Recently mobility has become an increasingly important issue in relation to social as well as urban contexts. Global movements of capital, commodities and migrants, the explosion of tourism and increasing virtual travelling are radically changing societal structures and conditions of social action, while the continued expansion of urbanisation into the countryside is bringing mobility forth as an ever more significant urban issue. Importantly, also politics and power are affected by mobility: today the mobile seem to be the powerful, and in face of increasing global mobility politics seems, to a large extent, to remain local and immobile. Hence, mobility is proposed as key concept for a reorientation of social theory that transcends the nation-state framed concept of “society”. Meanwhile, in urban theory, mobility surfaces in a variety of contexts that relates it to, for instance, public space, social networks and disputes about access to urbanity through collective or individual transportation.

Not surprisingly, mobility is also a highly contested issue in both social and urban terms. This is obvious, especially if mobility is thought of in terms of power, a context in which the legitimacy of such power is immediately, and significantly, questioned. But one could also ask, in more general terms, how and in which ways mobilities are justified and criticised. In this article we sketch a way of dealing with such questions by integrating them into the regimes of justification presented by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (1991, 2000) and Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello (1999). We find their idea of a plurality of different and mutually contesting regimes of justification mobilised in public disputes convincing, and suggest that they also provide a fruitful framework to discuss the dynamics of public disputes about mobility and urbanity.

Mobility

Four points to start with: Firstly, mobility is not a universal phenomenon. It is not, so to say, a human condition. As Bauman argues, mobility differentiates the human condition rather than unifying it. Whereas mobility is a matter of choice for some, for others it is a fate.
Concomitantly, mobility as destiny and mobility as fate are different. And such divisions point towards different social topologies of mobility. Whereas increasing mobility can bring liberation in one social topology, it can create hell in another.²

Secondly, mobility is a relational concept. As Virilio puts it, “[s]peed is not a phenomenon, it is the relationship between phenomena”.³ One’s mobility may well be another’s immobility. More importantly, the immobile “stand-ins” can contribute considerably to the stabilisation of the mobile, reticular world today.⁴

Thirdly, there is not a single type of mobility. Following Virilio (1995) again, we can operate with three kinds of mobility. These are related: firstly, to transportation; secondly, to transmission, that is, to the information and communication networks; and thirdly, to what Virilio calls “transplant”, that is, to internalisation of technology in the human body like in the case of cyborg technologies. But, crucially, in all these three forms, mobility is a paradoxical concept. Taken to their extremes, all three forms of mobility result in inertia.⁵

To give an example, the high point of mobility, the Kosovo War, took place in network space. As Virilio wrote, during this war,

the soldiers stayed mostly in their barracks! In this way ... inertia has truly become a mass phenomenon. And not only for the TV audiences watching the war at home but also for the army that watches the battle from the barracks. Today the army only occupies the territory once the war is over.⁶

Hence, one of the consequences of mobility may be immobility. This is, perhaps, the dialectic of mobility.

In our framework, there is a fourth form of mobility, which has nothing to do with physical movement. In this context Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “nomadism” is particularly interesting. Nomadism is associated with a particular sort of mobility, which is not linear, that is, directed from a fixed point to another, but which “deviates to a minimum extent”. Hence, the opposition between the Nomad and the non-Nomad is not that of the mobile and the immobile. The opposition is between speed and movement. Speed means, above all, a deviation, however slowly from fixation and linear movement.⁷ It is thus by speed, and not necessarily by physical movement, Deleuze and Guattari’s “nomadic space” is constructed. Likewise, Bauman’s “exile” creates, by staying “non-socialized”, or “non-integrated”, “a place of one’s own”.⁸ It is no surprise, then, some philosophers, who are often criticised for “romanticising” mobility, are in fact not so keen on travelling. Hence, “you shouldn’t move around too much, or you’ll stifle becomeing”, says Deleuze. He adds, by referring to Toynbee: “the nomads are those who don’t move on, they become nomads because they refuse to disappear” ⁹

And fourthly, we think of mobility in terms of power and justification. Indeed, mobility seems to be the most important factor of power and stratification today.¹⁰ The re-distribution of power and freedom today seems to take place in relation to mobility, which also makes it necessary to “politicise speed”.¹¹ As Paul Virilio puts it:

Wealth is the hidden side of speed and speed the hidden side of wealth... People say: ‘You are too rich’, but no one ever says: ‘You are too fast’. But they are related. There is a violence in wealth that has been understood; not so with speed.¹²

Power is basically about the capacity of action at a distance. As Luc Boltanski suggests, “action at a distance” is the “very attribute which describes in the most concise and striking fashion the intuitive content of the idea of power”.¹³ Mobility is what makes action at a distance possible.

