The main purpose of this article is to construct a concept of the welfare city that hopefully will facilitate the understanding and theorization of contemporary urban development in the Western countries. In order to do this, we first explore the concept of welfare. Our major message is that the concept is ambivalent, heterogeneous, evaluative and contestable. To establish this we rely on welfare economics and the debate on the welfare state. We also demonstrate our message into the debate on different welfare regimes. Focusing on the utilitarian element in welfare, we then establish a link between utilitarianism, architecture and the modern city. This provides the basis for a conceptualization of the welfare city that integrates the differences between welfare regimes. Following this, we present some major developmental tendencies of the welfare regimes as background for a discussion of the impact of globalization processes on the welfare states and the welfare cities. Here the emphasis is on social and spatial polarization and on the fate of social citizenship as the solidarity basis for welfare in a globalizing world.

In the late 1960s Manuel Castells initially and implicitly presented the idea of a welfare city as “The Urban Question” (1977) of the time. We close our article by discussing Jacques Donzelot’s recent formulation of a new urban question by relating it to the question of a new basis of solidarity for urban welfare.

Ambivalent welfare
The meaning of the concept of welfare is imprecise, ambivalent and contested. The concept has, one could say, a fluid, mobile character. One observer remarks that ‘welfare’ mostly refers to “having access to what is needed for a good life. But the conceptions of what that is, are many” (Andersen 1988: 9). Yet, even this statement is contestable since welfare may be considered as a humiliation. In this view, you are precisely not leading a good life if you are on welfare. One complaint is that the welfare society “causes humiliation through its own institutions” by creating “dependent people, who are willing to sell their birthright of personal autonomy and pride for a bowl of lentils from the public kitchen” (Margalit 1996: 224). Further, the scope of
the concept seems almost all embracing. Some would argue that welfare primarily includes the covering of “basic human needs” (Pinch 1997: 5) for food, shelter, health care; others would include needs for education, culture, work, leisure, solidarity, mobility, recognition, democratic participation etc.

Pushpin as good as poetry
One way to establish some order in this heterogeneous and ambivalent situation is provided by the discipline of welfare economics. Here the concept of welfare includes any useful good or service (classical utilitarianism) or anything preferred by individuals (modern subjectivism) that it is not freely available. To come under the heading of economic welfare, the item in question must need the embodiment of labour to be useful (classical) or should be available only as a scarce good (modern) (Myint 1948, Little 1965). Whether the need or preference is basic or superfluous is an irrelevant question. In a celebrated formulation the father of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, stated: “if the quantity of pleasure is the same, pushpin is as good as poetry” (Bentham quoted in Macintyre 1996: 207). Welfare economics, however, is not only preoccupied by the production and allocation of utilities or preferred goods; the main concern is to improve the economic welfare of a society of individuals. The main question is not the creation of wealth but the distribution of wealth among the individuals of a society in such a way that the total welfare (utility, pleasure, happiness, preferred goods) of the society is optimized. For neo-classical welfare economics it means the allocation of given scarce resources and goods in such a way that no one can be better off without someone else becoming worse off in terms of preferences (given the income distribution) (Little 1965). This so-called Pareto-criterion is a modern equivalent to Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian principle that “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” is the welfare criterion for a society and in general the measure of “right and wrong” (Sabine 1968: 676). For classical utilitarianism utility was a measurable and interpersonal comparable entity that could provide the scientific basis for the investigation of welfare and welfare maximization, and thus also for a science of ethics. To say that some change of circumstances will increase total happiness in a society is the same thing as to say that such a change is good (Little 1965: 7). The modern subjectivists did not believe in utility, but rather in ordered preferences. The aim, however, was the same: to investigate the extent to which economics as a science can evaluate whether or not a given state of an economy must be changed in order to improve total societal welfare.

This is not the place to enter the technical details of welfare economics. Our main point is that if ‘economics’ turns into ‘welfare economics’ then evaluation or appreciation follows. Economics prefixed with ‘welfare’ turns into “a sub-discipline that evaluates the activities of markets, firms, industries, individuals and government agencies” in terms of the contribution to social welfare. In this respect welfare economics reflects “a social philosophy in which social institutions and cultural conventions have no intrinsic value”. They are valuable “only to the extent that they are valuable to individual members of society” (Baumol & Wilson 2001: xv).

What then, has welfare economics had to say about such evaluation? Two things should be mentioned here. Firstly, that the allocation of goods by the market, under idealized competitive conditions, can realize the Pareto condition that everyone should be better off in terms of happiness or levels of choice (Andersen 1988: 40). Secondly, that welfare economics cannot establish whether or not a given actual distribution of income is better that another. It can only state the ‘compensation principle’ that an improvement of welfare has taken place if those better off are able to compensate the loss of the lesser off, and still be better off than before (Little 1965: 105). However, welfare economics also has been biased towards the equalization of income distribution and progressive taxation. This bias originally springs from the utilitarian idea of diminishing marginal utility (the more you have of some good, the less pleasure you get from getting an extra exemplar) from which follows that total social welfare can be increased by reallocating goods and services to the less well off. This idea has during the years been reformulated in various ways by referring to prevailing
preferences for economic equalization in western societies (e.g. Mishan 1960: 254).

All-embracing, eclectic and contested welfare
But welfare is more than economic welfare, even for welfare economics. For Bentham, welfare was concerned not only with “subsistence” and “abundance”, i.e. economic welfare regulated through the market, but also with “security” and “equality” that should be regulated by legislation (Halevy 1952: 45 f). I. M. D. Little (1965: 51) compares welfare to a well of unknown depth that can be filled from various taps, economic, political, etc. Only if the non-economic taps are closed can one say that welfare has improved by turning on the economic tap. But what is non-economic welfare? One contemporary answer is that non-economic welfare is welfare provided by the welfare state, but this again is an ambivalent concept. According to Bent Greve “there is still no agreed definition of what a welfare state is” (Greve 1998: 129), and for Avishai Margalit the idea of social welfare has an “eclectic character” which indicates that “the sources of the welfare river must be sought in many streams: Christian, socialist and statist (Bismarck)” (Margalit 1996: 222).

