Normally, we tend to think of places as something quite well defined – they are what we live in or go to. But we do also regularly relate to more “fuzzy” kinds of places, such as those in the periphery of our daily routines, places that we vaguely know of but never enter, or those we might find ourselves in without understanding how we got there or how to navigate in. They may give us feelings of uneasiness, or they may require too large an effort to be deeper accessed. Further, we may deliberately avoid places for many different practical or psychological reasons. The disregard of places, momentarily or on longer terms, involves a cluster of judgements too complex to be comprehensively grasped in one singular theoretic discipline, like psychology or aesthetics. Theoretical determination of “place” and of qualities that we may label “placial,” involves by necessity a distinction between “place” and some other part of the geography that is under current study. Recognised as either a background topology, as a counter-place, as a fake place, or simply being neglected, there is always a place-like entity left that has to be placed outside a current definition. What individuals, sciences, and urban practices distinguish as a place, and what they in consequence disregard as non-place, is indeed a facetted matter and depends in a complex way on our relation to the culture(s) at hand. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to explicitly state what constitutes a place – and when it comes to the design and theorisation of architecture they are an inescapable part of the game.

As a central concept in architecture, “place” has sometimes been defined through other disciplines and sometimes through individual opinion – cognitively, emotionally, semantically, geographically, graphically, cartographically, politically, to mention but a few grounds for delimitation. They more or less involve each-other but highlight a certain aspect. And every time a place or the concept of “place” is defined, there are inevitably left-overs which do not fit into the current idea of what a place is. When a place is recognised for instance by the amount of social activity that is going on, or when there is an aesthetic criterion like the harmony of landscape and building, that recognition inevitably also excludes phenomena at hand that
does not fit into the picture. This type of exclusion, i.e. this cognitive production of “non-place,” may be explicitly declared, for instance as an investigative delimitation of what to regard as placial when performing an anthropological study. But it may also turn out as an unpredicted consequence of the fact that a certain type of focus is kept when a place is studied.

The aim of this article is to investigate this type of delimitation of place/non-place. Since such a production is made virtually every time the word “place” is uttered, or every time a place is designed, the scope of this investigation could easily expand out of hand. For this reason, and for the sake of addressing an influential type of place theory the subject is here restricted to a discussion about theories that deal explicitly with the concept of place, with a special focus on dichotomies derived from phenomenological thinking. The investigation will also be done in respect to how a handling of “place” and “non-place” may unfold as artistic undertakings. In the article it is argued – in a critique of theories of place that to a certain extent operate with dichotomic preconditions of “good” and “bad” – that they essentially work against their own phenomenological spirit. This will be done in relation to texts representing the last three decades of architecture theory, authored by Edward Relph, Kenneth Frampton and Edward Casey. Contrary to making an unprejudiced (as far as that is possible) analysis of what architectural place is, they all seem to take for granted a certain type of “goodness” of a place. Consequently, an axiology of “good” and “bad” is initially constructed, which is also sometimes tied to explicit architectural examples. In the article it is suggested that dichotomic notions of place are better serving reality when the are modalised, i.e. acted subjectively upon, or replaced by a graded succession of states that correspond to an experience of practical realities. Finally, as a contrast to the purely theoretical examination of places, an example of practical/ideological activity is regarded, an activity attempting at a modalisation of placial taken-for-givens, namely the techniques of the art (or anti-art) movement Situationist International. Their activities too, just like the works by the authors mentioned above, can be seen as a response to the unification and commodification of modern architectural environments, but with a more accepting, albeit not necessarily less troubling, type of sentiment towards the places addressed. In a reflection of the advantages and disadvantages of situationistic activity it is here suggested that for an artistic undertaking or modalisation of a milieu to be fruitful, it will have to either stay utopian, or deal responsively, i.e. be in future dialogue with, that milieu.

**Non-place as a matter of theoretical interest: a background**

In contemporary anthropology, sociology and geography, as well as in the aesthetics of today’s art and architecture, the quotidian making of space (and place) has showed to be a prominent theme, and philosophers of social space like Henri Lefebvre, Michel Foucault, and Michel de Certeau, recur as referents. Through their works and others’, a paradigm of space as a background extension or “ether,” described either technically via mathematical coordinates or through formalist expression, is abandoned for an understanding of space as socially and individually produced in the ordinary doings of humans and in the scientific disciplines. The focus on production, kept by these thinkers much in a critique of institutional (conceptual or societal) powers of spatial production, brought into light the placial properties produced and excluded by “proper” types of thinking or “taken-for-given” paths of practice. But they too had to create their own “non-places” in order to put forth their ideas (or better, their counter-ideas). In fact, Lefebvre’s dialectical writing builds completely on the creation of opposites, and just to mention one, central, of the many dichotomic outsets of Lefebvre’s, one could point to the discussion of taking-over of space where he regards “dominated spaces” versus “appropriated spaces”. But contrary to many scientific models that claim (or have rigidly been accepted as) absolute validity, Lefebvre for the most part claim only temporary truthfulness, and the polarities are thus continuously overruled by himself in a narratological succession of thought. Certeau seem to be somewhat more fixated, as concerns dichotomies, in his critique of the static and taken-for-given orders that he links to the concept of “place,” and the pro-
ducts of individual freedom of action that he attributes “space.” These polarities are also linked, respectively, to his well-known distinction between strategies and tactics. And Foucault finally, runs, via the concept of “heterotopia,” a veritable modelling of a dichotomic place, namely the reflecting place that contrasts the utopias of society, and in that aspect society itself.

In a more recent speculation about late modern spaces and places – or supermodern, to be more in line with the terminology of the author – Marc Auge has suggested a new type of interest for anthropology. Auge’s notion of “non-place” has in a certain respect turned this term into an established one, at least in recent discourse about the late-modern society, where architectures such as air-ports, supermarkets and themed places for recreation and tourism are recasting the identity of humankind as place-beings. Auge builds partly on ideas from Certeau concerning the individual’s navigation in places as a production of (new) space. Certeau regards as non-places or “nowheres” those holes or “passages” in a stable (urban) fabric-of-place that can emerge as deviations in the acts of walking or reading signs. Auge follows Certeau in the sense that it is the individual’s perspective that is highlighted, but his concept of “non-place” is fabricated more as a response to the anthropological fact that there are virtually no “true” places in an anthropological sense, graspable or uninfluenced by the one who recognises them, especially not in today’s society of fast, diverse and global mediation.

One of the most evident mechanisms of spatial exclusion at hand, which has only lately reached more prominent theoretical status, is the (lack of) place for the woman in the world of the man. Feminist contributions to the space/place problem has highlighted not only the social patterns of action that virtually create non-places for women, but also shown the gender based semantic figures of thought of various disciplines, a taken-for-grantedness that not either the above mentioned “radical fathers” of late modern space philosophy can free themselves from. From a philosophical perspective, one of the most fundamental contributions is Luce Irigaray’s, who attacks a vast amount of male-conditioned thought-paraphernalia. She points to how the role of bodily difference between the sexes generates conceptions for the place and non-place of women. And she also discusses, very concretely, various mechanisms for the domination of common space (such as noise as a right for men).

The politics of place/non-place, taken as a wide geographical issue, is central to the problems of national and ethnical formation. The attribution of phantasmatic images to countries powered as colonies or to places for recreation, not to mention the drastic fabrication of non-place based on “protection of the nation” and manifested as ethnical cleansing in war-time and “peace”-time, are two geo-political issues behind a contemporary geographical turn of interest in the social sciences as well as in the arts.

I will in what follows not so much discuss explicitly the concepts of these background authors, worthy as they would be of a critical study in itself, but rather devote this essay to a critique of a couple of texts that refer to a phenomenological tradition of thought, a tradition that also most of the authors hitherto mentioned have links to.

