective outsideness* which includes the separation of person and place, and in which places are treated as ideas and locations, and at last *existential outsideness* which includes a deep alienation from all places.

Together with emotional commitment, Relph also introduces self-consciousness/deliberate attention and unselfconsciousness as important factors. The choice of terms can be discussed, but I have chosen Relph’s own terms for describing the different states of mind. For the person physically present, the behavioural insider, “deliberate attending” to the physical environment is of primary importance. The difference between physical and emotional insideness Relph describes as

...a fading from the concern with the qualities of appearance to emotional and empathetic involvement in a place.

He claims that emotional insideness requires “...some deliberate effort of perception.” The existential insideness implies that

...a place is experienced without deliberate and selfconscious reflection yet is full with significances.

Consciousness of a place through vicarious insideness is underlined by similarities with the selfconsciousness of places that we already are familiar with. The objective outsideness is a “deliberate adoption” of an attitude where places are described as geographical points with different physical attributes, while the incidental outsideness is described as “...a largely unselfconscious attitude...” to the physical environment. Finally the existential outsider is not only “aware of” meaning in the physical environment, but is also “self-conscious and reflective” in his alienation from a particular environment.³²

According to Relph the different identification perspectives affect the individual image of a given place in the following ways: for the “behavioural insider”, the place is ambient environment, whose landscape or townscape are the nucleus in public or common consensus knowledge of a place. The “empathetic insiders” are familiar with a place through “sociality in community”. The place is a document which expresses the cultural values and experiences of those who created or live in that place. For the “existential insider”, who has an individual perspective and lives in “sociality in communion”, places are living and dynamic. They express familiar meaning and are experienced without reflection.

In the “vicarious insideness” the place has an identity, which might be explained in two main ways. One is the *public image*, the other is an artificial *mass identity*. This consensus identity is peripheral to direct experience/perception and is communicated in ready-made form by the mass media. Mass identity is artificial and can be changed and manipulated. It mixes with and changes individual experiences and is influential as it gives the identity of a place new symbolic values.

In “incidental outsideness” it is the functions of a place which are of importance and the identity of the place is reduced to little more than a background to the chosen functions. In “objective outsideness” the place is reduced either to the dimension of location or to a space with localised objects and activities. In “existential outsideness” finally, commitment for the place has been lost and cannot be regained. Places are experienced as incidental “for existence itself is incidental.”³³

As additional complications Relph says that the different types of identity are dynamic and constantly changing in interaction with the appearance of the place and the activities, with our observations and our preconceptions. He also points out that they are “not discrete”, and that apart of “existential outsideness” they do not exclude each other. On the contrary he claims that we can carry several modes at the same time. As an example he takes the emotional attachment to ones home town:

we may know our home town as dynamic and full of meaning, yet be quite capable of also viewing it as professional planners or geographers from the perspective of objective outsideness, and also participate in its mass identity.

Relph stresses that “The identity of place is not a simple tag that can be summarised and presented in a brief factual description.” and he states that a place can not be said to have a “a real or true identity” connected to i.e. “existential insideness”. But he notes one thing that gives reason to question his firm denial of “discreteness”. He says that

Indeed an outsider can in some senses see more of a place than an insider – just as an observer of argument gains a perspective not available to those arguing, even though he misses the intensity of being involved in that argument.³⁴

Relph is thus critical to Lynch’s narrow definition of identity. Firstly he reminds the reader of the characteristics of the different objects in the physical environment which both connect and divide those objects. Secondly he stresses that there are far more complicated mechanisms which affect identity, than the visual perception which Lynch draws attention to. This is where emotional involvement to and consciousness of the physical environment belongs. Relph puts this directly in contradiction to Lynch’s statement that identity in the physical environment is based on clarity and uniqueness. Relph’s formulation of the types of identification with the environment can therefore be considered as an antithesis to Lynch’s theory.

Lynch’s normative theory about good city form

In *Good City Form* Kevin Lynch formulates a normative theory which elaborates the qualities of good urban form. As a point of departure he suggests that “good” cities can be measured with the help of

performance *dimensions*, that is, certain identifiable characteristics of the performance of cities which are due primarily to their spacial qualities and which are measurable scales, along which different groups will prefer to achieve different positions.³⁵

Here one might concur that Lynch has taken Relph’s criticism ad notam in saying that different groups of people can group themselves in different places along his scales. He says however nothing about how these groupings might be made. Instead he continues with

It should then be possible to analyze any city form or proposal, and to indicate its location on the dimension, whether by a number or just by ‘more or less’. To be general, the dimensions should be important qualities for most, if not all,

persons and cultures. Ideally, the dimensions should also include all the qualities which any people value in a physical place. (Of course, this last is an unbearably severe criterion.)³⁶

Here Lynch safeguards himself, first stating a highly general validity and then immediately withdrawing.