Henning Fonsmark, one of the participants in the intense debate on the coming welfare state that took place in Denmark in the 1950s and early 1960s (Fonsmark 1962), looks back 30 years later at the debate for precise ideas and delimitations of the concept. He looks back in vain. The Social Democrats used the concept in a positive and very broad sense, often synonymously with “democratic socialism” and as including “respect for the human being” as well as “equal opportunities for all throughout life” (Fonsmark 1990: 171). Social solidarity should be more comprehensive than public aid to the poor. Welfare should prevent people from coming in need of public help, and should be a guarantee for equal opportunities for all. Thus one should ensure the provision of schools and hospitals, the educational system, the care for the elderly, the general life and work conditions of families and population at large, as well as their ways of utilizing leisure time (Ibid. 173). Contrary to the material commercialism of private capital, the public sector should provide for “spiritual welfare”. Material needs having been covered by public redistribution, welfare politics should also include culture: adult education, radio and television as non-commercial public services, all of which would strengthen participation in democratic processes and institutions (Ibid. 175). The welfare state should on the one hand prevent human beings against the market and the specialists and experts of the new technologies (Ibid. 178). On the other hand, it would require other groups of experts to identify and solve problems of welfare: psychologists, teachers, doctors, architects, cultural critics (Ibid. 182). The concept of welfare in this way was surely “all embracing” (Ibid. 181).

Just as embracing as it was, just as contested it was. Welfare experts and professionals were characterised as a new “ruling class” (Dich 1973) that defined the needs of others while pursuing its own expansive interests as a professional group. Liberal and conservative opponents perceived the welfare state as a “paternalistic state” socializing values related to all fields of life (Ibid. 186 f). Instead the welfare state should always draw limitations to itself. Ordinary voters are responsible for their own life and deeds, and only when this does not function, should social solidarity provide welfare for the weak (Ibid. 196–98). From the political Left, the welfare state was criticized as a compromise between the bourgeoisie and the working class thus preventing revolution, and for being based on a capitalist economy continually producing the very social problems that the welfare state was intended to solve. It was, however, also embraced by the less revolutionary Left as an intermediary step towards socialism (Ibid. 190 f).

This debate from the 1960s seems surprisingly relevant today. It captures many of the major questions related also to the contemporary debate on welfare. Let us therefore sum up the concept as it is illuminated by welfare economics and the debate on the welfare state:

The concept of welfare relates to a wide diversity of issues such as the quantity, quality and distribution of material goods and services, the (re)distribution of income, protection against poverty, the security of employment and wealth, the provision of health care,
education and culture, the provision of security and shelter, the guarantee of a certain equality and equality of opportunities, the support of and participation in democratic institutions, the general quality of life. Interwoven in this comprehensiveness is an evaluative dimension. By declaring something as welfare it is also appreciated as such: is the distribution of wealth a welfare distribution, and could someone be better off without anyone becoming worse off in terms of happiness or preference? Social services and transfer payments should, as welfare provisions, also be contributing to the good life. But are they? Do they create dependency? Are the collective provisions of welfare services oppressive rather than liberating and promoting the good life? The appreciative component of the concept and the complexity and diversity of the referential content turns the concept into a contested one (Gallie 1956, Connolly 1974). This, by the way, not only relates to politics and ideology, but also to research:

Liberal authors mistrust state intervention a priori, while Social-Democratic and Christian-Democratic authors all too easily take social problems as evidence of the state’s responsibility to solve problems. (Kaufmann 2001: 16)

Further evidence of this relationship follows below.

The good, the bad and the ugly
The concept of welfare is differentiated and contested. Just as differentiated and contested are the ways of organizing welfare provision. Family, friends, relatives and neighbours, charitable and voluntary organisations, the market, and the state provide welfare (Pinch 1997: 7–11). Within different nation-states such different ways of welfare provision occur in various combinations.

Following from this, a diversity of welfare state typologies have occurred in the social sciences, most of them with a focus on the state–market distinction. The classical one was provided by Richard M. Tittmuss, who distinguished between three welfare models: The residual model in which the state only comes into operation as a last resort when family and market fail to cover welfare needs, the industrial achievement–performance model, in which welfare policies are geared towards the smooth functioning of the economy, and the institutional distributive model in which universal services are allocated by the state on the basis of need (Pinch 1997: 12). Building on this typology Gösta Esping-Andersen in (1990) presented his highly influential typology of welfare regimes, which is focused on the ways in which welfare provision is allocated between state, market and households. The liberal welfare regime is committed to minimize the role of the state, to individualize risk and to promote market solutions. The definition of risk is narrow and need-based, resembling the poor relief of the 19th century. The conception of what risks should be considered ‘social’ is narrow as well, and the promotion of market solutions encourages individual and collective insurance solutions to welfare problems. The liberal regime corresponds to Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and the UK (Esping-Andersen 1999: 74–78).

The conservative welfare regime blends status segmentation and familialism. Welfare provisions are strongly related to status differentiation, often favouring civil servants’ benefits. Corporate status divisions permeate the systems of social security. Risks are pooled within particular occupational groups or social strata. Familialism, i.e. a composite of the male bread winner as social protection and the family as central caregiver being ultimately responsible for its members’ welfare, implies that parents or children are legally responsible for children or parents in case of need. The inclination to provide public family care services is low. Voluntary associations play a key role in the provision of welfare in conservative welfare regimes (Ibid. 81–84). Countries such as Germany, Belgium, France, Italy and Spain exemplify this model.

The social democratic welfare regime is committed to universalism, i.e. the provision of welfare as a right for individuals based on citizenship, rather than as demonstrated need, or based on a corporate occupational relationship. The regime actively works to minimize market dependency with the intent of maximizing equality. Welfare is ‘de-commodified’ in the sense that market dependency is counteracted by granting en-
titlements independent of market participation (Ibid. 43). Welfare compensations are generous, and risks are comprehensively socialized. Welfare provision is highly “de-familiarized” due to the participation of women in the wage-labour force. The regime is committed to full employment and productivism in the sense of maximizing the productive potential of the citizenry (Ibid. 78–81). The social democratic regime corresponds to the Nordic countries.