An issue of interest in architectural discourse, an issue with many facets, could be stated as a question: Has the new planning strategies and new designs been able to provide a sense of place at all, or has that particular ability vanished as the “old worlds” were successively or abruptly replaced? Are the places of today worthy of their epithet? In architectural, geographical, and anthropological theories about place, a recurrent opposition is often stated: There is either “place” – genuine, authentic, lived – or there is “placelessness,” characterised by anonymity, lack of life, ugly architecture, exploitation or other kinds of threats to a presumably humane environment. This type of separation recurs also in discussions closer to the architectural profession, or else in arguments about the guidance for the aesthetics of a new prospect, as for instance in debates about the importance of “the context,” i.e. the (cultural, societal, environmental, climatological, topological, stylistic, etc) circumstances that surround the prospection of a new building, a new urban structure, a new highway, etc. The polarities relates to finance, style
and technological method and could be expressed as: context contra construction; regional contra high-tech; habit contra exploitation; local contra international. In practice, an architectural project involves a mix of these contradictory aspects, but “goodness” or “badness” of the placial qualities are nevertheless often taken-for-given as scientific or aesthetic facts, instead of evaluated as part of a forthcoming process.

Preferences concerning place qualities are theoretically coded into concepts like “spatial emptiness,” “non-place” or “placelessness.” This type of axiological categorisation of actual geographies, for instance of places having none, or low, social or aesthetic value, or for less explicit reasons being not suited for place studies at all, sometimes influences the terminology itself, creating a biased semantic ground for place discussions. A concept like “site,” for instance, might thus as we shall see, turn out negatively loaded and even be treated as the primary representative of non-place-qualities. “Site” is then no longer denoting a potential placial concern, but is turned axiologically opposite to “place.”

The incentive in the following is not primarily to pinpoint the necessary distinctions between two different phenomena or two different labels, like for instance “place” and “site.” Rather, the aim is to discuss the axiologies, the value systems, tied to such dialectics, and thus the values and preferences behind the place-distinctions. The assumption will be made that in connection to real circumstances there is an inevitable discrepancy between a concept like “placelessness” and the actual locus chosen to illustrate it. Suburban sprawl, forgotten backyards, supermarkets, airport terminals, or the vague areas close to highways, to mention just a few spots of placial concern, have occurred negatively as “non-places,” representing lack of for instance social complexity or architectural form. But as places for individual enjoyment or production, these types of geographies may of course be judged otherwise: where a politician or a city planner sees a social or aesthetic problem (“How shall we fill this gap?”), the occasional walker may find an untouched area for meetings or recreation.

Providing a room for “place”

As a general phenomenon, “place” has in contemporary thinking often been regarded as something lived, created and reached for – contrary to a traditional view of it being a subordinate part in an abstracted or stratified spatial structure. This is a main thought in for instance Edward Casey’s The Fate of Place, a philosophical history of “the idea of place.” Casey defends the concept of place in its own right, against a number of attempts to disregard it as only part of a system. “Space,” for instance, is regarded by Casey as a counter-concept, because it returns in the history of western philosophy as the abstract over-all extension that threatens to encapsulate “place” and surpass it to nothing but a small anonymous part of a hegemonic structure. And he considers the role of “site,” in philosophy as well as in planning, as an even stronger threat to place-values. “Site” is thus turned into an axiological opposition to “place” by Casey, because it only situates: “site is the very undoing of place, its dismantling into punctiform positions.”

Before going further into the dichotomies created by Casey, it should be stated that he explicitly discusses “nonplaces,” “nowheres,” and “absolute voids” on different levels. After having opened for the old philosophical (empirical) question of whether there is such a thing as a no-place – for instance as the state before we have anything at all – he concludes that the idea of an actual no-place is highly problematic. He states that there can be no such thing as an essential no-place, an absolute void, because place is necessary for all other existence: “place is the first of all things.” That there are non-places in a logical or poetic sense is another matter, and Casey makes use of this metaphorical possibility in his own writings.

The understanding of space as an over-all structure is rendered by Casey as the primary and longest living threat to a multifaceted, subject- and body-oriented concept of place. Philosophy’s early orientation of place-like qualities as subordinated a panoptic or divine umbrella was slowly during the 15th – 19th centuries replaced by another umbrella with more scientific (esp. logical and geometrical) preponderance. According to Casey, “place” was never in the Western history of philosophy given its proper conceptual status, despite the
fact that there were embryos for a more activity-based place-concept already in Greek philosophy. Descartes, Leibniz and Kant belong to those who, according to Casey, failed to give the concept of place a status of its own that could conquer the dominating idea of an abstract and geometric space that contains punctiform or merely relational places. While philosophical thought, in Casey’s view, for hundreds of years fabricated the thought of place as mere location, it finally, in the 20th century via e.g. Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray, seems to start to incorporate subjective intentions and bodily desires as essential properties of place. According to Casey, “place” has however still not been given its full rights and proper semantic demarcation, whether in philosophical conceptualisation or in the practice of urban planning.

A “site” is in Casey’s view a representative of the anonymous structures that threatens the values of a genuine and lived place: “Site is striated space,” and as such held by Casey as an abstraction and elimination of place-value. While “place” is, ideally, definite in its own right, “site” is, in Casey’s phenomenology, merely a para-site to the real thing: “a place has the ability to really situate […] richly and diversely, [whereas …] a site is entirely extrinsic to what is sited.” “Site” and “space” are thus axiomatically merged by Casey and mutually attributed a negative value in their dubious capacity of turning place anonymous. They are even viewed as instances of each other, in their ability to neutralise, or oppress, “place”: “Site is the realm of the anonymous position that place traditionally has been given in space.”

In Casey’s investigation of the place/space/site complex, he is in search for concepts where “space” is created out of “place,” showing that space-production is, or should be, something that emanates from a place. He finds this principle, more or less mature, in thinkers like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Irigaray. He also finds it with practices that emphasise architecture as event, and in “transarchitecture,” where emphasis is neither on architecture’s expressive capacities, nor on its impasive (e.g. international style) ones. Casey thus has no trouble finding interconnections and mutual containments of space and place. But he seems to have a harder time with the incorporation of site into place and vice versa, which is strange because he in many ways considers “space” and “site” as two instances of essentially the same attitude towards “place.” Since the concept of site is fundamental, if not taken for given, in architecture, as well as in the branches of contemporary art that deal directly with a geographical, urban or communal circumstance, we may take a closer look at the place/site as a presumed conceptual opposition.

The development of cartographic representation in the seventeenth century is viewed by Casey in the light of this place/site complex: “To make place calculable is to transform it into site, […] metrically precise maps of the earth were construed as a global scene for sites of discovery and exploitation. How could it be otherwise, if place is conceived as a mere phase of space.” One must of course agree with Casey to the extent that the possibility to map an area has provided a neutrality that “covers” the suffering and unpredictable political consequences that follow invasions and exploitation. It is, for instance, not very hard to imagine a group of strategists gathered calmly around a table using the map of another part of the world as ground for the calculation and imagination of a forthcoming violating scenario. In Casey’s view though, the violence of the cartographic “gaze” is solely site-oriented. His ex-
planation of the implicit dangers of cartographism is thus tied to his main enterprise, namely an almost semantic construction – or cleansing – of the concept of place. He thereby risks, in my view, to miss other possible forces behind exploitative and violating actions, and especially those forces that has to do with alliance with a place, i.e. more or less presumed bounds based on birth, family, ethnicity, collegiality an other “natural” belongings, often used in propagandistic claims of “right” to a place. The type of desire that we may label placial fetishism, which can be evoked through maps as well via other types of indirect knowledge about a place, stories for instance, cannot be solely regarded as a site-phenomenon. The mechanisms behind cultural domination and cultural exchange, need to be thought of as interrelations of place and site, of ego and alter, of nature and culture, and not as separated entities. Our psychological bounds to places may substitute for a clearer knowledge of them, a fact that shows only too evident in political and warfare activities, as in (fictitious) actions of territorial revenge. The complex mechanisms behind military or terrorist operations are often linked to the wish to regain, or to achieve a certain place, a place already existing in the mind of the appropriator. And so called holy places may in this respect host a double fiction – not only the relocated divine existence but also the locus for perfect religious/political control. The will, thus, to possess, involves “place” as well as “site.” We don’t necessarily turn a place into a mere site as soon as we situate ourselves external to it. On the contrary, deliberate unbelonging may even be the only possible sound relation, since it is critical, to the “roots” of one’s culture.