He then singles out five fundamental dimensions in the good city: *vitality*, *sense*, *fit*, *access* and *control*, as well as two metacriteria: *efficiency* and *justice*. He describes the metacriterias as “repetitive subdimensions of each of the five (dimensions)”. He is also careful to point out that these dimensions are groups of qualities/characteristics, rather than one-dimensional criterias.³⁷

Vitality measures

the degree to which the form of the settlement supports the vital functions, the biological requirements and capabilities of human beings.

Sense, which is the dimension that I will examine more closely here, measures

the degree to which the settlement can be clearly perceived and mentally differentiated and structured in time and space by its residents and the degree to which that mental structure connects with their values and concepts.

Fit is

the degree to which the form and capacity of spaces, channels, and equipment in a settlement match the pattern and quantity of actions that people customarily engage in, or want to engage in...

Access measures

the ability to reach other persons, activities, resources, services, information, or places, including the quantity and diversity of the elements which can be reached.

The fifth dimension, *control*, measures

the degree to which the use and access to spaces and activities, and their creation, repair, modification, and management are controlled by those who use, work, or reside in them.

The metacriteria *efficiency* is

the cost, in terms of other valued things, of creating and maintaining the settlement, for any given level of attainment of the environmental dimensions listed above.

Justice

balances the gains among persons, while efficiency balances the gains among different values.

In the descriptions of the validity of these dimensions the reader can see that Lynch's generalisations vary between "human beings" in general for vitality, while sense and fit are limited to "residents" and respectively "actions that people customarily engage in". Access measures the "ability" (again in general), while finally control includes "those who use" without restriction, as those who "work, or reside". Meta-criteria are valid for "persons" and "values" with restriction. The varying levels can be compared with those of Lynch's listed restrictions for "useful" performance dimensions. Requirement no. 7 states "The characteristics should be at the same level of generality".³⁸ The question is shouldn't one demand that the applicability then also should have the same level?

Sense

Lynch defines the dimension *sense* as

the clarity with which it (a settlement) can be perceived and identified, and the ease with which its elements can be linked with other events and places in a coherent mental representation of time and space and that representation can be connected with nonspatial concepts and values.³⁹

He continues:

This is the join between the form of the environment and the human processes of perception and cognition. Too often ill-defined and so passed over with a few pious regrets, this quality lies at the root of personal feelings about cities. It cannot be analyzed except as an interaction between person and place. Perception is a creative act, not a passive reception.

Sense depends on spatial form and quality, but also on the culture, temperament, status, experience, and current purpose of the observer. Thus the sense of a particular place will vary for different observers, just as the ability of a particular person to perceive form varies for different people. Nevertheless, there are some significant and fundamental constancies in the experience of the same place by different people.

Here we should pause for a moment and consider what Lynch is saying. He admits that "sense" depends on among other

things on "the current purpose of the observer", but again he claims high generality: "there are some significant and fundamental constancies...", just as he does when he continues:

These constancies arise from the common biological basis of our perception and cognition, certain common experiences of the real world (gravity, inertia, shelter, fire, and sharpness, to name a few) and the common cultural norms that may be found among those who habitually use any particular place.

Here Lynch contradicts himself when he immediately limits himself to a few of Relph's identity perspectives; Relph makes a distinction, as noted above, between those who can be considered as more regular users of a place (the participants and the committed) and incidental or second hand visitors.

Identity

With the dimension sense Lynch returns to his conception of identity from 1960, now somewhat adjusted. He says that

The simplest form of sense is *identity*, in the narrow meaning of that common term: 'a sense of place'. Identity is the extent to which a person can recognize or recall a place as being distinct from other places – as having a vivid, or unique, or at least a particular, character of its own.⁴⁰

Later he continues that

most people have had the experience of being in a very special place, and they prize it and lament their common lack. There is a sheer delight in sensing the world: the play of light, the feel and smell of the wind, touches, sounds, colours, forms. A good place is accessible to all the senses, makes visible the currents of the air, engages the perceptions of its inhabitants. The direct enjoyment of vivid perception is further enlarged because sensible, identifiable places are convenient pegs on which to hang personal memories, feelings, and values. Place identity is closely linked to personal identity. 'I am here' supports 'I am'.