Reflecting on the huge debate on this threefold typology, Esping-Andersen has proposed a fourth welfare regime centred on familialism. In such a regime, which is exemplified by Mediterranean Europe and Japan, the provision of welfare is dominated by familialism. Here de-commodification means strengthening the position of the male breadwinner, family welfare benefits are low and family production of welfare is high (Ibid. 50–67).

Other typologies have been presented in the debate and could have been mentioned here (cf. Merrien 2002: 215 ff). The point in the present context is, however, only to emphasize two things. Firstly, that the ways of organizing welfare within different nation states are diverse. This should be a caution against generalizing statements on the development of welfare provision systems. Secondly, just as the concept of welfare is a contested concept, so are the typologies of systems of welfare provision. This is not only in regard to empirical validity and theoretical consistency, but also in the sense that the typologies may contain implicit evaluations of the different types. Thus it has been argued that there is a normative dimension to Esping-Andersen’s typology. The social democratic regime is the good one because it is strongest in de-commodification and social rights, and thus pushing back the frontiers of capitalist power. The liberal regime is the bad one because the state encourages the market and minimizes de-commodification. The conservative regime is neither really good, nor really bad, but just ugly, because it keeps and strengthens the status orientation of the conservative ‘Sozialstaat’ and the corresponding social inequality (Manow 2002: 204). Thus the typology implicitly measures the other regimes by the standard of the social democratic regime; by more or less proximity to Stockholm (ibid: 205, cf. Jensen 1999)!

In the following we will maintain Esping-Andersen’s typology. This is not because we share the evaluations or find the criticisms irrelevant. The reason is that the typology is sufficient for our main purpose, which is to emphasize at a general level the diversity of the forms of welfare provision. It does not subtract from the value of the typology in this regard, that it has played a highly important part in the welfare debates of the recent decade.

Utilitarianism, architecture and the modern city

For Bentham, utility was not only a question of the provision of goods via the market. As mentioned above, it was also a question of state regulation. The greatest happiness of the greatest number could be provided by law, regulation and planning. By measuring pleasure and pain the human condition could be regulated in such a way that pleasure was maximized and pain minimized for the greatest number of individuals in a society. As an example, punishment should only be accepted if it served the goal of utility. Punishment should not inflict the same amount of pain as suffered by the victim, but prevent others from committing similar crimes, and in this way increase overall utility. Bentham’s well-known idea of the panopticon-prison should remind outsiders that their utility would decrease if imprisoned, and organize surveillance internally in such a way that the imprisoned were surveying themselves, thus maximizing utility and minimizing costs. The calculation of pleasure and pain, the maximization of utility and minimization of cost should be the vehicle for rationality, transparency and control. Everything, pushpin as well as poetry, could be reduced to and measured according to utility (Diken & Laustsen 2002: 100 f).

Such ideas of a rational society also entered architectural thinking. This is shown in the theoretical work of Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand, professor of architecture at the École Polytechnique in Paris. In 1795 he stated that

In all times and all places, all the thoughts of man and all his actions have their origin in these two principles:
The love of well-being and the aversion of all kinds of pain. That is why men, in isolation when they construct private buildings or united in society when they rise public buildings, should search to 1) draw from the buildings they construct the greatest advantage and consequently make them in the most convenient way for their purpose and 2) to build in the least painful way in the beginning and the least expensive way later on, when money became the price of labour.

(Durand, quoted in Fixot 1999: 138)

Here, architecture is submitted to the criteria of maximizing the utility of the building, while at the same time maximizing efficiency in building production. The idea was “to achieve maximum result with minimum effort” by reducing “the system of values in architecture [...] to a scale between pleasure and pain” (Pérez-Goméz 1983: 303). In this regard Durand proposed that elementary geometrical forms were the most efficient. “The more symmetrical, regular, and simple a building is, the less costly it will be” (Ibid. 300). In the case of private commissions, the task of the architect was to design and construct the most convenient building with a given amount of money. In the case of a public institution, the architect should make the most economical construction of a building whose details were already known (Ibid. 302 f). Geometrical forms did not have any transcendent, metaphysical or symbolic meaning, they were just efficient and useful, and architectural decoration should be avoided as disutility. “If economy prescribes the greatest simplicity in regard to all the necessary things, it prohibits absolutely all that is not useful” (Durand, quoted in Fixot 1999: 138). The character and style of a building likewise should not be subject to separate consideration; it would spring from the utilitarian solution to the design task (Pérez-Goméz 1983: 302). Hence, architecture had no other objective than “private and public usefulness, the conservation and happiness of individuals, families and society” (Durand, quoted in Perez-Goméz 1983: 299).

As pointed out by Pérez-Goméz and Fixot, such utilitarianism reappeared in 20th century functionalism, which became the architectural and urban ideology of the modern city. Here comfort had prevalence over metaphysical or symbolic meaning (Pérez-Goméz 1983: 303), and just like in Durand’s theory, where number and geometry were turned into technical instruments for ensuring efficiency, so also

the geometry of the Bauhaus, the International Style, and the Modern Movement [...] was essentially the undifferentiated product of a technological world view [having] cast off metaphysical speculation.

(Ibid. 311)

What Durand had theorized at the level of the building, the Modern movement realised at all levels of urban space, from the housing unit to the whole city (Fixot 1999: 153).

Just like Durand, Le Corbusier emphasized the efficiency and utility of non-complex forms. The straight line and geometrical forms signified belief in science and technique. Circulation needed linearity, not curves; standardization impregnated his architectural thought. The goal was simplicity, order, efficiency and purity. The modern spirit, according to Le Corbusier, was ‘purist’, searching efficiency everywhere “with a tendency towards rigueur, precision, the best utilization of forces and materials, the least waste, in sum a tendency towards purity” (Le Corbusier quoted in Fixot 1999: 160). This is a pure utilitarianism of pure form. The city was conceived as an efficiently organized and useful machine, creating order in the chaos of the non-regulated city with curved streets and crowded and socializing neighbourhoods. Even if the direct inspiration for Le Corbusier’s obsession with disorder, loss of time and detours was Taylor’s principles of scientific management (Ascher 1995: 87), one can, in the spirit of Bentham, say that the modern idea of the city was one of ameliorating the disorderly and irrational city by means of a purifying urban planning, and in this way producing more happiness for greater numbers.