If mobility is related to power, then, of course, it is also related to justification and critique. Power needs legitimisation (justification) and legitimisation can be de-legitimised by critique. But in what sense is mobility related to justification and critique? This question is central for our argument. Our point of departure here is that critique is based on justification. Justifications can only be criticised on the basis of other justifications. In order to understand critique we therefore need to understand how we justify. We need a theory of critique just as well as a critical theory of mobility. We are interested in a “sociology of criticism” as well as a “critical sociology” in the context of mobility.¹⁴ We need to investigate how different forms of critique (on mo-
Regimes of justification

How does one justify one’s critique, then? Boltanski and Thévenot in their book on justification (1991) give the following answer to this question. People engaged in public dispute and critique refer to different regimes or worlds of justification, each with their own criteria of validity and internal consistency. Such regimes of justification make it possible for situated actors to engage in disputes with others on the “common good”. Regimes of justification do not have a normative connotation in the sense of the telos of communicative rationality in Habermas’ understanding. Rather, they establish different registers of grandeur and of denunciation to be employed in disputes. Neither do they imply a search for consensus. Consensus is possible only within a given regime of justification – across different regimes only compromise is achievable.

Several regimes of justification exist simultaneously. Boltanski and Thévenot register 6 different regimes of justification in their 1991 study. These are the regimes of inspiration, opinion, domesticity, civility, market, and industry. With this notion of a limited set of regimes of justification, Boltanski and Thévenot try to find a middle ground between “formal universalism and the kind of unlimited pluralism which has often been the response of empirical disciplines like history or sociology to transcendental stances”.

Each regime is based on “a principle of equivalence” “that enables ... apparently distant conditions to be brought together”. Likewise, each regime of justification engages a definition of humanity and a set of overarching principles in relation to the “common good”.

To be sure, the (limited) plurality and simultaneous existence of the regimes resembles the idea of a differentiated modernity (based on the notions of autonomous fields or autopoietic systems). But, in contrast to theories of differentiation, Boltanski and Thévenot also allow for de-differentiation. Hence, the principle of “equivalence is not related to different groups ... but to different situations”. Furthermore, they are not only interested in knowing what is happening within a single regime of justification, but also in situations in which different regimes clash or compromise with one another. What is of interest is not only intra-regime but also inter-regime relations such as criticism, conflict or compromise.

This idea is important in relation to the discussion of mobility. But first we would like to mention how we think that mobility is seen, justified or criticised from within different regimes of justification.

1. Mobility as inspiration

The regime of inspiration is characterised by the grandeur of inspiration, spontaneity, feelings, singularity, originality, creativity and movement. What is important here is to avoid routines and habits, to free oneself from the inertia that is inherent in “having knowledge”. Inspiration is about “receiving the mystical alchemy of creativity” in transgressing oneself. Within this regime of justification, mobility is a tool, with which what is seen as static is criticised. In this context, concepts such as nomadism, exile, “walking”, “tactics”, and displacement are associated with resistance to and emancipation from the sedentary power. Thus, Deleuze & Guattari’s “rhizome”, for instance, develops according to the logic of transversal movement, reticular connection, multiplicity, and becoming, and it is juxtaposed to static, linear, and striated “roots”. They wrote:

Make rhizomes, not roots, never plant! ... Run lines, never plot a point! Speed turns the point into a line! Be quick, even when standing still! ... Don’t have just ideas, just have an idea.... Have short-term ideas.

Retrospectively, one could say that mobility once promised emancipation. It is striking that even in the 1990s, this idea of mobility as emancipation was alive and well (and probably still is). Thus, Edward Said wrote in Culture and Imperialism:

... liberation as an intellectual mission ... has now shifted from the settled, established, and domesticated dynamics of culture to its unhoused, decentred, and exilic energies, energies whose incarnation today is the migrant....
This optimism of mobility (as inspiration) was closely related to aesthetic modernity. Aesthetic modernity was, above all, a reaction against the solidity of the organised-industrialist vision of modernity.