What becomes obvious, in these regards of mapping, yearning and culturally conditioned being-out-of-place, not to mention the daily investments in a “site” made by architects, artists and politicians, etc, is that sites are wishes rich of existential value. In arguments and petitions concerning sites we can hardly disregard the placial qualities involved. Instead of letting the analysis of the concepts of place and site suffer from a dichotomic categorisation we may try to examine the modalities of the vague semantic area where “genuine place” and “cartographic site” are supposed to play opposite roles. By regarding phenomena like habitation and exploitation as processes, and not as societal or ontological ready-mades, we will automatically be able to question the borderline that tries to hold “place” and “site” axiologically apart from one another.

**The placeness of site and the situatedness of place.**

On an obvious level, and in accordance with Casey, one may say that “site” connotes visual over-view, external law, territorial delimitation and speculation. In this sense it is not constituted by quotidian life, like a “place” would be. But the notion of site is therefore not, as Casey repeatedly has it, devoid of place-value. Rather, “site” depends on “place,” and vice versa. An attention towards a site, manifested for instance as a wish for something to be built there, can not be characterised solely as the axiological opposition to how a place is approached or lived, but better, as a pre-existent form of place. The semantic distinction between “site” and “place” probably has its clearest cause in relation to time – or better – change over time. By “place” and “site” we normally express two different stages (and states) in a process of habitational reordering. Seen from such a temporal perspective, the ideal “place” could be seen as a final stage, a fulfilled habitat, whereas a site would be the initial locus for a wish of some kind. Between the initial and final stage in a habitational process we will then have hybrid forms, partial places and sites, or stages of non-fulfilment. From a purely dichotomic perspective, these stages would have to be regarded as veritable non-places or non-sites, since they do not fit into the perfect polarity.

A recurring concept in the phenomenology of habitation is exploitation, not seldom used solely in its negative sense as depriving a population of its rights or destroying cultural, environmental or architectural properties. Exploitation can in that perspective appear as the inversion of habitation (high degree of exploitation = low degree of habitation proper, and vice versa). In this line of thought, Casey associates exploitation with “site,” while treating it as the opposite to placial concerns. He also regards it as a definite state of order, as an agent of power external to the place itself. By a simple operation of thought we may disturb this “per-
fect” dichotomy. By regarding exploitation as a process, and in this respect point to the interconnection between sites and places, we will in the same moment be able to show the durational turn from the one to the other. If we regard this turn as a succession rather than as two contradictory states, we get the following approximate stages of exploitation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAGE OF EXPLOITATION</th>
<th>PROSPECTING ACTIVITY</th>
<th>DOMINANT TYPE OF LOCUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. not exploited</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. possible to exploit</td>
<td>idea /concept</td>
<td>place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. announced to be exploited</td>
<td>decision /concept/drawing</td>
<td>place (site)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. started to be exploited</td>
<td>program /drawing/building</td>
<td>site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. newly exploited</td>
<td>building</td>
<td>site (place)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. once exploited</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>place* (site)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It deserves to be stated clearly here, that this brief grading is hypothetical: It could be made with other stages in mind as well, and the number of stages could be less or more. In the six stages here chosen, the starting point could be for instance an inhabited part of a town, which in the next step is chosen as site for a planning of a new area. The last step represents the renewal of placelessness on the terms of the performed exploitation, and it is in reality the kind of step taken when a group of inhabitants are accustomed to the new milieu. Slowly, the new locus may become lived, i.e. inhabited by not only the prospected typology of inhabitants, but by those that start to inhabit the street (walkers, scaters, etc.) and its sometimes unforeseen market places (sellers of fast food, etc) in less programmed ways. This last stage is therefore called place* (new), and could also be seen as the starting ground for a new exploitation cycle. The middle stages, 2 to 5, are here seen as more or less dominated by the enterprise of exploitation, even when the actual type of locus may be evaluated as “place.” In the succession here rendered then, the different stages of exploitation, principally characterised as influencing the domains of “place” or “site,” are thus not fixed. The occurrence of a parenthetical site or place in the locus column signifies that the change does not happen discretely but partially. The parentheses also indicate that the distribution depends on choice of perspective when judged. For instance, since “the dominant type of locus” reflects essentially a judgement of placial qualities, an expropriator or a builder would probably see both a working place and envision a future place in some of the later stages where a person who was forced to move from the exploitation area only is able to see an anonymous site for building construction. The spectrum also depends on how, and by whom, the initial exploitative decision was made, and the effect of this decision in the successive process. In regard of these flexibilities, this simple scheme of exploitation renders on principle the interdependence of site and place.

The (geographical/architectural/mental) stages of this process could be called modal, because they concern the way in which a change occurs (or how someone exploits/builds/experiences). These modalities concern, as we have seen, first of all temporal adjustments to a supposedly absolute understanding of exploitation. And they implicate that exploitation is not fixed, but consists of possibilities, probabilities and likeliness, or in other words, that exploitation is open for adjustment, a fact that can be used politically by both exploiters and exploited.

An act of exploitation is thus logically flexible, individually convertible, and politically changeable. To ascribe to “site” the negation of “place,” by linking it to exploitation, as in the manner of Casey’s semantic division, therefore blocks the dynamical interchange of sites and places, and eventually risks diminishing the possibilities to change and create places. The axiology of a “good” place versus a “bad” site runs in this sense against a dynamic notion of place, a notion where space is provided through placeness and situatedness in combination.

We have seen so far that a preferential positioning of “place” may turn out problematic, and even run against its own purpose of articulation of placial qualities in relation to spatial and situational ones. By scrutinising the phenomenological opposition between “place as lived” and “site as speculation,” via the modalities of an act that involves both parties, namely exploitation, the focus shifted to “place as crea-
tion” and “site as potentiality.” In the following we will address other types of modalisation concerning places and their supposed counterparts.