Similarly in the USA, architects in the 1930s countered the professional threat from engineers, builders and manufacturers by leaving the Beaux-arts tradition. Within this tradition public housing could not be defined as an architectural problem. Here architecture was “more than mere building”, and people “could not afford it” (Brain 1994: 210). “The modern architect should not design for the cultivated few, or for the cul-
tural uplift of the masses, but for the human needs of the modern citizen, defined in terms of common rights and basic needs." (Ibid. 211) Aligning with the public housing projects of the New Deal, architects focused on the provision of basic “decency, health, amenity, and comfort and convenience” by means of efficient standardization. Catherine Bauer, a well-known house reformer at the time, stated that standardized parts “instead of creating dull uniformity, [could] become a positive force in creating a unified whole”. This would make “meaningless surface ornament [...] not only unnecessary but ridiculous”. The conclusion was that

[good materials, simple lines, and geometric forms become, when combined with carefully designed and planted open spaces, all the elements necessary to a authentic modern architecture. (Bauer quoted in Brain 1994:212)

Quite an echo from Durand!

In modern architecture and urban planning utility, efficiency, transparency and geometry fused to purify the new modern city into separated spaces for work, habitation, leisure and transport. This idea of utilitarian urban planning corresponded to the reasoning within welfare economics on externalities. Externalities are cases where welfare effects, positive or negative, do not show up in market prices. In such cases public intervention is required. In the case of external diseconomies, public intervention would be needed to ameliorate the loss in welfare for some third party, C, due to market transactions between A and B. Also so-called public goods that are provided in common and are freely accessible, fall into the category of externalities (Andersen 1988: 43f, 64 ff). In the new urban sociology of the 1970s this question turned up as collective consumption.

The welfare city concept

On this background a concept of ‘the welfare city’ seems meaningful. On the one hand the ideas of architecture and urban planning, which shaped urban development in the years after the Second World War, were closely linked to the utilitarian ideas that are a founding part of welfare thinking in general. On the other hand this urban development, like the welfare state, was highly influenced by state interventionism. The utilitarian ideas were codified into the CIAM charter, which also gathered “the principles and ways of thinking from Taylorism, Fordism, and in a certain way Keynesianism and the welfare state” (Ascher 2002: 30). These principles became so influential after the Second World War that the urban development of these years has been characterized as a “taylo-ford-keynésio-corbusian” period (Ascher 1995: 86).

It must, however, be expected that the concept of the welfare city is just as heterogeneous, ambivalent and contested as the concepts of welfare, the welfare state or welfare regimes. In so far as the concept of the welfare city refers to urban built environments and urban ways of living, which have developed under the influence of the welfare state, this influence must be expected to vary according to the different forms of welfare regimes.

The welfare city as collective consumption

The imprint of the welfare state on the city was the underlying problem Manuel Castells hinted at in his famous discussion in the late 1960s of the object of urban sociology. He argued that only spatial units of collective consumption should count as the scientific object for urban sociology. Collective consumption he defined in various ways. He defined it as related to organizational and management features “given the nature and size of the problems: e.g. housing, collective facilities, leisure provision, etc.” (Castells 1976: 75), but also as related to the character of certain needs that “make their satisfaction necessarily collective, due to the quantity of material means needed to meet them (Ibid. 81). On the other hand he denied that the collectivistic character of consumption was due to some “intrinsic quality” of the consumption. Collective consumption was taking place through the state apparatus, because it was not assured by capital due to “the specific and general interests of capital” (Castells 1977: 460). Castells here explicitly referred to externalities in welfare economics: “Collective commodities, say the marginalist economists, are those that have no market price” (Ibid.). He was, though, not quite clear about
the role of the state. Collective means of consumption “increasingly depend on direct or indirect state intervention” (Castells 1978: 38, italics na/bd), collective consumption is “largely determined by state activity” (Ibid. 181, italics na/bd). No wonder that he admitted that the concept has “a fluid character”, while at the same time he emphasized that it is “widely accepted that ‘collective goods’ are key factors in the economy and in social organization” (Ibid.).

However precisely defined, collective consumption goods had become increasingly important for the reproduction of labour power. According to Castells, the spatial concentration of collective means of consumption therefore defines what is urban (1977: 449). An urban unit is defined as

the everyday space of a delimited fraction of the labour force, which, he says, is “not very different from the definition, current among geographers and economists, of an urban area on the basis of the map of commutings. (Ibid. 445)

Seen in the light of the fluidity of the concept of welfare, the fluidity of the concept of collective consumption comes as no surprise. Neither does the fact that, despite this fluidity, the examples of collective consumption are quite clear: housing, health, education, and sports, leisure and transport facilities. These are precisely some of the important collective goods and services provided under the heading of welfare by the welfare state and considered as such by welfare economics.

Castells’ definition of the object of the new urban sociology is focused on the provision of welfare goods and services for the labour force organized in collective form whether by state intervention or otherwise. This provision is located in the spatial units within which the labour force lives its everyday life, and these units are defined as urban. Castells here defines the urban in such a way that the development of the welfare state eo ipso is urban development. The development of the state as a welfare state, in so far as it is focused on goods and services for labour power, is the development of the city as a welfare city, in so far as we look to the spatial form. The welfare state in this sense is the welfare city.

The social democratic welfare city

Juhani Lehto’s discussion of different cities in different welfare states is less demanding. Rather than implicitly identifying welfare state and welfare city, he argues that “national institutions, particularly the welfare state, have shaped and will continue to shape the development of cities”, the implication being that different welfare regimes shape their cities in different ways (Lehto 2000: 112). Focusing on the social democratic welfare regimes in Scandinavia, which he seems to consider the most developed form of welfare regimes, he expects “the impact of the welfare state on cities” to be “most visible in Scandinavia” (Ibid. 113). Here, rapid urbanization and expansion of the welfare state have been “parallel phenomena” (Ibid. 117). Scandinavian cities, then, have developed as welfare cities. The provision of public welfare goods was a significant factor in the urbanization process attracting people away from rural life into cities (Ibid. 117). Yet, one should not for this reason identify welfare state as welfare city. The social democratic welfare regime is universalistic and based on social citizenship rights and does as such not distinguish between city and country. Social policies in the Scandinavian countries cannot be regarded as urban policies (Ibid. 118).