2. Mobility within the industrial regime
In the industrial regime, with its technological objects and scientific methods, grandeur is about efficiency, performance, productivity, predicting, ensuring functionality and giving utilitarian answers to “needs”. Operational objects and professional experts count as “grand”. Unproductive people and dysfunctional objects count as “small”. Here, expert-knowledge, belief in progress, and planning and organization are given pride of place.

In the context of modernity, social engineers and planners have always been interested in mobility. According to Le Corbusier, for instance, the modern city and modern life were to be shaped by the new criteria of speed, comfort and efficiency. Traffic planning, suburbanisation and neutralisation of the urban environments (through land-use planning according to the logic of industrial efficiency): to be sure, mobility is what made all this possible.

Consequently, the industrial regime has progressively normalised mobility in daily life. Hence, transportation has become an integral, taken-for-granted part of both planning processes and everyday activities since the 19th century. Similarly today, almost all IT-projects related to “connecting” people are supported by authorities.

Importantly, the shift from Fordism to Post-Fordism has accentuated the question of mobility. In this context, some writers even argue that “economies of speed replace economies of scale”. It is therefore no coincidence that mobility is an integral concept of much critical work on the present state of capitalism and social life.

3. Mobility in the market regime
In the market regime, grandeur is competitiveness, richness, the desire for scarce goods, and a willingness to take risks. Short-term, rather than long-term projects count more within this regime. What is “small” is being a loser, or having a product that does not sell (well).

Marx pointed out the contradiction between industrial capital, which seeks to establish a planned or organised process of production, and merchants and finance capital, which seek profits via marketing and speculation. Regarding mobility, this has placed capital under the contradiction of the fixed and the fluid, stock and flow, the immobile and the mobile. Within the market regime, risk-taking on the basis of mobility is, still, a positive value, and increasingly so.

4. Mobility as opinion
In the regime of opinion, the grandeur is in the recognition of others. To be visible, to have publicity, to influence, attract and seduce others are the preferred values. What is undesirable is to be forgotten, hidden and to appear as a blurred image.

Being able to move in accordance with public opinion is in this regime grand. Within this regime, you “have a standpoint until you take a new one”, as a Danish social democratic prime minister has put it. Keeping in touch with the recognition of others by moving around, showing up everywhere, locally or in the media, or worshipping the stars by following them around is grand. However, by being too mobile you may also lose recognition, you may be known for being someone with whom it is “difficult” to get in touch.

5. Mobility against community – the regime of domesticity
In the regime of domesticity, the grandeur is personal trust among the members of a collective, a tradition, a community, a generation, a family or a hierarchy. Good manners, respect and responsibility, family and memory are valuable; egoism is undesirable.

Within this regime, freedom and/or mobility do not necessarily lead to happiness. Mobility is most often associated with flows of capital and global interdependencies. As against these flows, belonging to a territory and “roots” are held to be more valuable. A good example of justification within this regime is thus communitarianism. Practical disputes in this context are about defending a territory, a heritage, a nation, or a
tradition against the ex-territorial, seamless and rootless flows of global capital and technology. In Castells’ terminology: the “space of places” is defended against the “space of flows”.

In these global space wars, “territorialisation” – not only in the geographical but also in the social and cultural sense – becomes the magic answer to all the uncertainties caused by global mobility. The domain of the “home” becomes the shelter against the horrors of deterrotorialised capitalism.

It is of course not evident that increasing mobility automatically causes the disappearance of proximity – for instance, the car may make it possible to get to others as well as to escape from others. It is not evident either that proximity and co-presence are the same things. But within the regime of domesticity these are simply taken for granted.

6. The civic regime and mobility
In the civic world, the grandeur is common will and equality. Here it does not depend on persons, but on collectivities and representation. The grandeur is to subordinate to the collective will, to have a mandate, to be delegated, to act legally. What is undesirable is fractions, corporatism, and individualism.

Whereas the argument against mobility seems to favour “territorialisation” within the regime of domesticity, within the civic regime of justification the argument seems to be “slowing down”.