Lynch also has a line which one might understand as being aimed directly at Relph, whose name is referred to in the margin beside the following text: "Intense familiarity" says Lynch

will create a sense of place, just as will special form. One's home or one's childhood landscape are usually very identifi-

able settings. When form and familiarity work together, the emotional result is powerful: 'I am the citizen of no mean city.' Tourism is based on a superficial exploitation of this same sense of place. Not many of us, however, experience that abiding pleasure (and occasional irritation, but at least heightened sensibility) of daily life in a distinctive environment – a Venice, a mountain intervalle, an island town.

Here it is not clear though if Lynch actually has lived in Venice or investigated the image of the Venetians, or if he is referring to pleasant tourist experiences from places alike.

Lynch and Relph

As far as the author can understand, in the above Lynch admits that Relph may have a point with his criticism. But despite this the text does not demonstrate a more complete synthesis, only a slight adjustment of Lynch's theories towards those of Relph. This is strange, because apart from the reservations made above, even more of Lynch's own data and comments actually point to Relph.

Lynch's interviewees in the pilot studies were selected in a such way that they can be compared to Relph's later defined identification groups, at least with respect to familiarity. Lynch's selection criteria say however nothing about the emotional involvement (commitment) to the environment in question, nothing about identification with the place. The persons that were interviewed in the first studies "were long resident or employed in the area" and they still were when the interviews took place.⁴¹ The selection excludes all incidental visitors, but includes for example a few people which, in Lynch's own words were "extremely familiar" with the environment examined.⁴² In *Good City Form* almost the same definition is used. Lynch refers to

...the common cultural norms that may be found among those who habitually use any particular place.

The term *habitually* implies an exclusion of all incidental visitors, those who are newcomers in a certain environment as well as the writers and artists who reside temporarily (but sometimes a little longer) in a place and communicate their images from these places. On the contrary, *habitually* includes those tourists as well as the artists and authors that regularly and during many years return as guests to the same place. But in the expression *the common cultural norms*, a sliding towards Relph's criterion for the emotional engagement can be traced.

The consequence of the formulation of the theory is that either the theory is valid only for inhabitants and workers who have a long relation to their place of work (not family visitors, new residents, the newly employed or salesmen temporarily visiting a city), or the theory must be modified to allow different perspectives to be explained within its frame.

The former implies that cities are only there for their inhabitants and regular users, which the author has some difficulty in accepting. And the theory cannot be generally valid for the good city for everyone, as has been demonstrated above that it claims in its present form.

A modification of the generality of the theory, seems more interesting for two reasons. Firstly that the city then is considered as a meeting place for inhabitants and strangers. This means that all of Relph's modes of identification can be included. Even the vicarious insideness (identity mediated i.e. in guides for the visitor) can be considered here.

Secondly because Lynch himself sorts his interviewees into sub-groups similar to Relph's identification modes. This is found where he describes and comments upon his studies. The subgroups are connected with different parts and levels of the physical environment. The extremely familiar people in the quotation above i.e. had difficulties in seeing districts in the city. Instead they were aware of small differences in parts throughout the city. In the same place Lynch also concludes that increasing "acquaintance with the city" affects the "recognition of distinct districts". According to him "people most familiar with Boston" could recognize districts, but when they organized their images and for orientation, they had a tendency to "rely more heavily for organization and orientation on smaller elements".⁴³ The text offers more examples:

People with least knowledge of Boston tended to think of the city in terms of topography, large regions, generalized characteristics, and broad directional relationships.

People who were more familiar with the city

had usually mastered part of the path structure: ...thought more in terms of specific paths and their interrelationships.

People with best knowledge of the city tended "to rely more upon small landmarks and less upon either regions or paths."⁴⁴ Lynch describes in another place how the image could depend both on the actual appearance in the environment and the

familiarity of the interviewed person. In this case “unfamiliar subjects usually mentioned only a few landmarks in office interviews” but when they were interviewed during a walk in the same environment, they were able to “find many more”.⁴⁵