Universalism, then, excludes the identification of welfare state and welfare city in the Scandinavian context. This does not invalidate the concept of a welfare city as concept for the urban areas, which developed in the Scandinavian countries in the second half of the 20th century. Not only was the built environment highly imprinted by the provision of (local) state welfare goods: public housing, hospitals, schools, universities, libraries, sports and leisure facilities, care-centres for children and the elderly, and infrastructural networks, the local welfare state also provided the city with new political actors and new configurations of political alliances. As urbanization increased, so did the part of the urban population employed in education, health, social and cultural welfare services. Local welfare state employees and professionals became influential groups in urban politics just as the consumers
The liberal welfare city

In the liberal welfare regime, the concept of a welfare city has quite another meaning. In the mid-1980s Gurr and King (1987) analyzed the importance of the state policies for urban development and decline, with special emphasis on the USA and the UK. They also discussed some alternative futures for western cities, distinguishing between prosperous new industrial cities and administrative and service cities on the one hand, and stagnant old industrial cities and welfare cities on the other. The category “welfare city” was reserved for cities “in which there are no significant growth sectors, public or private, its residents subsisting mainly on transfer payments, public employment and secondary service industries” (Ibid. 192). Such cities are “the economic backwaters of the advanced capitalist societies, largely abandoned by private capital, passed over in plans for regional redevelopment, and heavily dependent on government spending to maintain individual and collective existence at a subsistence level” (Ibid. 200).

Here the welfare city is a special case among contemporary cities, it is ‘a city on welfare’ in the pejorative liberal sense. This is not a welfare city in the Scandinavian sense that manages to keep unemployment rates low, income distribution relatively even and proportions of the poor small in comparison with most other OECD countries (Lehto 2000: 118). This is exactly the contrary: a residual welfare city with welfare focused on public transfer payments to maintain subsistence.

In a liberal welfare regime, welfare in an urban context may, however, have a broader meaning. Analysing welfare in the metropolitan areas of the USA in the mid-1970s, Diana Pearce and David Street present social welfare institutions in metropolitan areas as heterogeneous, uneven, and poorly bounded collection of programs, personnel and practices – both public and private – that attend to the human needs in the name of the public good. (Pearce & Street 1978: 319 f)

Social welfare institutions range from the Club Scout pack meeting in a local church basement to the giant public hospital for the care of the poor. (Ibid. 320)

The public good is primarily focused on local communities, rather than on universalistic social citizenship rights, and is usually targeted to specific populations, with the aim of rectifying delinquent behaviour (Ibid. 321). There is a tendency towards “bifurcation of social welfare” between “an inner-city ‘warehousing’ and ‘containment’ segment and a suburban ‘amenities’ segment” (Ibid. 324). The suburbs tend to exclude the poor recipients of public welfare and consumers of public housing. As a consequence the inner cities include “welfare mini-ghettoes”, while the suburbs include welfare amenities – desirable in all communities, rich as well as poor – such as “small clinics and private practices aimed at helping with individual adjustment” and “benefits to normal youths and adults” (Ibid. 323–24). The inner-city welfare institutions “emphasize support through public assistance and housing programs at subsistence level along with direct social control”, while suburban welfare “is fundamentally concerned with providing adjustment counselling and consummatory services to the families of the middle class” (Ibid. 324).

According to this description of the 1970s, welfare in American metropolitan areas very much parallels the liberal welfare regime. Being localist and communitarian rather than universalistic and oriented by social citizenship, being organised privately as well as publicly and in hybrids of public-private organization, being targeted to specific poor groups for social control or privately organised as amenities for the middle classes, welfare in urban areas reflects the liberal welfare regime. As welfare cities American metropolitan areas were liberal welfare cities.

The conservative welfare city

While the distinction between a social democratic and a liberal welfare city can be established in a quite
clear-cut way, the situation is more difficult in regard to the city of the conservative welfare regime. This is due not least to the fact that such regimes (familialist regimes excepted) have been as statist as the social democratic regime in regard to the planning of the urban environment (Benassi et al. 1997). This especially has been the case in France (Fixot 1999). It might be argued that welfare policies in the conservative case reasonably can be characterized as urban policies, in so far as segmented welfare focused on occupational groups may have tended to concentrate in urban areas due to the general urbanization process. Further, the segmentation of welfare in the conservative model has shown in the urban areas as higher poverty rates, higher income differentials and lower participation of women in wage labour, just as well as housing policies have been less deliberately planned with the aim of preventing segregation than in the Nordic countries (Lehto 2000: 117–119). The question of the specificity of a conservative welfare city, however, needs further clarification.

The nation-bounded welfare state

The welfare state was, from the start, structurally related to nation-building and national solidarity, and it has always been a nation-state (Giddens 1994: 137). T.H. Marshall conceives of welfare as social citizenship within this framework. In the 20th century social citizenship extends the civil citizenship of the 18th century and the political citizenship of the 19th century with “the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society”. Social citizenship thus implies “a universal right to real income which is not proportional to the market value of the claimant” (Marshall quoted in Klausen 1996: 212). The ‘prevailing society’ mentioned here is the bounded society of the sovereign nation state, and the solidarity underpinning social citizenship is a national solidarity. As pointed out by Gunnar Myrdal in his book ‘Beyond the Welfare State’, from 1960: “the democratic Welfare State in the rich countries of the Western World is protectionist and nationalistic” (quoted in Klausen 1996: 216). The solidarity presupposed by this conception of welfare as a universal right was connected to the citizenship of the nation state, a national solidarity founded not only in the implicit organic solidarity (Durkheim) based on the interdependencies of a national division of labour (Loftager 2003: 19 f), but also in the more romantic idea (Turner 2002: 47) of a national community of a people, cf. the Swedish notion of the Social Democratic welfare regime as “Folkhemmet”, the “People’s Home” (Klausen 1996: 214). Not only were the rights of welfare as social citizenship based on work (Turner 2001: 192) as one solidaristic pillar in the sense that “everybody was expected to contribute their share, but, if they could not, the community assumed the obligation of providing for the needy” (Klausen 1996: 214). This obligation furthermore also implied a shared style of life, a population united in a single civilization (Urry 2000: 187). While social citizenship entitlements did not eradicate the class inequalities of capitalism, but modified such inequalities by bestowing equal status on those who fully and actively participate in their society (Urry 2000: 164, Turner 2001: 190, 193), it did, in Europe, presume ethnical and racial homogeneity. Thus the welfare state could take the form of a nation-state community implying a direct relationship between the nation-state and each member of the national community (Guiraudon 2002: 131).