Within this regime, mobility and speed are the enemies of politics and reflection. Democracy, debate, and civic life require concentration, and in this sense mobility is “small”. This form of justification is easy to find in the works of Sennett, Bauman and Virilio.

It is now thirty years ago that Richard Sennett wrote his famous book on urban sociology: The Uses of Disorder. Here he argued for “disorder” and displacement against the panoptic enclosures (zoning and segregation) of the modern city. The chaotic and mobile city, proposed by Sennett in this early work, seemed to promise its citizens chances of exposure to beneficial encounters with strangers by subverting, moving across, or escaping from the enclosures of the “ordered” city.

But, interestingly, Sennett is writing in a different tone today. In his recent writing he argues that we have to revise our “fear of discipline”, that the contemporary city also needs “disciplinary spaces”, that is, “spaces of democracy”, against increasing mobility.

Mobility is also what Virilio’s concept of “trans-politics” is all about: the end of politics, understood as time for reflection and dialogue. “Democracy … requires time”.

[W]e no longer have time for reflection. The power of speed is that. Democracy is no longer in the hands of men, it is in the hands of computerized instruments, answering machines, etc.

Hence speed, according to Virilio, is in a sense, “beyond” politics.

Speed beyond politics: this theme surfaces in Bauman’s recent work too. Referring to Castells, Bauman argues that global power is increasingly liberated from politics; whereas power belongs to the “space of flows”, politics remains “hopelessly local”. Power is ex-territorial, whereas politics remains territorial. The speed of ex-territorial power is what enables it to escape the agora, the space in which private fears are translated into “political” issues.

Power is the capacity to escape. The instruments of power are thus fluidity, liquidity, speed and movement. This relates, for Bauman, to a major shift in relation to modernity and capitalism. The new phase of modernity is “liquid modernity”, which operates according to the logic of dis-embedding without re-embedding. Deterrotorialisation without re-territorialisation. In this sense, liquid modernity signals “the revenge of nomadism”.

Following this logic, the question becomes: where is the political equivalent of global nomadic power? We don’t have fast-moving political institutions. The existing political institutions are unfit in the face of nomadic power. Confronted with the increasing gap between power and politics, Bauman’s question becomes how can we “slow down” the new nomads, the movements of power? Slowing down, without necessarily “territorialising”. That’s also to say, how can we reinvent politics?

Against Bauman one could insert the idea that po-
Politics is also about delegation and representation. Politicians are delegated to move away in order to represent the electorate; the electorate has handed over their votes, and their voices, to politicians. To be sure, politics moves slower than global capital, but the argument that politics today is “hopelessly local” seems, at least to an extent, to overlap with the arguments from within the domestic regime.

**Justification: Compromise and (peaceful) conflict**

As should be clear by now, different regimes come up with different and conflicting justifications. But there are also possibilities for compromise. To give an example, let us dwell on how the possibilities of conflict and compromise are observed from the regime of inspiration.

Seen from the regime of inspiration, all other regimes suffer from considering stability as “grand”: norms, principles, traditions, promises, plans, predictions, commitments, objectivity, and expertise. The regime of domesticity, particularly, is seen to be mistaken, because it clearly prioritises personal and traditional bonds, “roots”, against moving on. On the other hand, seen from the world of domesticity, the regime of inspiration lacks self-control, a sense of order, respect for hierarchies, habits, and the meaning of gradual change.

Hence, a straightforward compromise between these two regimes seems difficult to attain. Roots and routes, tradition and innovation, territorialisation and deterritorialisation seem to conflict with each other, although one can territorialise only to deterritorialise again (Deleuze). But a compromise between the regime of inspiration and the regime of domesticity can be found in the context of Deleuze & Guattari’s concept of “micro-fascism”. They deal with fascism as a micro-politics of becoming based on rhizomatic movements – which they also perceive as the real strength of fascism. What is at stake here is that although fascism speaks the language of an internally non-antagonistic community, “us” versus “them” and so on, it has indeed a rhizomatic, innovative, mobile structure. Micro-fascism is, in other words, a compromise between the two regimes of justification in contrast to the authoritarian state.