**The sense of belonging.**

Segmentation of place-qualities is not always a matter of the either-or kind of polarisation. The geographer and architecture theoretician Edward Relph proposed already in 1976 a modulated theory of place by linking it to degrees of identification. In Place and Placelessness, Relph investigates placial experience in terms of identification with the place one is physically situated in. A central concern of Relph’s could be stated as a question: How is the complexity of identification taken care of in theories and schemata that claim to provide tools for the analysis and planning of places? What he does, as a statement against simplified notions of identification in urban milieus, and in an attempt to avoid the dichotomy of stating this identification as being either an insider or outsider, is to grade the mode of feeling included/excluded. He suggests an evaluation of place that to a greater extent take into account the complicated sense of belonging, by presenting a finite list of seven different types of outsideness/insideness – well aware of the dilemma of trying to situate an actual experience in this or that category. The categories may be listed briefly as going from high sense of belonging to no sense of belonging:

- existential insideness (a self-evident, close habitual relation to a place)
- empathetic insideness (a reflected, respectful and understanding relation)
- behavioural insideness (a navigating, utilitarian and pragmatic presence)
- vicarious insideness (a sense of knowing a place through mediation)
- incidental outsideness (a visitors attitude – place as occasional utility)
- objective outsideness (a deliberately distant and observing position of interest)
- existential outsideness (not feeling involved at all, even though being there)

As we see, Relph maintains “insideness” and “outside-

ness” as a dichotomic ground, which indicates that an either/or belonging is what essentially matters in evaluation of identification with a place. As we shall see, this is perhaps not a self-evident choice of ground. But before returning to this problem it must be admitted that this distribution seems to be able to describe for instance a process of integration into a community, where a significant turn might be felt when someone is going from an unbelonging towards becoming one in a group. This graded categorisation could therefore, as far as I can judge, in principal provide a terminology by which the conditions of social integration could be evaluated and analysed. Relph’s concerns though, are above all about a more general, and more abstract, feeling of identification with a place. And as we shall see, he is in the end more directed towards a certain type of architectural and urban “failure.” But first, his modalities of outsideness and insideness will be given some explanation and comments.

When discussing “existential outsideness,” Relph is not primarily interested in the type of actual social omission that we might call literal outsideness, which would be an exclusion executed either as a silent intersubjective non-allowance to a place, or as an explicit (governmental) statement. Instead of going deeper into the kind of social constructs that forms such phenomena as homelessness, ethncal separation or spatial differentiation based on income or gender, Relph renders outsideness as an individual experiential phenomenon. He associates with “existential outsideness” primarily a type of personality trait – a constant feeling of being an outsider: “Existential outsideness involves a self-conscious and reflective uninvolvment, an alienation from people and places, homelessness, a sense of the unreality of the world, and of not belonging.” This type of experience, Relph says in accordance with a common view of the artist-as-outsider, has “fascinatated poets and novelists,” and he uses Rilke and Proust to exemplify the type of mind that presumably have a greater access to the feeling that “all places are of the same meaningless identity.” When Relph discusses the concept of outsideness in its different modes, he is mainly concerned with the principal ways in which a visitor may identify with the surroundings. Both “ob-
jective outsideness” and “incidental outsideness” are exemplified by the figure of a scientist, that for experimental reasons or for residential purposes relate to a place without having the intention of becoming a member of the community. Relph views the scientist’s gaze as typically abstractionist and reductionist: “The attitude of the objective outsider effectively reduces places either to the single dimension of location or to a space of located objects and activities.” When discussing “vicarious insideness,” “the artist” returns again, now in the role as the mediator par preference, even though mass media and its “ready-made” renderings of places also are mentioned as having us imagine remote places.

“Incidental outsideness” reflects, in Relph’s model, a kind of attendance to a place where only certain functions are selected. As incidental outsiders, we turn the place into a mere background for our more or less unreflective activities: “the fact that we do things frequently overshadows where we do it.” In the sense that we don’t reflect very deeply on our surroundings, this type of outsideness therefore resembles the type of insideness that Relph calls “behavioural,” the contrast only given by the fact that the latter involves a stable and habitual – though still superficial – attendance towards the place. The emphasis of “behavioural insideness” lies with the manner in which things in our surroundings appear on a basis of “visual patterns.” It is thus based in the visual recognition that simply tells us that we are here rather than somewhere else, and Relph regards this category as “the narrow sense in which the phenomenon of insideness is probably most commonly understood.”

Judging from Relph’s description of these seven categories, it is not obvious why the inside/outside distinction should be kept as labels. A model describing the identification with a place could probably do well without a dichotomic ground for a modalisation. Since the model implies that a person is actually located in the place in question, but feeling more or less identified with it, it seems that the categories could very well be seen as seven modes of insideness. The 5th and 6th category could then for instance still be labelled incidental and objective (insideness) and still denote the same types of experience, and the 7th could perhaps be labelled inhibited, or fictitious insideness. This way, the model would, apart from technically getting rid of one parametric level, be beneficial to analyses of places where human presence is taken as an initial fact or natural precondition.

Despite the fact that “insideness” and “outsideness” are kept as a primary separation, and despite the grounding of the gradation of insideness/outsideness in a dubious scientific fashion where human experience is rendered as observable experiential strata, sorted by over-belief in the applicability of complex phenomena like empathy, authenticity and identity, this model seem to have advantages in the discussion about the relation between the place and the individual. Relph’s categorisation is an attempt at modalising an otherwise polarised terminology of belonging, and it is consequently an attempt that could question notions of architecture as providing either place or placelessness. If such a set of categories were treated with the caution of keeping the limits between them open and discursive, this would also be a clearer theoretical stance against the reduced notions of identification with a place, that are too focused on visual recognition, or too obviously made to fit into simplified demographic views of human activities.

From the overall perspective of exposing and modalising place dichotomies, Relph’s original seven categories seem to come to a certain right as listed in the first part of Place and Placelessness. As such, they are promisingly interdisciplinary since they concern a combination of physical and mental modes of presence, and also because they apply to a sociological understanding of place as related to the influence of architecture. As long as this kind of diversification avoids supporting pre-established notions of “good” or “bad” places, it may provide a terminology for not only different modes of an individual’s identification with a place, but also for how an integration into a community proceeds. Unfortunately, Relph himself does not in Place and… deepen or manifest this incitement to a modal theory of belonging, though. Instead, when dealing more directly with placelessness, his intent seem to alter completely, from a description of those
who occupy places, to a mere classification, or rather disqualification, of certain types of architecture.

Which places are lesser places?

Instead of fulfilling a modal aesthetics of place, Relph turns in *Place and…* into a discussion much more guided by preferential aesthetics of existing places. He defines placelessness as tied to failures linked to modern urban projects, and categorises architectural types as being placeless or not. By displaying photographic images of for instance houses or cities – suitably photographed from a distance, thereby given an aura of exploitation or anonymity – and letting them represent placelessness by labelling the places inauthentic, touristic, disneyfied, decorated, machine-like and kitsch, he turns the whole project dichotomic again. And this dichotomy is essentially based on traditional aesthetic clichés. It is not hard to grasp – nor at times to sympathise with – his overall intention: a critique of senseless architecture that occurred with the unreflecting sprawl of uniform styles and technological package solutions, as well as of theoretical models that fail to capture this loss of “continuity with place.” But harder to accept is his taken-for-granted choice of urban fabric, a choice that manifests a traditional delimitation of good and bad taste: old curved roads versus new motorways; old authentic villages (even ruins) versus new suburban “machines” to live in; etc. There is not much room in *Place and…* for easy-to-achieve bungalows or unplanned streets, corners, backyards and parking lots as vital urban possibilities. There is no opening up for the possibility of the modernity-born places as something to like as a home, to establish activities in, to hide in, or to have meetings in. Relph does briefly admit, in response to a reading of Lefebvre, that “the ugly everyday landscape in some respect is a vital mess, because it is a more or less unselfconscious expression of peoples activities and wants.” But then he quickly re-package this promising “vital mess” and victimises it in a simplified, if not caricaturist, view of the reign of capitalism: “[…] but it is however promoted and exploited by salesmen.”

When placelessness is discussed as a contradiction to ideal forms of well-being, and ideal forms of architecture, there is an obvious risk of accepting the already existing architectural tradition as perfectly sufficient. Activities aiming at connecting people from different places are consequently seen as suspect. When for instance “other-directed architecture” is treated by Relph in a passage about mass-culture and tourism, it is in a negative way. It is described as “deliberately directed towards outsiders, spectators, passers-by, and above all consumers. Other-directed places suggests almost nothing of the people living and working in them.” Relph aims here at a critique of the “downtown shopping and entertainment districts where other-directedness reach their purest expression in the cityscape of pornography and ‘pornscape,’” but his simplified and negative notion of “other-directedness” leads inevitably to a range of questions that must be asked but that fall outside of Relph’s self-assumed scope.