Lynch is here introducing *familiarity* which also might be called *intimacy*. Synonymous with familiarity, he also uses “knowledge” and “acquaintance”. Lynch’s sub-groups clearly resemble Relph’s different identification groups, but Lynch describes his subdivision almost exclusively in terms of how familiar or acquainted the interviewees are with the environment examined. Lynch’s clearly stated departing point was to exclude “meaning”, but in his definitions of paths, landmarks etc. he discusses social meaning and even mentions outsiders: “Most of the Jersey City regions were class or ethnic areas, discernible only with difficulty for the outsider.”⁴⁶ At another point he writes on the subject of a district in Los Angeles that the area “lacks any visual strength or impact” but that it nevertheless was “recognizable by its population and the lettering on its signs” even if it besides this was “indistinguishable from the general matrix.”⁴⁷

In *Place and placelessness* it is unclear whether Relph has noted or used Lynch’s groupings when Relph’s own identification modes were defined. But interesting enough, after Lynch’s combination of physical elements and *his* subdivision of people with different levels of familiarity, it is possible to make a direct comparison between the physical elements of Lynch and the identification perspectives of Relph.

Hypothetical model with physical elements and identification groups

Relph expressly warned against seeing identity as one single true identity, tied to a specific perspective. He pointed out that a person can even have several positions or modes of identification at the same time. But instead of this, and instead of the very general validity of the theory of good city form, I suggest a synthesis of both. This will give a hypothetical dynamic model, oscillating between the different perspectives. The synthesis is based on both Relph’s development of the different levels of assimilation into a culture, and Lynch’s statement that increasing familiarity with a certain environment influence the content of the image. The process emerges clearly when Lynch’s subgrouping of the interviewed people are arranged together with Relph’s types of identification as shown in table x.

The left column shows Lynch’s division of the interviewees into subgroups of familiarity. They are listed with familiarity increasing from top down. The terms used for the subgroups are Lynch’s own words. The right column shows Relph’s types of identification. Here the different types are also ordered with increasing degree of identification (but ending with termination of identification). Like as before Relph’s own terms are used. The column also shows Relph’s suggestion that persons with different degree of attachment also demonstrate differences in selfconsciousness and unconsciousness. Two of Relph’s types fall completely outside the context of Lynch’s: The “vicarious insiders”, which included persons who never visited a certain place, is one of them. Here it is considered as a potential precondition for at least one visit to the place in question. Therefore it is included in the first row of the table. It coincides partly with the image of a certain place that architects and planners form when we study maps and descriptions when starting a new project. The vicarious identity might also be the only image a person ever gets of a certain place, which for whatever reasons is never visited. The other type of identification, “the existential outsiders”, might be considered as a possible alternative to the existential insiders. It is therefore placed at the bottom of the table.

Finally, the middle column shows both Lynch’s aspects of the urban environment and the parts of the environment that Relph is referring to. The content is ordered with each authors description of the environment in the same row as their respective degree of familiarity or identification with the environment, Lynch’s to the left and Relph’s at the right. Two phenomena can be observed in this column: firstly, the increasing degree of complexity in the structure of the image; secondly the decreasing size of the landmarks. Lynch mentions this fixed order in *The Image of the City*.⁴⁸ His explanation is that peoples *dependence* of different parts of the environment changes with increasing familiarity. Instead this might be combined with Relph’s assumptions of selfconsciousness and unselfconsciousness. In such a way this fixed order can be connected to a shift of attention to or awareness of the environment; from prominent landmarks to smaller ones, from simple structures to the more complex and detailed. Additionally I propose a widening/extension of Relph’s suggestion that the emotional insiders or commitment requires “... some deliberate effort of perception”. The proposal is that all modes of identification