Another example: compromising with the market regime means submission to money, seen from the regime of inspiration. The commercialisation of the “concept”, for instance, is the danger here. And from the point of view of the market regime, the regime of inspiration lacks distance and cold-bloodedness. It cannot take hold of chances and thus drive business. Nevertheless, the inspired “act of madness” can succeed also in business life. Thus, Anita Roddick, the owner of Body Shop, can be keen on presenting herself as a nomad: “I am such a nomad, such a tramp.” Marketing of nomadism is everywhere today.

So, compromises exist. But conflict often prevails. Let’s now have a look at mobility and community again. From within the regime of domesticity, Robert Putnam draws attention to the stressful relation between rising mobility and diminishing social capital. On the other hand, John Urry points out – from within the industrial regime, it seems – that mobility does not cause social capital to diminish, rather it contributes to the accumulation of social capital. To be able to maintain social networks, you need mobility. Network mobility reshapes the relationship between physical and social proximity. It was supposed by classical social theory that community, for instance, requires both physical and social proximity; but mobility seems to make social relationships possible in spite of geographical distance. Putnam seems to propose “slowing down” as a political/ethical alternative; whereas Urry stresses the importance of equality of access to mobility: a “socially inclusive society” is, in this perspective, a society that can minimise “immobility” and maximise conditions for “co-presence”.

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**Dispute/conflict**

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52
Both Sennett and Bauman argue that excessive mobility results in the disappearance of public spaces and politics. Speed means moving through the city in passivity. Against this, Mimi Sheller and John Urry state that mobility is necessary to get people to public spaces! From this perspective, mobility is what holds social networks together. If the “old” public spaces disappear, then new ones emerge: for instance, the media, the smart car, and so on. These new public spaces also combine different mobilities (transportation and communication) so that the conditions of possibility of communication and thus political action are significantly increased.

As should be clear by now, both perspectives are internally consistent, or, we could say both perspectives are right (or wrong): mobility is both related to participation in networks and to slowing down – social capital is related to both co-presence and movement. This is, we believe, also the inherent ambivalence of mobility.

**Mobility as violence: Power above justification?**

So far so good, it may seem. However, there are some holes and cracks in our story. Is John Urry really arguing from within an industrial regime? Does Bauman, after all, not have a good point in stressing the global aspect of power as against the local-ness of politics?

There seem to be two alternative ways out of this situation. Firstly, one can argue that mobility also makes it possible to raise above the six regimes previously outlined, and one can try to justify this argument from within one or more of the six regimes of justification. And secondly, one can ask if there is emerging a new, 7th regime of justification – a mobile regime, so to speak. Boltanski & Chiapello in their book on the new spirit of capitalism (1999) follow this route. Let’s have a look at both of these.

In the first case, the idea is that power is above justification. “Speed is violence. The most obvious example is my fist,” says Virilio. So, there is more to the world of humans and non-humans than justification by equivalence. Boltanski and Thévenot suggest that there is a regime of violence, which is beyond any principle of equivalence – a regime that is located at the “limits” of justice/justification. Likewise, a regime of love is beyond the rule of equivalence. In general, four modes of action can be distinguished, as shown in the following diagram:

Now let’s have a look at liquid modernity, global interdependencies and mobility as power above justification, that is, as violence.

The main argument here is that the mobile elite seem to be outside, or above, the regimes of justification; in this sense, it is non-commitment that characterizes the behaviour of mobile elites. The easier you change location, profession or environment, that is, the more mobile you are, the less tied down (by commitments) you are. In this context, property is a misleading concept to discuss the social divisions of today. Property means attachment and commitment. Peasants, shopkeepers and others who have property are not necessarily privileged any longer. The new global elites do not own factories, lands, nor occupy administrative positions. Their wealth comes from a portable asset: their knowledge of the laws of the labyrinth ... [they] love to create, play and be on the move.

In liquid modernity power lies in the ability to “travel light”. If you are a light traveller, your privilege is to be outside Boltanski & Thévenot’s regimes of justification.

Max Weber noted that the separation of businesses from the household had created a neutral empty space for businesses which became free from ethical constraints. The state’s legislative power had then imposed ethical constraints on this void. But now, businesses are liberating themselves from the national state and yet, Bauman points out, there is no equivalent to the nation-state-like legislative power. There is no regime of justice that can impose restrictions on global power.