In relation to our understanding of placelessness, outsideness, and non-places we may then retrospectively put a set of such questions here, necessary for a more adequate understanding of the production of placial dichotomies: What is an “other” in other-directedness? Who works at service-oriented places, and for what reasons? Who uses/lives in them? When does a place – or differently put: at what moment does architecture – turn “touristic” and “other-directed”? And
ultimately, who would actually be served in a place equipped with “proper” placeness?

**Place as a highly evaluated phenomenon.**

With regard to the dichotomies found in Relph’s Place... and in Casey’s The Fate, as well as in other place-oriented architecture theory where phenomenology plays a referential part, such as in Kenneth Frampton’s Towards a Critical Regionalism, we may have reason to pinpoint a problem. For the lack of a better expression, it could be labelled “the phenomenological ready-made.” With this term I mean the presupposed locus of genuineness and ontological richness that seem to appear a priori, or else as an expected finding, in theories as well as in certain practices of architecture. A common denominator here is a “heideggerian anxiety” concerning the observation of a general (modern) loss of awareness towards the conditions of being. Even if phenomenological philosophy in its original version regarded placial existence and the experience of “non-place” as inevitably linked, second hand interpretations tend to keep these conceptual domains completely apart or even tied to separate empiri. The common “fear” sensed in this particular field of thought, is that we as modern beings are loosing not only ontological depth and a reflective relation to our life and our surroundings, but more specifically, that we have started to make “bad places.”

A lorry driver on a highway, or a waiter at a tourist restaurant, does not necessarily prefer to move, or change habits, just because their daily places may be disqualified, or labelled “inauthentic” in a discourse about architectural place. To detect “placelessness” a closer relationship is needed. The choice of an individual, or a community, not to mention an architect who ties her doings to that community, is hardly grasped through presupposed notions of good life and good places. A placial choice is more likely grounded in engagements, or in the personal or ideological investments made to provide habitat, room for activities, space for expressions of opinion, etc, for oneself or for others. And these engagements concern both existing places, and possible places, i.e. sites. Also from artistic place-related works, or site-specific ones, a field into which

I will now turn, we may have reason to expect an engagement beyond the implementation of a visual or conceptual ready-made.

**Drifting as a modality of place.**

Since uniformity and rigidity could be said to be the general background against which any critical artistic and architectonic initiative is taken, it would be beyond the scope of this essay to try to give a view of this diverse practical undertaking of places. As a last entry to this discussion of possible modalities of place formation, I will therefore restrict the analysis to a specific practice, or practical aesthetic movement, that combines idiosyncratic undertaking and social awareness with local investigation, namely the Situationiste International (SI). This movement has an initial resemblance with the theoretical investigations of place that we have so far discussed, in the ambition to address general (or basic) societal issues linked to a current state of architecture and urbanism. Just like many theoretical attempts at grasping place phenomena, SI explicitly set out to pinpoint, comment, criticise, and hopefully change, the rules of modern social grammar, rules that format, and are formatted by, the urban conditions.

Viewed in the perspective of the concerns of modern art and its links to other areas in society, the performed practices of SI may be regarded as an “early” example of an explicit attempt to combine the “aesthetic” and the “social” as modal factors of place formation. “Psychogeography” as discipline and as attitude, was launched as the study of geographical settings based on the “mood of the individual,” and condenses in way in one view their agenda. The situationist activities were typically performed by the members of a small group of people, but were also launched through 15 years of more or less regular publication, as part of a general ambition to explore the city and its influence on the mood of its inhabitants. The sources of SI can be traced back to other avantgardist movements such as surrealism, but also to the development of public media like the television, and to the philosophy of Henri Lefebvre. SI took as one of its original inspirations a pamphlet written in 1953 called Formulary for a New Urbanism, a veritable blue-print for a future urban pro-
gram, where such objectives as architectural mobility, individual choice, and substantial spatial emptiness were held high, against the artificiality and dullness of modern life forms, represented in the architecture of “storyless plasticity,” “air conditioning obscuring seasonal changes,” “gardens where games are forbidden,” or “tourist places for free love.”

When it comes to architectural propositions, SI’s contributions were for a couple of years more or less those of one of its leading figures, Constant. As Constant grew more and more an architect producing highly elaborated models, and less a contributor to the anarchistic pamphlets conducted by Guy Debord, a split between them was inevitable. Since very few of his projects were realised, and if they had been they would certainly have lost much of their radical qualities as mobile, flexible and revolutionary, Constant’s (and SI’s) contribution to the tradition of architectural praxis must be regarded as indirect but nonetheless influential. If we want to come closer to the problem of practical modalisation of dichotomies, we would be better served if we leave this utopian architectural project, and approach a more “humble” and actually realised, but probably not less romantic, type of SI activity. In the case of SI the dichotomy of place/non-place is linked to the problematics of what was at that time felt as the emerging of the so-called “society of the spectacle.”

One of the situationist practices – and as such one of the small scale techniques in their dealing with the large scale urban uniformity of the broadly launched life-styles that they pointed out as monotonous and taken-for-given means for living that were produced by the capital as well as of the power of state – was “drifting” (derivé), a systematic group-based type of strolling through chosen city areas, more or less peripheral. Based on collectively agreed preferences, whims or desires, it was launched as an investigative method that aims for states of disorientation combined with alert attention to the different urban settings that were “visited.” In drifting, efforts were to be taken to follow impulses that lead out from the expected movement patterns, at the same time as “paying attention to the terrain and the encounters found there.” Drifting was thus based on spontaneously created, but still collectively agreed “rules” for orientation, in analogy with some of the activities associated with surrealism’s automatism, such as walking according to maps of another city. A drift could, for instance, be directed by walkie-talkie instructions from a part of the city other than that where the drift was physically performed. The objective was to learn to know urban life in a new and original way, more radically than could be done following the expected social grammar.

The SI documentation show little evidence of the actual effects that drifting had on the people or the communities of the city parts that were visited by drifters, and one may wonder to what degree, if any, that people other than the drifters themselves were involved. The rulemaking must in other words be regarded as “exemplary” rather than operative, as concerns society at large. The experiences were kept inside the group only to be secondarily mediated. In that sense the original SI drifters were visitors rather than partakers and influnents. If we, only for the sake of comparison, return to Relph and the modalities of outsideness/insideness, a “drifter” could best be described as an outsider, both “incidental,” “objective” and probably also, albeit the difficulties of the term, “existential.” In a “drifter” these categories would conjoin into a kind of conglomerate placial figure. As concerns the modes of insideness, the original drifts made by SI would have to be seen in a larger context and or in a rhetorical perspective (i.e. society as a “global” place – or Paris, perhaps).

One may view drifting and other SI techniques as too historically bounded, or more precisely, too interested in the logic of the modern urban life as it appeared in the 1950s, to be transferable as a principle relevant for urban investigation or artistic attitude today. Guy Debord and some of his companions were romantically focused on an essentially impossible mission, namely to conquer the “society of the spectacle,” the all-encompassing mediation of a conformist modern lifestyle that threatens love, game and free individual choice. On the other hand, non-conformist urban tactics is still a concern for any critical place-maker, and moreover, the conception of a society where human experience is “artificially” mediated seems to be ever returning.
What has to be recognised also, as a still working principle of SI’s, is that they had a paradoxical, and creative, acceptance of the conditions at hand. They viewed the existing society and the prevalent architecture as material to use critically/practically, not as objects to simply reject or replace. The main difference between the unitary program of Situationist International, and the type of obsolete aesthetics or idiosyncratic masterpieces, and calls for pre-conceived design principles, SI tried to establishes new and alternative types of activities directly in, or on, the urban landscapes that emerged from uniform (capitalist or state-governed) programs. And contrary to the ontological division between sites and places as advocated by Casey, the situationist attitude accepts the urban site as a self-evident part of a placial investigation. This does not mean that SI “succeeded” in actualising a new urban paradigm. Their over-estimated trust in a “common revolutionary consciousness” and the leadership’s obstructions against an actually constructed architecture (or society) based of the activities of the members, meant that SI would become most accurately remembered, and actually most effective, if seen as a provisional ideology.