Familiarity Lynch: The Image of the City	The physical environment, its structure and parts	To identify oneself with the physical environment Relph: Place and Placelessness
	Consensus identity: 1 public or 2 mass identity. The public id comprises the more or less agreed on physical features and other verifiable components of place (symbols, significances and values). The mass id is provided ready-made by massmedia: glib and contrived stereotypes (pp 58, 61). The pictures of painters and poets, travel accounts or motion pictures, depiction that correspond with our own experiences of familiar places (pp 52–53).	Vicarious insideness, insider 1 conscious?, insider 2 unconscious? (pp 52–53, 58–59).
	Selected functions of a place, the identity is little more than that of a background for the functions (p 50, 52, 61).	Incidental outsider, largely unselfconscious attitude: researchers, businessmen attending conferences and meetings, flight crew and truck drivers (p 52).
Least knowledge of the environment Unfamiliar, the novice	Topography, large regions, generalized characteristics, and broad directional relationships (p 49). Use of distant landmarks, prominent points visible from many positions in organizing the city and choice of routes for trips (p 81). A few landmarks (p 83).	
	Concepts (p 50). Describable objective geography (p 51). Places are reduced either to the single dimension of location or to a space of located objects (p 61).	Objective outsider, deliberately dispassionate, selfconscious observer (p 51).
Better knowledge of the city	Part of the path structure, specific paths and their interrelationships (p 49). Continuity (p 105).	
Familiar observers	A vast quantity of point images in familiar sequences, although recognition may break down when the sequence is reversed or scrambled (p 83).	
	Patterns (especially visual), structures and content of the inside that tells us that we are here and not there. Surrounding walls, enclaves and enclosures, or other physically defined boundaries (p 53). Colour, texture, scale, style, and character (p 54). Ambient environment possessing qualities of landscape and townscape that constitute a primary basis for public or consensus knowledge of that place (p 61).	Behavioural insider, deliberately attending to the appearance of a place, the place is experienced (p 53).
	Same as for the beh. i. but with fading from concern with the qualities of appearance to emotional and empathetic involvement, deeper and richer identity (p 54). Places are records and expressions of the cultural values and experiences of those who live in them (p 61).	Empathetic insider, some awareness of the environment, to identify with a place, demands a willingness to be open to significances of a place, deliberate effort of perception, intimate association (pp 54–55).
More familiar	Rely increasingly on systems of landmarks for their guide – to enjoy uniqueness and specialization instead of the continuities used earlier (p 78) Contrast and uniqueness (p 105).	
Best knowledge Most familiar	Rely on small landmarks and less on regions or paths (p 49). Recognize regions but rely more heavily for organization and orientation on smaller elements (p 67).	
Extremely familiar	Unable to generalize detailed perceptions into districts: conscious of minor differences in all parts of the city, do not form regional groups of elements (p 67).	
	Places are lived and dynamic, full with meaning (p 61).	Existential insider, knowing and experiencing without reflection (p 61).
	Meaningless identity (p 51).	Existential outsider, profound alienation from all places (p 50). Selfconscious and reflective uninvolved (p 51). Lost and now unattainable involvement (p 62).

Figure 1. Lynch's familiarity, Relph's modes of identification and physical elements as a connection between them.

requires deliberate effort in order to move the focus of consciousness “backward” and “sideways” in the process, if this shift is not brought about by drastic circumstances such as noise, light or obtrusive forms.

Structured like this I suggest they show a hypothetical and dynamic model for an individual and simultaneous process of gradually growing familiarity with the physical environment, increasing knowledge of the environment, a gradually increasing emotional commitment (or termination of commitment) and finally a gradual distortion of focus of the consciousness/awareness/attention about aspects of the physical environment and their interrelation. I also suggest a specific order in the displacement of attention/consciousness of different aspects of the whole structure in the physical environment, from major to less noticeable landmarks, from simple to more complicated and detailed structures.

The development of the image and the identification with a certain environment takes place in an interplay between those factors and the different aspects of the physical environments total structure. The different parts of the physical environment and their interrelationship, structure, are organised in hierarchic levels and still described in Lynch’s terms, but the content and the meaning in the image changes according to the individuals identification mode.

Development of the theory of good city form

It can not be denied that Kevin Lynch and Edward Relph with their respective works contribute to the understanding of the built environment. However it has also been established that Lynch’s theory, on its own is insufficient to be

used as a design tool for *The Good City Form*, which it aspired to. Relph, a critic whose work is directly linked to Lynch’s, considers human factors as well and a complexity lacking in Lynch. He is therefore a clear candidate for academic notion of merging the two authors theories, in order to produce a more useful and reliable theory. As a consequence of the hypothetical model above, the theory of good city form would have to be developed. The development concerns the dimension “sense”. The changes would be needed in the definition, and the words in question are marked in italics. Instead of defining sense as

the clarity with which it (a settlement) can be perceived and identified, and the ease with which its elements can be linked with other events and places in a coherent mental representation of time and space and that representation can be connected with nonspatial concepts and values

I suggest that *sense* should be defined as

the different ways in which it (a settlement) can be perceived and identified by individuals with different knowledge and emotional commitment to the settlement, and how its different elements can be linked with other events and places in a coherent mental representation of time and space and that representation can be connected with nonspatial concepts and values.

This is a suggested development which I expect to be criticised and elaborated further. Whether this new compound theory can be put into *practice* remains to be seen and is the next task of the author.