**A seventh regime: The project regime**

The other route is to ask if a new 7th regime of justification has developed within liquid capitalism, a regime adjusted to mobilities and networks. This is what Boltanski & Chiapello argue in their recent book.

In the 7th regime, the “project regime” (cité par pro-
jets), the activity of the mediator that establishes and extends networks is of value in and of itself. The general equivalent is activity (of whatever kind). Activity transcends the distinctions between labour and non-labour, wage and non-wage, interested or benevolent, measurable or non-measurable according to productivity. The aim of the activity is to generate projects or to integrate oneself into projects initiated by others. The project is always limited in time. Grandeur is, therefore, living a life of simultaneous and successive projects, the more diverse the better. What counts is always being on the move towards another project, always preparing, always coming up with some new idea.

The project-form is well adjusted to a world of networks precisely because it is a transitory form:

the succession of projects extends the networks by multiplying the connections and making the links proliferate.

Those who do not have projects or do not explore networks are threatened by exclusion, and exclusion is the same as “death” in a reticular world. Therefore it is important always to develop oneself and one’s employability.

In this connectionist world, the most important value is to connect to others. In order to do that one needs the ability to trust others, to know how to communicate, to freely discuss and also how to adapt to others and to new situations. One should be “physically and intellectually mobile”, and be able to answer the call of “a moving world”.

Rather than sticking to your own stable skills, you should be flexible and polyvalent, and you should do this on your own responsibility, autonomously. That is, the risk of connecting is yours.

The new grandeur is being at ease everywhere, while at the same time knowing how to be local. The “connectionist man” knows how to be present and personal in differing contexts and how to judge the emotional states of others.

In this reticular world, a stable habitus (Bourdieu) is not desirable. Rather, the grand person is the one who is able to link different domains and fields to one another, and to distance oneself from one’s own environ-

ment and immediate circle of relations.

All these competencies can of course be used individually or egoistically. However, this is not justified in the project regime. You should be acting in search of the “common good”, that is, in order to engage with others, inspire confidence, be tolerant, respect differences and pass information to others, so that everyone can increase her/his “employability”.

There is, then, an ethical scheme of evaluation that pertains to the project regime as well. Face-to-face relations, responsibility, trust, confidence, common experiences, mutual aid, keeping your words, co-operation and partnering are the key-words in this context.

But you don’t gain anything without sacrifice in the regimes of justification, which also applies to the project regime. Within the project regime, one has to sacrifice everything that can be a barrier to one’s disposability for another project. “The grand person is mobile. Nothing must disturb his displacements. He is a ‘nomad’”, say Boltanski and Chiapello. This demand for lightness means renunciation of stability, roots, local attachments, pre-established links. One should not distinguish between relations of friendship and professional relations. Neither should one be burdened by one’s own passions and values, nor by attachment to a heritage or property.

So, there seems to be a regime of justification that matches the networks of liquid capitalism. You may travel light in this connectionist world, but you can do it for your own sake or for the common good of the connected in a temporary network. This is not a de-personalised, abstract world; on the contrary, it is, or rather it can be, a mobile world full of relations of trust, friendship and confidence.

From within the project regime, however, liquid capitalism can be criticised only to a limited degree. Within this regime, there are limits to Bauman’s light traveller, but nevertheless light travelling cannot be problematised in itself. If this is to be done, it can only be done with reference to other regimes of justification. But then the problem of inadequacy, which Bauman points out, surfaces again: namely, the situation in which mobile power can bypass justification.

What is needed, therefore, seems to be a concept of
critique adequate for liquid capitalism. An immanent critique of liquid capitalism. In face of this, Boltanski & Chiapello focus on the concept of exploitation, which is ignored by theorists of the “connectionist” network society.

Interestingly, in their view, exploitation is directly related to mobility. Those who are exploited in a connectionist world [...] are the immobile, sedentary individuals, who thereby contribute to stabilizing the world in which others move swiftly. They also increase the mobility of their employers to the point of ubiquity by fulfilling the function of ‘stand-ins’ ... who ensure the maintenance of network connections.67

What is particularly interesting here is the focus on vertical rather than horizontal inequality: Boltanski & Chiapello do not only speak of “access” to networks (Castells, Rifkin, Urry), or of inclusion in autopoietic subsystems (Luhmann), but also of exploitation in vertical structures.