Conclusions
When “placial” qualities are discussed, we are often faced with value-based dichotomies such as “placelessness/placelessness,” “lived place/anonymous site,” or simply “good/bad.” Beliefs in ontological difference, such as these, are necessary for a broad understanding of places, but they appear also, unfortunately, as fixed empiricisms or as a priori elements in simplified or ready-made phenomenologies of place. When axiological polarities like these are tied to actual architecture, or taken for given as an unquestioned ontological basis in theorisation, certain problems arise. As related to the built environment, such polarised axiologies may turn out as neglecting on the one hand the creative potentiality that lies in existing architectural diversity, and on the other, the possibility to influence the chains of events that lead to new places. And examples of architecture considered as negative in such axiologies of place, might conveniently be dismissed as solely blocking the “original” place-values that are supposedly true and grand. Despite an at times radical or critical out-set, such as in Relph’s, Frampton’s and Casey’s critique of uniform architecture, the introduction of axiological oppositions between “place” and a supposed “counter-place” runs the risk of going against the original critical purpose. They may unfortunately turn out as enterprises of empirical exclusion instead, reducing,
and therefore failing to address other decision-making factors in place-formation, cultural factors of a more economical, political or societal kind. In the end these concepts of place may therefore become unclear or fail to function as an aesthetic positioning, if we regard aesthetics widely as a domain which includes judgements involving the impact of gender, state politics, economy, race, etc, on what is traditionally called style or form.

As a way to question Casey’s axiological and ontological distinction between “place” and “site,” I proposed a hypothetical modalisation of exploitation as a process that showed the interdependence between a site and a place. And in another passage, while rejecting Relph’s distinctions between place and placelessness, I proposed instead a re-evaluation of his seemingly useful modalisation of belonging, or identifying with a place, as states or stages of insideness.

In artistic and activist evaluations of a “non-place,” the “negativity” may be seen as a resource in itself. The site where the artistic activity takes place, may thus be approached without the intention of turning it into an established “good” place. Such an intervention may be done with more or less intent of investigating, commenting on, criticising, or influencing, the current placial conditions. The specific, situationist, undertaking of place as a locus for dérivé, i.e. drifting as an ad hoc attention to a place while moving against normal cohesion, would typically regard a “dubious” urban condition as a material given to act in, to comment on, to reorder, and to learn from. Such an activity will thus modalise a place in the sense that it changes its evident role in the apprehension of the city. We may label it modalisation by personal intervention. The question remains though, to what degree, and to which qualities, such an undertaking really effects the daily doings of the community in the area addressed.

Illustrations:
Photographs showing the author at an exploitation-site in Malmö, at a high-way restaurant in South of Sweden, and at office reading a map.

Notes
1. The attribution “placial” is the place – oriented analogy to “spatial”. This adjectival construction is not generally to be found in dictionaries, but it is used in recent philosophy of place, such as Edward Casey’s. I will use it throughout this article in the sense: relating to, being the attribute of, or having the character of place.
2. Relph and Casey will be more deeply addressed here than Frampton, who will be mentioned mostly via footnotes. A more thorough analysis of Frampton’s “critical regionalism” will be done in a forthcoming dissertation on place and non-place, a dissertation of which this essay is a revised excerpt.
3. – seminal ones like for instance: the complex and extensive de-(and re-)marxist philosophy of space: The Production of Space (Lefebvre); the short, dense, and lecture-based sociological provocation Of Other Spaces (Foucault) and the proposal to a science of individual initiatives: The Practice of Everyday Life (de Certeau).
4. See Lefebvre, The Production of Space, e.g. pp. 164–168. Having established the dichotomy of domination and appropriation – in short, the way space is abruptly taken over contra the way it is assimilated by recognition of its qualities – Lefebvre makes an effort first to distinguish them both from detournement, (or “diversion,” meaning a (temporary) re-use of an existing property with the intention of radically changing its original task or status) (p 167, 168.) In this context “disappropriation” is mentioned as “the abdication of responsibility” that occurs in a society dominated by fragmented visual representations, of for instance bodies. In a later passage he makes an attempt to find, significantly, a dialectical synthesis between (or escape from) these two opposites, in the notion of co-optation (p. 368 ff).
6. Foucault, Of Other Spaces. The launching of the concept of heterotopia as a specific figure of spatial and architectural thought, was done in this short text, roughly outlined, dense, influential, problematic.
7. He also reconsiders, as does de Certeau himself, Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between geometrical space and anthropological space – the important distinction that also has formed a contemporary disciplinary interest of which Augé is a self-evident advocate and critic.
9. She does so, by effectively addressing major philosophical “fathers of the fathers” [my quotation], such as Aristotle and Hegel. See for instance “Place, Interval: A
reading of Aristotle, Physics IV.”
10. I will deal more closely with Certeau’s place-space division, Foucault’s heterotopia, and Augé’s non-place in the previously mentioned forthcoming dissertation about concepts of place/non-place.
11. This term is taken from the geographer and architecture theoretician Edward Relph, and serves potentially here as a good general label representing this type of opposition. We will return to Relph for more specific analysis of “placelessness.”
12. The Fate of Place, p. 186.
13. Ibid., p. 46. In this discussion he pays tribute both to Greek philosophy (especially that of Archytas of Tarentum), and to contemporary philosophical thinkers (such as for instance Jacques Derrida, Luce Irigaray, and Jean-Luc Nancy).
14. Casey launches Archytas of Tarentum throughout The fate of Place as a pioneer that foregrounds a body-based and action-based concept of place. Referring to Archytas, place could be said to be that which is created when we stretch out for it. This concept has the implication that for any limited spatial extention, constructed to define a space or a place, there is always the principal possibility, when one is situated close to the border of that construction, to reach out and pass the limit. Ibid., p. 101.
15. The idea of place as an extension of the body (Merleau-Ponty), and the mutual enveloping between sexes as an alternative to the prevailing idea of lack of proper female place (Irigaray). Neither for Merleau-Ponty nor for Irigaray can place and body be treated as separate entities.
16. Casey refers here to Deleuze-Guattari’s notion of “stratiated space as the relative global: limited in its parts, which are assigned constant directions, are oriented in relation to one another, divisible by boundaries, and can interlink.” Ibid., p. 183.
17. Ibid., p. 178.
18. Ibid. I am indebted to David Kolb, and a seminar of his in Lund in November 1999, for making clear some of the questionable conceptual principles of Casey’s.
19. For some reason, he does not mention Henri Lefebvre or Michel de Certeau in The Fate… For both of them space production as emanating from placial conditions were important, if not essential. It seems to me that Casey must be partly influenced, at least indirectly, by Henri Lefebvre’s The Production of Space, which is a plea for an interconnection of lived and conceived space/place, but Lefebvre is never referred to in The Fate… (except for a brief mentioning as one in a listing of exemplary contemporary place-thinkers).
20. The idea of a transarchitecture was manifested in for instance the philosophical/architectural collaboration between Jacques Derrida and Bernard Tchumi/Peter Eisenman. One of the actual outcomes of this, Parc de la Villette in Paris, is considered by Casey as an architectonic failure, “without concrete issue” (Ibid., p. 312), if viewed in its concretion, but very important in the launching of a non-static conceptual tool for architects and planners.
21. Ibid., p. 201.
22. See for instance the cultural semiotics by Jurij Lotman, and others of the so called Tartu School, and its followers and critics, as in Göran Sonesson, “Ego Meets Alter: The meaning of otherness in cultural semiotics.”
24. In the Biennale exhibition of art in Venice, 1976, there was an argument between the artist Michael Asher and the curator of that exhibition, Germano Celant, about the possibility to open up a passageway in one of the walls of Asher’s allotted room. The passageway was there originally but had been closed in consideration of the total exhibition space. Asher did not get his passageway (he was first promised allowance to open it), and was prepared to leave Venice without participating in the exhibition, but after a written petition from seven other artists in the exhibition, Asher’s proposed opening in the wall was executed. See Michael Asher, Writings 1973–1983 on Works 1969–1979, pp 140, 144, 145.
25. This said in accordance with how Lefebvre in The Production of Space, “constructs” space by the interweaving of opposites, like the one of abstract space and absolute space, or that of domination and appropriation.
26. This place of fulfilment would of course, since it is an idealism, in an evaluation of an actual dwelling process be impossible to detect as appearing in a precise moment. It could also be recalled here, in this context of idealisms, that in certain romantic aesthetics there is, apart from the habitational (place) and the pre-habitational (site), a third category, namely the post-habitational state of the ruin. This will not be dealt with further here though, since it essentially neglects human existence. An aesthetics of place must, if it aspires to involve lived life, include social interaction or individual modalities as a necessary part.
27. A modality is essentially the way in which something given is adjusted. In the philosophical tradition of modal logic, it is the adjustment of a proposition according to such qualities as necessity, possibility or probability. As used in semiotics, by such authors as A J Greimas (in On Meaning) and Michael O’Toole (in The Language of Displayed Art), modalisation means the way an act is influenced by a subject, or the way an image is personalised by an artist.
28. Temporal – of time, is one of the traditional types of modalities in philosophy of modal logic. Another one that is involved in the logic of exploitation, is the deontic, a
The Fate of É... was published in 1986. Järnefeldt, 82. Ibid., p. 47. We may here compare with Marc Augé’s interest in the placelessness phenomenon of gender-based non-places was only too obvious. One may think of for instance Doreen Massey’s American, architecture destroys and prohibits good sense of place. A complete list of types of “placeless” geography is provided by Relph, ibid., p. 118–121.