Paul Pierson has aptly characterized the mature form of this nation-bounded welfare state as an “immovable object” (Pierson 1998), due to the fact that mature welfare states have shown a marked resistance to change. There are two major basic sources for this resistance. One source is electoral support. As welfare states have expanded, so has the size of the electorate that receives welfare benefits or income from the welfare state. Also as a source of social stability and guarantor of basic rights of citizenship has the welfare state retained considerable legitimacy (ibid. 552). The other source is institutional “stickiness”. Institutional stickiness on the one hand relates to political systems that allow minorities to block reforms, on the other it relates to so-called ‘path dependence’, i.e. the fact that certain courses of development, once initiated, become increasingly costly to reverse. The costs of change increasingly exceed the costs of continuity. Policy-makers are ‘locked
in’ by commitments already made. This relates to systems of pensions provision as well as to complex sets of institutions and organizations (Ibid. 553).

The sticky, immovable welfare objects have, however, been confronted with “irresistible forces” (Pierson) from within the nation-states. A slowdown of productivity growth due to the post-industrial shift from manufacturing to services, the latter being more labour intensive (education, health care, child care) and more resistant to standardization, has impeded the growth of wages and salaries and therefore also the tax base of the welfare state (Ibid. 541 ff). The continuity, the expansion and institutionalization of welfare state commitments with the rising costs of “increased generosity” as a consequence, has been another major source of pressure (Ibid. 545–50). And a third major source comes from the ageing of the population, which has lead to higher health costs and increases in pension spending (Ibid. 553).

The different welfare regimes have adapted to these pressures as well as changed (restructured) according to their specific character. The social democratic welfare regimes have adapted by expanding employment in the public service sector without worsening wage inequalities. The consequence has been increasing budgetary pressures on already high levels of taxes. In conservative regimes public service employment has been limited and labour market regulations and high fixed costs have impeded employment growth in the private service sector. The consequence has been increasing unemployment, “welfare without work” (Merrien 2002: 225), and a sharp division between insiders and outsiders. In liberal regimes with strong budgetary restraints on public expenditure, employment in the service sector has been expanding at low-wage levels, causing mounting poverty and inequality because of weak social protection (Pierson 1998: 543–545; Merrien: Ibid.).

Changes, while reflecting the differences of the welfare regimes, have generally been incremental and centristic (Pierson 1998: 554). Change has taken the form of re-commodification of former de-commodified welfare provisions, the form of cost-containment in order to prevent tax increases, and the form of reforms, either as rationalization, where welfare programs have been modified according to new ideas, or as updating programs to meet changing societal demands and norms (Pierson 2002: 377 ff). Liberal welfare regimes have focused on re-commodification and cost containment, the social democratic regimes on cost containment and rationalizing reform, and the conservative regimes on cost containment and updating (Ibid. 402).

**Globalization and welfare regimes**

Just as the welfare regimes have responded differently to the same internal forces of change, so they have responded differently to processes of globalization. Globalization is not a unitary process affecting different welfare regimes differently; rather, globalization means different things to different regimes. Different “dimensions of globalization create different ‘pressure points’ on different welfare states, according to their specific institutional features” (Palier & Sykes 2001: 10). Globalization and welfare regimes are in “reciprocal interaction” (Ibid. 12).

Thus for instance, globalization has put especially small European welfare states under pressure in regard to mobile taxation objects. Taxation objects may be more or less mobile, and the more mobile the more welfare states may compete among each others on lowering taxes, such as taxes on capital, companies and commodities (in case of border trade). Taxes on companies have been lowered from an average of 50% to an average of 30% among small European states from 1985 to 2004 (Andersen 2004: 150).

Regarding labour and wages, it is often held that globalization has put the low-skilled and labour-intensive mass-production sectors under pressure from competition from especially Asian countries. This however, has mainly been of substantial importance in the liberal regimes of USA and UK, where comparatively low skilled, mass-production industry has dominated traditionally (Esping-Andersen 1999: 102). In general the regimes have reacted differently to such pressures. Conservative regimes have opted for an exit strategy enabling workers to leave the labour market, liberal regimes have employed a wage deregulation strategy to
bring down relative wage costs, and social democratic regimes have responded by retraining programs and the provision of welfare state jobs (Palier & Sykes 2001: 9).

Globalization also means mobility of people. High mobility of people between welfare states will be a threat to the tax base of the welfare states, if people move towards lower taxes. However, in the EU-context, which implies free mobility for labour-power, such mobility still is very low (Andersen 2002: 26). Labour-power mobility thus far has not been a threat to keeping up the differences in taxation levels between the different welfare regimes, even if some high-income groups may have increased their mobility (Ibid. 28). Yet, even if labour-power mobility has been low, job mobility has been increasing due to the global integration of product markets, which has made it less important than before where products are produced. This may put a pressure on the tax base of high-tax welfare states (high taxes reflected in high wages), but also induce such welfare states to increase the educational level of the labour-power in order to attract high-wage jobs. Such a strategy will hold as long as labour-power mobility is comparatively low (Ibid. 33).

In general, globalization should not be seen as only a threat to welfare states. On the contrary, the small European welfare states have always operated in open economies. It was precisely because of the international vulnerability that the small European economies spearheaded strong worker protection and welfare guarantees (Esping-Andersen 1999: 102). Even if mobility, not least of all job mobility, has been increasing during the last 20 years, a stable welfare state may still be an advantage in the global economy in so far as the advantages of predictable models of wage regulation linked to productivity and competitiveness, a highly skilled and productive work force, and low levels of social conflict, may surpass the disinclination of global mobile capital to invest due to the scope of the public sector or high levels of wages (Merrien 2002: 224).