The city
We have already discussed some questions relating to the city. More generally, cities may be conceived as highly complex artefacts involving a heterogeneity of things and humans. As such they also give rise to public disputes that often involve several regimes of justice. Struggles regarding the appropriate regime of justification for a given “urban question” are always pertinent in the city. Cities can even be classified according to regimes of justification: the commercial city, the industrial city, the city of political power, the city of dwelling (garden city), and the city of artworks. Within each of these, the respective regime of justification will have a dominant role in disputes about urban questions. If, for instance, the city is known primarily as a commercial one, the regime of the market will dominate urban politics.

The modern way of resolving disputes over “the urban question”, which engage different regimes simultaneously, has been segregation. The idea of segregation stems from the industrial regime and efficiently separates problems of dwelling from problems of industrial production, commercial problems from problems of heritage, and so on. Once separated from each other into corresponding urban areas the public dispute between regimes of justification may move into a regime of peaceful “justesse”, where the “equivalence can be present in a tacit way”68 due to the order of things in the given urban area.

Nevertheless, this industrialist way of resolving urban questions has long been disputed by the other regimes. For instance: the political power should be decentralised (a criticism against the civic regime by the domestic regime). Commercialised facades should be redesigned to give space for urban history (criticism of the market regime by the domestic regime). Segregated and under-stimulating housing areas should be reintegrated with production and art (critique of the domestic and industrial regimes by the regime of inspiration and the civic regime). Such compromises among regimes of justification sometimes are stable and hold for a long time. And sometimes they produce urban disasters just as well as segregation. To be sure, typical conflicts recur over and over again. In Aarhus in the year 2001, for instance, tense urban disputes concern: a new art museum versus more social expenditure on the elderly (regime of inspiration vs. civic/domestic regimes), a big new commercial centre versus the small shopkeepers and peaceful residence in the neighborhood (market regime vs. civic/domestic regime), and a new building of luxury flats disturbing the habitat of the residents already present (market regime vs. domestic regime).

Also the project regime is present in the city. We find it, firstly, in situations in which it has replaced the industrial regime as justification for bigger urban building projects. Increasingly, comprehensive urban planning has receded to a succession of more or less singular projects.

Secondly, mobility has become an increasingly important issue as urban areas have become more and more dispersed into the countryside. The more the difference between city and country has been erased, the more mobility has become an urban issue. Some, like the French urban economist François Ascher, would argue that the implications of this development
are still not realised among planners and politicians. Needless to say at this point, proximity within the extensive city has become a question of mobility and speed. An important concept in this regard is the concept of “urban potentiality”, which, according to Ascher, means “the number of possible interactions from the same place within a given time”. Such a concept should, in an urban world, where intra-urban speed has doubled within the last 30 years, be integrated into urban planning.

Furthermore, one could look for new urban public spaces in the areas detested by urban planners: parking lots, airports and their surroundings, peripheral commercial centres, service stations etc. At present they are conceived mostly from a technical/functional point of view, but they should also be considered from a civic and aesthetic perspective.

Urban segregation should also be seen in the perspective of urban potentiality. What should be worked for is a more equal distribution of access to mobility. A real social policy in urban transport should give the “greatest number the means of metropolitan mobility”.

In this regard collective transportation is not necessarily the only answer to problems of urban mobility. If urban zones become less and less dense, the advantages of collective (industrial) transportation also diminish. Rather, a strategy of multi-modality in urban transportation seems appropriate, taking into consideration that different modes of transportation pertain to different urban zones.

One cannot avoid noticing the similarities between the project regime and Ascher’s arguments concerning mobility in the city. The urban potentialities should be as extensive and equally distributed as information should be in an ethically sound project-network. John Urry seems to argue in the same way.

Is this an industrial way of arguing for mobility in the city? Hardly so, we think; it is rather a network-approach. And isn’t this network-approach to proximity and mobility in the metropolis already present in Le Corbusier’s idea of the modern city? To be sure, the modern city was planned according to the ideals of an industrial regime of justification, and collective transportation was an integral part of it. But the automobile was also present as a mediator of proximity by mobility.