29. Since Casey does acknowledge a temporal influence in the becoming of place when discussing the phenomenology of dwelling in general, and ideologies like the “architecture as event” in particular, it is surprising that he maintains the static axiological division between place and site. He does not seem to accept their concurrent formational ability in the process of habitation. As far as Casey’s analysis of dwelling is concerned, it is above all tied to a reading of the philosophical stages of Heidegger’s, who according to Casey (The Fate of É..., p. 284), finally “made for ‘place’ what Bergson made for ‘duration’.” Also the time-related strategy of design called “Architecture as event” is discussed, in relation to Bernard Tchumi and Jaques Derrida, and their mutual interests as architect and philosopher in the architectural project Park de La Villette, Paris, but without letting it violate the site/place borderline.

30. A case of literal outsideness would be for instance a refusal of residence permits.

31. A study of a place in terms of its repallancy (capacity of repelling) would probably more concretely bring social fabrication of space into discussion.

32. When Place and Placelessness was published in 1976, the feministic literature on the explicit problematic of place and space was not very manifold, even though the phenomenon of gender-based non-places was only too obvious. One may think of for instance Doreen Massey’s memory of herself, as a nine year old girl travelling by bus alongside the large playing fields by the River Mersey – puzzled over the sight that “whole vast areas where covered with little people and all of them were boys.” See Doreen Massey, Space, Place and Gender, p. 185. Further, Relph’s model is, when judged in the light of migration and immigration, only a hinting at the mechanisms of exclusion/inclusion, but could, it seems, if taken farther, inform analyses in this field.

33. Edward Relph, Place and Placelessness, p. 51.

34. Ibid.

35. We may here compare with Marc Augé’s interest in the visitor/traveller, i.e. the seminal figure needing the construction of a new type of study, namely the sociology of solitude.

36. Ibid., p. 61. It seems that Relph, when discussing the seven categories, often have in mind a visiting scientist (geographer, anthropologist). This is partly explained by the fact that he borrows three fundamental categories – behavioural (“dispassionate”), empathetic, and cognitive (“going native”) – from a rendering (Peter Berger’s) of the levels of an anthropologist’s assimilation to a place (Ibid., p. 50). Relph makes a terminological replacement of Berger’s “cognitive” with “existential,” thus perhaps implying a focus more on the relation to a place than on the comprehension of that relation.

37. The fact that this long-lasting conception – of artists and scientists as “standing outside” and modelling for the personality trait of “not belonging” – has been a subject for deconstruction within both art and science during 20th century, does not seem to concern Relph in his exemplification. His out-set in the model of the anthropologist’s degrees of closeness to the observed society would, it seems to me, in itself be radical enough to make him hesitate to use scientists and artists as the clichés for outsideness.

38. Today, some twenty-five years after the publication of Place and..., the role of computer-based mediation would of course have to be added here, in its capacity of providing vicarious insideness, (virtual realities and net-based living) and letting this be experienced in ever vaster societal and geographical strata.

39. Ibid., p. 60.

40. Ibid., p. 53. It becomes obvious through other parts of Place and... (p. 45–46), that Relph hereby criticises a reductive tendency in other place theory, such as Kevin Lynch’s, which to a larger extent is based on this simplified (perceptual) type of spatial recognition and identification. For an elaboration on the differences between Relph and Lynch, see Ingrid Järnefeldt, Identity-identification: aspects of identity in the built environment. Järnefeldt also makes an attempt of applying Relph’s categories in an empirical investigation of a built environment.

41. In Place and..., p. 63–147.

42. This is done much in anger over how modern, mostly American, architecture destroys and prohibits good sense of place. A complete list of types of “placeless” geography is provided by Relph, ibid., p. 118–121.

43. Ibid., p. 80.

44. Ibid., p. 132.

45. Ibid., p. 93, referring to J. B. Jackson.

46. Ibid., p. 95.

47. Frampton’s sources in Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance, the short and polemic plea for a modern place-oriented architecture, are many, among them Paul Ricoeur and his distinction between Culture and Civilisation. He is also referring to Heidegger’s distinction between Spatium and Raum (TowardsÉ, pp 24–25), in his defence for a bounded place-form against the reign of an international and high-tech-dominated non-place architecture.
48. Since phenomenology as a Husserlian discipline set out to avoid scientific presuppositions, this label might seem paradoxical. I am here however basically referring to idealised interpretations of earlier phenomenological philosophy. To what degree it is possible to avoid a priori elements, and prejudiced notions, in any process of eidetic reduction, or in any phenomenological investigation, is a question out of scope of this essay to discuss.

49. Also architects, like for instance Steven Holl, refer to phenomenology as a tool to reach a presumably good place.

50. The passage in The Fate..., where Casey performs his most close-reading investigation of place-oriented philosophy, is when he approaches Heidegger. He suggests that H. in his investigations of “the ontological problem of space” experienced “angst of a distinctly philosophical sort,” when faced with the possibility of finding “not only nothing but nowhere” as the basis for “Dasein’s ineluctable being not-at-home (un-heim-lich).” The Fate..., p. 254. According to Casey, H. then made a halt in his explicit interest of the problem of place and space, only to return in his later writings to “place” as a more dynamic and action-based concept. But despite this investigation into what we might call the interdependence of place and non-place, Casey treats “site” as a recurrent and simplified opposition to “place.”