Migration, social citizenship and welfare

This being said, globalization must be expected to have an influence on the relationship between citizenship and welfare. As mentioned above, welfare is primarily a nation-state phenomenon, linked to nation-state solidarity and community. Citizenship also is still primarily a nation-state phenomenon. Under the pressure from globalization processes the frame of citizenship is, however, in certain respects becoming “denationalized” (Sassen 2004: 179). This happens in two ways, outwards and inwards. The outward denationalization of citizenship mainly takes the form of the ‘augmentation’ of citizenship rights with human rights as formalised in international codes and laws (Turner 2001: 203, Urry 2000: 166). Human rights are conferred upon people as humans irrespective of national citizenship, and people thus can claim human rights even when they are stateless people and disposessed refugees (Turner 2000: 134). Globalization thus involves “the growing importance of human rights over nation-state citizenship rights” (Ibid. 135), for which reason they are also often seen as replacing citizenship rights (Soysal 1994, cf. the critique of this position in Faulks 2000: 142 ff). Inwardly the denationalization of citizenship takes the form of granting social rights to non-citizens and in some cases also political rights at the local level (Ghiraudon 2002). In other cases legal status is granted to illegal immigrants due to the recognition of their practices in the residential community as citizenship practices (Sassen 2004: 187). Further, dual or multiple citizenships are increasingly being recognized (Turner 2002: 58).

Such changes create a solidarity problem for the universalistic model of welfare provision. This regime builds on an implicit solidarity contract for whole life spans. As an example the provision of education by public finance is premised on the condition of a later payback by taxation on higher income. With high mobility among educated people, there will be an economic incitement to move to countries with another welfare model. On the other hand the universalistic model will attract people with needs that can be fulfilled by the welfare regime, without participating in the public financing (Andersen 2002: 35). This will most often be the case for low-income groups, while the former applies to high-income groups (Ibid. 28).

This problem clearly shows that welfare as related
to the nation-state and social citizenship implies a distinction between inclusion and exclusion. Citizenship “creates an internal space of social rights and solidarity, and thus an external, exclusionary force of non-membership” (Turner 2000: 135). Paradoxically, then, the universalistic regime of welfare provision as linked to nation-state citizenship is presumably also the most exclusionary regime.

Seen in this perspective the social democratic regime may come under pressure from globalization processes and the denationalization of citizenship to move towards insurance and corporate community based systems of welfare provision. In such systems provision and payment are more directly connected and therefore less demanding in regard to nation-state based principles of solidarity (Andersen 2002: 35, Abrahamson & Borchorst 2001: 50).

Another possibility is that solidarity based on nation-state citizenship will be strengthened by inhibiting immigration and weakening the provision of welfare for non-citizens as much as possible within the limits of the human rights conventions. Until recently legal immigrants to EU-countries have enjoyed the same social rights as nationals, even if the political climate from 1970 onwards has been increasingly hostile to immigrants. When family reunifications took place, foreigners’ contributions to the welfare state no longer outweighed the benefits they received. Yet they gained social rights and in some cases also local political rights as in the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark (Guiraudon 2002: 129). The explanation can be found in the administrative and juridical apparatuses. Relatively insulated from electoral politics they extended the prevailing national social rights to foreigners (Ibid. 130).

This insulation from electoral politics was broken during the 1990s. What followed was a much more restrictive politics towards immigrants and a revitalization of the notion of welfare for nation-state citizens. In the Danish case such “universalistic-excluding” policies of “Danish Welfare for the Danes” has been strongly promoted by the Danish Peoples Party, recently with considerable political influence. Significantly, in the World Value Survey conducted in 1990 among the European peoples, it was precisely the people of the Nordic countries that considered themselves more as nationalists than as cosmopolitans. While in Western Europe the ratio between cosmopolitans and nationalists was between 1:1 and 1:2, in Scandinavia it was about 1:3 (Urry 2000: 178). Such processes exemplify the observation by Manuel Castells that the weakening of national sovereignty by supranational EU-institutions and the coming of immigrants consolidating multi-cultural and multi-ethnic communities in most Western European Countries, leads to a strengthening of territorially defined identities (Castells 1994: 24).

**Globalization, segretation and the welfare city**

The impact of globalization on welfare cities is as diverse as on the regimes of welfare. Some general tendencies, though, seem to have been prevailing. The increasing integration of urban economies into the global economy has accentuated the importance of urban areas as central loci of economic growth. Cities have entered an inter-urban competition in regard to differentiating from each other. Whereas in the modern welfare city within the confines of the nation state cities should provide similar welfare goods and services, wherever people moved, in the global economic space the point of cities is to make a difference that makes a difference. In global economic space cities should be “branded”.

This shift can be seen as a shift in urban politics from policies dominated by welfare issues to urban policies dominated by issues of economic growth, changing the welfare city into an ‘entrepreneurial city’ focused on public support of private enterprise, new infrastructure, attractive housing, cultural institutions and privatization of public service (Sehested 2003: 13). With the diversity of welfare regimes and their different ways of responding in sticky ways to irresistible pressures in mind, we consider such changes as modifications of the welfare city, as the emergence of an ‘entrepreneurial welfare city that can take different forms in different welfare regimes. Also employment policies are welfare policies, welfare can be provided in many forms, as public-private cooperation and in market forms (Bailey 2001), and entrepreneurial policies and welfare policies do not exclude each other (Sehested 2003: 15).
a global economy a stable welfare regime may be an advantage and the same may be true for a welfare city. As an example, the Liberal major of the city of Aarhus, Denmark, in a recent discussion in local television on local politics on the one hand stressed entrepreneurial issues: the necessity of branding Aarhus as a centre for culture and research and of establishing a common value foundation for urban politics. On the other hand the emphasis was on traditional welfare issues: the necessity of finding new ways of public participation in planning and, when asked about her picture of Aarhus in 20 years, that Aarhus hopefully still will be a city characterized by good living conditions for children, the young, the mid-aged and the elderly.

It is often stressed that social polarization has been increasing in the urban areas of the global economic space. The main examples have been global cities like New York or Los Angeles, where globalization has caused dramatic growth in financial and business services and a rapid decline of manufacturing industry. Service sector employment shows a sharper division between high- and low paying jobs than employment in manufacturing industry. This division is reinforced by the derivative rise of low-skilled and low-wage service jobs in hotels, catering, cleaning, personal services etc. and the rise of a “downgraded” manufacturing sector with informal and sweated low-skill and low-paid work, often immigrant labour. In this way the social structure has been polarised: the middle has declined and the top and the bottom has shown absolute growth (Sassen 1991 as quoted in Hamnett 2001: 165).