Ingrid Järnefelt, tekn. lic., doktorand
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Notes

1. *The Image of the City*, p 14.
2. *The Image of the City*, p v, 46 o 140.
3. *Good City Form*, p 131.
4. *Place and placelessness*, p 44 and *The Image of the City*, p 3.
5. Relphs 3 books: *Place and placelessness* (1976), *Rational Landscapes and Humanistic Geography* (1981) and *The Modern Urban Landscape* (1987). Lynch has published at least 10 books or reports: *The Image of the City* (1960, 1965 på tyska, 1971 på franska), *Site Planning* (1962), *A View from the Road* (Donald Appleyard 1964), *Visual analysis* (1965), *What Time is This Place?* (1972), *Growing up in Cities* (1975), *Managing the sense of a Region* (1976), *Good City Form* (1981) and *Wasting Away* (1990?).
6. Margrete Bech "Fra plan plan til rumlig plan" *Byplan 2/95*, p 67. (Triebe also refers to among others Donald Appleyard, Gordon Cullen, Christian Norberg-Schulz, Camillo Sitte) *Stadtgestaltung – Theorie und Praxis* (1974) and *Mensch und Erhaltung und Gestaltung des Ortbildes – Denkmalpflege, Ortsbildplanung und Baurecht* 1988 (1985).
7. Holmgren & Svensson *Byarkitektur i kommunens planlægning SBI-Byplanlægning 62* (1991), "Urban Architecture and Identity – a Danish Approach" *Scandinavian Housing and Planning Research* 11:129–144 (1994) and "Urban Architecture – Taking Care rather than Preserving" *Making them meet*, p 131–147, SBI/CIB, DK, (1995).
8. Margrete Bech "Fra plan plan til rumlig plan" *Byplan 2/95*.
9. Claes Göran Guinchard "Bildens av förorten" *att bo* 1965:4, p 184–196.
10. Ulf Sandström *Arkitektur and social ingenjörskonst*, p 222.
11. Kursprogram KTH?
12. Arne Branzell *Något om O and Att notera rumsupplevelse*, BFR T1:1976.
13. Kapitlet *Stadsomsorg, skönhet and trevnad* Remissupplaga TRÅD -92 – Förslag till råd för planering av stadens trafiknät and trafik i sammanhållen bebyggelse, Boverket oktober 1991, p 40.
14. *Hur ser Malmö ut egentligen?* Koncept till stadsbyggnadsanalys, arbetsmaterial för Malmö Stadsbyggnadsvision 1995?.
15. *Stadsbyggnadsfrågor* Diskussionsunderlag, PM nr 8b, Stadsarkitektkontoret i Lund 1997–01–07, 6–10.
16. I use hypothesis in the meaning of a tentative explanation of certain facts, some mechanism whose existence is inferred but for which unambiguous, objective evidence is not available, a provisional idea. Filosoflexikonet, Termer i sociologi, Penguin's Dictionary of Psychology.
17. *The Image of the City*, p 3.
18. *The Image of the City*, p 4.
19. *The Image of the City*, p 4–5.
20. *The Image of the City*, p 8.
21. *The Image of the City*, p 46.
22. *The Image of the City*, p 8.
23. *The Image of the City*, p 9.
24. *The Image of the City*, p 10.
25. Boston, Jersey City and Los Angeles, *The Image of the City*, p 14.
26. *The Image of the City*, s 49.
27. *The Image of the City*, s 83.
28. *Place and placelessness*, p 44, see p 47.
29. Quoted from *The Image of the City* (edition 1960, p 6) in *Place and placelessness*, p 45.
30. *Place and placelessness*, p 45.
31. *Place and placelessness*, p 49.
32. *Place and placelessness*, p 51–55.
33. *Place and placelessness*, p 61–62.
34. *Place and placelessness*, p 62.
35. *Good City Form*, p 111.
36. *Good City Form*, p 111–112.
37. *Good City Form*, p 118–119.
38. *Good City Form*, p 113.
39. *Good City Form*, p 131.
40. *Good City Form*, p 131.
41. *The Image of the City*, p 15.
42. *The Image of the City*, p 67.
43. *The Image of the City*, p 67.
44. *The Image of the City*, p 49.
45. *The Image of the City*, p 83.
46. *The Image of the City*, p 68.
47. *The Image of the City*, p 68.
48. *The Image of the City*, p 109.



Figur 1: Arkitekt Poul Fræhr Hansen, der har stået bag renoveringen af denne bebyggelse, har tydeligvis fundet inspiration i den tidlige funktionalisme. (Varbergparken, Haderslev).