51. A notion such as “authenticity,” for instance, was used in Place and... one-sidedly as substituting for positive values like trueness, sincerity and genuineness, whereas inauthenticity consequently became a major characteristic of placelessness: “inauthentic existence is stereotyped, artificial, dishonest, and planned by others.” (Place and Placelessness, p. 80.) Instead of being accepted as two necessary ingredients they are used as a tool for the separation of “place” and “non-place,” or simply for classification of places as good or bad. Strangely enough, Relph first admits that Heidegger – obviously a central, even if mostly indirectly referenced source of inspiration – takes pains to stress that inauthenticity (in Heidegger’s philosophy essentially closeness to the world) “is of no lower existential order than authenticity – only a different one.” But in the next paragraph he relapses into a solely negative connotation.

52. I mean modernity here as a condition, as an ideology of renewal, rather than as a time period or style. So viewed, concepts like “postmodernity” and “supermodernity” may very well be included in an analysis of modernity, and not simply as contradictory to it, or as stages totally separated from it.

53. The most reactionary side of this type of philosophy – a slant of which Heidegger as a predecessor can not be free of guilt, even if he also tried to, as Casey has it, struggle “against himself” – would be a sentiment towards a self-contained world, or even towards a lost one.

54. Artistic and architectural practices may be viewed as spatial, situational and placial activities performed with more or less criticism against the prevailing aesthetic idioms or the regional or local restrictions. The critical handling of these objectives is the essential stance in Kenneth Frampton’s notion of “critical regionalism.” In Towards a Critical Regionalism, Frampton views topological, climatological and tectonic qualities as the most prominent ones, rather than keeping an openness towards the cultural, and the actually lived, specifics of “the regional.” Partially, Frampton’s bias can be explained in the light of the fact that he, just as Casey and Relph, in different ways lean on aesthetic preferences and ready-made interpretations of phenomenological analysis of place. For a critique of Frampton’s limited notion of “regional,” see Miwon Kwon, Site Specificity and the Problematics of Public Art: Recent Transformations at the Intersection of art and Architecture.

55. The expression “social grammar” is an influence from a paper presented by David Kolb in Lund 2000. On Kolb’s notion of grammar as related to place, see for instance his internet-based Project on Contemporary Places at http://abacus.bates.edu/~dkolb/dkht/index/generalo/place-grammari.html

56. SI can be said to be early if seen from a perspective of the concerns of contemporary art. Constituted in the 1950s much as an anti-art movement, consisting mainly of artists, writers, film-makers and architects, their production has later been described as both art, architecture and anarchistic politics. By means of written pamphlets, cartographic re-ordering and environmental actions, SI planted ideas and techniques with which existing urban structures could be approached alternatively or changed according to the mood of an individual or the political will of a group of people.

Art as a participating response to a social circumstance,
or as an alternative social undertaking, is not, of course, an entirely new phenomenon. We may only extend our perspective and think of constructivism, of Goya, of church paintings, of street happenings, etc. In later years though, direct confrontation with parts of society outside of the traditional exhibition spaces has emerged in art forms labelled social art, environmental art and relational aesthetics. Today, if we want to give justice to contemporary artistic work, an aesthetics is needed which to a larger extent includes social and epistemological issues, as well as medial and formal ones.

57. Typical activist strategies (or techniques) were “drifting (dérive),” “détournement,” “decomposition,” “psychogeography,” and “constructed situations.” Drifting (dérive) was launched as a technique for passing through varied environments, using guidelines alien to the normal patterns of movements; Détournement is a strategy of re-organisation and re-contextualisation, directed towards prefabricated aesthetic elements. In this sense there is no essential situationist painting, architecture, or music, only a situationist use of these and other already existing media; Decomposition aims at “helping” traditional cultural forms to destroy themselves, through the application of “superior” means of cultural construction; Psychogeography was to be the study of the precise effects of a geographical setting, consciously managed or not, directed by the mood and behaviour of an individual; Constructed situations were “moments of life,” constructed as concrete and deliberate activites of spatial and temporal sort, involving art, technology and human needs.

Only parts of the many-folded situationist activities did reach direct publicity in mass media, but the movement is often considered to be one of the influential forces behind not only later activity-based art but also a catalyst in the student revolts and strikes that culminated in Paris 1968. And in the 1990s their activity-based conception of art and architecture has had renewed interest for museums and artists, and to a certain extent also for schools of architecture. See for instance 1) Theory of the dérive and other situationist writings on the city, 2) Situationistische Internationale 3) Basic Banalities: Brief History of the Situationist International.

58. For an interesting analysis of the origins of situationism, as a response to an historical condition, see Jonathan Crary, “Spectacle, Attention, Counter-Memory,” in October: the second decade, 1986–1996.

59. Formulaire pour un urbanisme nouveau was written by Ivan Chtcheglov, under the pseudonym of Gilles Ivain. Written 1953 it was not published until 1958 in the first SI manifest. (Published in english in Ken Knabb, ed., Situationist International Anthology (Berkeley Bureau of Public

60. For a reflection on Constant’s and Debord’s project of “unitary” urbanism and architecture, see various parts of Simon Sadler, The Situationist City.

61. Simon Sadler mentions linkage to Constant in the so-called utopian architecture of such origins and schools as Team 10; the “Place”-exhibition at ICA in London; Archigram; AA of London; Richard Rogers; Bernard Tschumi; Nigel Coates and the NATO-group. See The Situationist City, p 163.

62. Which has an obvious aftermath in what has since then been noted as “symbolic space” or “semiotic space,” notions that can be traced back to Lefebvre, but are used later in the fashion of Baudrillard, Augé, and others.


64. Simon Sadler, The Situationist City, p. 78.

65. To my view the walkie-talkie, apart from it being a pre-runner to the mobile phone, also has the particular quality of having a loudspeaker that makes it possible to address a physically grouped number of listeners simultaneously. This creates a sense-of-group other than if the same group of people would have access to one mobile phone each.

66. It serves to be noted here that Michel de Certeau, in The Practice of Everyday Life, makes an attempt to elaborate the modalities of tactic walking, i.e. taking paths unexpected if seen from a prescribed, or normal, point of view. Certeau emphasises the effects that individually conducted walking, and reading (signs), have in the production of space. The resemblance here with the situationist drifting is of no coincidence. Henri Lefebvre’s dynamical notion of space production is an obvious link and source here.

67. See for instance Augé, Marc, Non-places: introduction to an anthropology of supermodernity. Augé links a “supermodern” condition, ruled by mediated impressions, that has created a new type of solitude, to our living in a “symbolic universe.” The notion of a “symbolic” or “semiotic” society often returns as denoting the increase of artificial or mediated sensations today, at times in reference to Jean Baudrillard’s analyses of the impact of simulacra in contemporary conditions and artefacts. Despite the perhaps dubious over-belief in the correlation between “mediated” and “semiotic,” this shows that the issue of second hand impressions is a highly contemporary one.

68. Kenneth Frampton’s position could be said to be so-
mewhere in between Relph and SI, since he pleases through the notion of “critical regionalism” for an architecture that uses current technology on local conditions. In his neglect of actual cultural difference though, he essentially up-dates Relph’s good-taste-stance with a new set of aesthetic preferences. See Miwon Kwon, Site Specificity and the Problematics of Public Art: Recent Transformations at the Intersection of art and Architecture, pp 95-96.

69. Placial = of place and place formation. In analogy with space/spatial and site/situational. See footnote 1.

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