This polarized picture may be true for some global cities in the USA, but it has been seriously questioned in the case of Europe. London, Paris, the Randstad in Holland and Copenhagen has been shown not to exhibit such social polarization (Hamnett 2001, Preteceille 1997, Andersen & Clark, 2003). Rather, post-industrialization here has caused an upward shift in the social structure, with rising employment for managers and professionals of diverse kinds and decline for unskilled labour. Rather than a polarization a “professionalization” of the social structure has taken place in such cities (Hamnett 2001: 170). In the Copenhagen region there have in the period 1981–1997 been no signs of income polarization. On the contrary, lower individual incomes have shown the highest rate of growth, due to income transfers from the welfare state (Andersen (forthcoming): 7). In so far the Copenhagen example confirms the general statement by Lehto that within European welfare states the Scandinavian welfare states have shown lower poverty rates and income differentials, than the rest of Europe (Lehto 2000: 117).

Social polarization, then, is not a necessary consequence of globalization. Here welfare policies matter. Neither can spatial polarization be directly read of from social polarization. Spatial polarization has in fact been increasing in Scandinavia, even if social polarization has not (Andersen (forthcoming), Andersen & Clark). Copenhagen area income differences between neighbourhoods have grown considerably from 1981 to 1997. Neighbourhoods already concentrating very high incomes have continued to do so and have increased in number, just as well as the number of neighbourhoods with very low levels of income has been rising. In such neighbourhoods immigrants and refugees are also concentrated. The decisive factor in this polarization has been the unequal distribution of high-income earners (Andersen (forthcoming): 10). This also counts for the other Scandinavian countries.
(Andersen & Clark 2003). In regard to spatial segregation, the social democratic welfare city has become polarized. Precisely the welfare policies of an earlier period have provided the material conditions for this: the functionalist housing estates on the one hand, and public supported private welfare in the form of tax reductions on ownership housing on the other (Ibid. 98 f). The former now concentrates low-income groups and immigrants, the latter middle- and high-income groups.

The new urban question

In the spatial polarization of the welfare city Jacques Donzelot sees a new urban question. If the urban question of the early welfare city was formulated by Manuel Castells as the question of the city as the spatial location of the public provision of welfare goods and services for labour-power and the related urban struggles, then the falling apart of the welfare city into unconnected fragments and the urban problems related to this situation, is the new urban question (Donzelot 1999). Spatially, urban regions are today not only segregated, but separated, splintered (May et al. 1998, Graham & Marvin 2001) into different kinds of spatial enclaves for different kinds of social lives, unrelated to each other. Urban segregation has turned into urban secession (Donzelot 1999: 109). On the one hand the disordered, violent life in the social or ethnical ghettoes, on the other hand the “vie affinitaire” in the suburbs and gated communities for those who have the means to choose in the ‘autonomous’ way of the free market, similar people as neighbours (Ibid. 98–106). In this process where the latter are consciously fleeing the former, the poor become “more poor and more violent, the rich, more distant, less solidary” (Ibid. 106).

According to Donzelot, urban policies answering to this situation must confront this mechanism of circular reinforcement of the “in-civil society” and “affinitary urbanism”. There is no perfect solution to this problem, but he points to the USA for relevant experiences. The problem of security and the problem of distribution of wealth are tackled by public and private investment into the empowerment of inner city areas (Ibid. 113). Community development corporations focus on the physical rehabilitation of degraded neighbourhoods as a means to restoring communitarian life (Donzelot 2003: 137–40, Donzelot et.al. 2003).

Empowerment strategies have also been used in the Scandinavian context (Andersen et. al. 2003, Sehested (ed.) 2003). The question however is if Donzelot has located the urban question for the contemporary welfare city. No doubt that spatial polarization is a major contemporary problem for all types of welfare cities, and perhaps the major problem for the liberal welfare city (Musterd & de Winter 1998). Spatial polarization can be destabilizing for the solidarity basis of the welfare city precisely because of the secession of urban spaces and populations. However, the secession thesis is problematical in two ways: the gated communities and their inhabitants are highly dependent on the surrounding urban fabric, and the fragmented urban landscapes show a multiplicity of ways and spaces of living and working that are interlinked by infrastructural networks and mobilities (Ascher & Godard 1999: 179).

This points to a new underlying question of solidarity.

In the new urban regions social networks are neither strong in the mechanical sense of Durkheim, i.e. marked by strong, but few links to similar people, nor strong in the organic sense of Durkheim, i.e. marked by strong, but diversified links within a division of labour. As mentioned above organic solidarity is founding the Marshallian social citizenship (Loftager 2003) and thus also the urban citizenship of the national, industrial and social democratic welfare city. But the paradox of the welfare state, not least the universalistic type, is that it includes a tendency towards undermining its own basis of solidarity. It produces individualization precisely by caring for the problems of redistribution and risk (Ascher & Godard 1999: 183). This does not, however, make the concept of solidarity irrelevant. In view of the stickiness of the welfare state it rather calls for another, a third conception of solidarity, a solidarity based on a multiplicity of weak, changing and diversified links that associates individuals to different social networks (Ibid. 184).

If the basis of solidarity for welfare in general and for urban welfare in particular is shifting in the direction of a third solidarity, then this perhaps should be considered as the new urban question for the welfare city,
at least for the universalistic one. Which urban policies are possible and appropriate on such a background? Further, what kind of citizenship does it call for? Isn’t it the ironical kind of citizenship that Bryan S. Turner (2000, 2002) is arguing for in the context of globalization: a cosmopolitan citizenship marked by cool loyalties and thin patterns of solidarity? Cool loyalties, but not disloyalty towards a national culture, marked by the ironic ability to reflexively distance oneself from one’s own culture, making the respect for others possible without disloyalty towards one’s own background. And thin patterns of solidarity like e-mail friendships.

This very much looks like the social relations Georg Simmel in his classical essay on the metropolis and urban life (1950) characterized as specific for the metropolis. Citizenship, welfare and cities may be on the verge of a new amalgamation.

References

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