If there is something new in the present situation in comparison to Le Corbusier, it seems to relate to the increasing need for reflexive relations in the urban world of auto-mobility. A relation that respects the autonomy of the mobile individual while at the same time making the whole network of (auto)mobiles work. Ascher recommends a “coaching”-like procedure. An equal distribution of information to car drivers about possible bottlenecks in the flow of traffic may inspire some of them to change routes, so that the predicted bottlenecks become self-denying prophecies. This is a project-justified way of regulating mobility.

**Mobility and critique**

Let’s now, to conclude, return to the relationship between critique and mobility. In Boltanski & Chiapello’s interpretation of the new capitalism, it seems as if all the freedoms dreamed of by new French philosophy have arrived, but not only as good news. It is as if “freedom comes when it no longer matters” as Bauman says. In other words, we seem to be “condemned to nomadism, at the very moment that we think we can make displacement the most effective means of subversion”.

But, significantly, the new French philosophy itself has been aware of this! For instance Deleuze & Guattari argued that the logic of capital is the logic of deterritorialisation, and that today control society is dominating the capitalism of the disciplinary/panoptic power. “Control”, says Deleuze,

is short-term and rapidly shifting, but at the same time continuous and unbounded, whereas discipline was long-term, infinite and discontinuous.

If the geography of panoptic discipline worked in terms
of fixed points or positions, control operates in terms of mobility, speed, flexibility, anonymity and contingent identities, in terms of “the whatever”.

So, where does this leave us with critique and mobility? If mobility transcends all critique, as Bauman and Virilio would argue, then criticism must be anti-mobile: slow down; localise!

As we have seen, however, mobility can be justified and criticised on the basis of mobility. In this context, the project regime is able to articulate the mobile common good. This, however, looks too innocent, if it is not confronted with Deleuze’s “control society.” But how to ground a mobile critique of control society? The concept of exploitation, presented by Boltanski & Chiapello, does not seem to work well here, because it is focused on the contradiction between the mobile and the immobile supporters of their networks. We are still left with an anti-mobile critique of mobility.

Where does this leave us with a mobile critique of mobility? In the tension between travelling light for the common good and light-travelling as control. And regarding this tension, there may still be a Deleuzian line of flight – speed as deviation, exile as “spiritual rather than physical mobility.”

Notes
2. See Bauman (especially 1998 and 2000) on the non-universality of mobility and the differential social topologies that emerge as the consequence of the two distinct mobilities: that of the tourist (choice) and the exile (compulsory mobility).
11. “We must politicize speed, whether it be metabolic speed (the speed of the living being, of reflexes) or technological speed. We must politicize both, because we are both: we are moved, and we move. To drive is also to be driven. To drive a car is also to be driven by its properties” (Virilio 1997: 35).
16. “The dynamics of each regime exhibits the link between the capture of a relevant reality and the outline of some good... the good is a common good, which rests ultimately on the assumption of common humanity” (Wagner 2000: 347–8).
18. (ibid. 347, 344f).
22. In a lecture at the Aarhus School of Architecture (18th March 1998), Daniel Libeskind pointed out that creativity is about not to know too much. The knowledge one has can block creative thinking.
26. See, for instance, Sennett (1996: 173, 197) in this context.
31. This point draws upon discussions in the “mobilities group”, Dept of Sociology, Lancaster University.
33. (ibid. 222–230).
34. J. O. Krag.
40. (Ibid. 61).
41. (Ibid. 86–7).
51. See Urry (2000). Consider, for instance, Mike Davis’ example from New York and Los Angeles. Mexican communities in these cities have dense trans-national network relations. Mexicans in LA “can go home for the weekend or negotiate with their counterparts in the village via speaker phone”. They participate directly and simultaneously in two different social spaces, and, to use Davis’ words, they “occupy strikingly different class positions in the parallel worlds they move between” (Davis 2000: 83, 86).
57. This point draws upon a private conversation with Zygmunt Bauman.
60. See Bauman (2000: 4).
62. (Ibid. 161ff).
63. (Ibid. 165–67).
64. (Ibid. 167).
65. (Ibid. 168).
66. (Ibid. 183).
70. (Ibid. 114–15).
71. (Ibid. 121).
72. (Ibid. 127).
73. (Ibid. 88).
74. Bauman (2000: 35). This is according to Bauman the case because the means to use the new freedoms are not available.

References


